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Executive summary
This study is centred on the concept of allocative efficiency and pro-
vides an analysis of the phenomenon of under-aided countries, sectors 
and sub-national regions. Against the current backdrop of declining aid 
budgets, the efficient allocation of aid is of crucial importance for aid 
effectiveness. Aid effectiveness depends not only on how well resources 
are used, but also on how efficiently they are allocated across recipients 
and uses. Efficient allocation of aid can be seen as a problem of oppor-
tunity costs that becomes more urgent when resources become scarcer.
The phenomenon of “under-aided” recipients is thus attracting increas-
ing attention in both development theory and practice, as the existence 
of “aid orphans” points to inefficiencies in the overall allocation of aid 
resources. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) calls attention to the fact that the phenomenon not only 
concerns countries receiving insufficient aid, but also neglected sectors 
and geographical regions within recipient countries.
The discussion on under-aided recipients takes place in the broader con-
text of donors’ commitments in various international forums in Paris 
(2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) to improve aid effectiveness 
through a better division of labour (DoL) at the international, in-country 
and sector levels. Among other things, DoL aims at reducing the num-
ber of donors in overcrowded “aid darling” countries and sectors, while 
increasing engagement in “aid orphans”. As stated in the Accra Agenda 
for Action (AAA §17), DoL is aimed at achieving “[i]mproved allocation 
of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries”. At 
the same time, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA § 17a) also states that 
“[n]ew arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individ-
ual developing countries receiving less aid” (AAA § 17a). At the 2011 
Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, donors committed them-
selves in the Busan Partnership document (BPd) to “accelerate efforts to 
address the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance, agree-
ing – by end of 2012 – on principles that will guide our actions to address 
this challenge” (BPd §25c).
However, no such principles have been agreed on so far. The lack of 
clear guidelines for aid allocation makes it difficult to define what 
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“under-aided” means, and thus to identify countries that might be receiv-
ing insufficient aid. In the case of under-aided sectors or sub-national 
regions, such judgments become even more difficult. Achieving alloca-
tive efficiency requires comparing the impact of aid across recipients and 
uses and allocating resources where they promise the highest returns. 
However, such comparisons are, theoretically and empirically, extremely 
difficult, and made even more complex by the existence of spillovers 
across countries and sectors. Thus, for the moment, no “optimal aid allo-
cation” has been determined.
Therefore, the phenomenon of “under-aided” countries, sectors and sub- 
national regions is still a very elusive one. It is thus important to under-
stand how under-aided recipients might be identified, and to get a better 
grasp of the nature and the extent of the problem, as well as of its causes.
Under-aided countries
The possible existence of under-aided countries causes concern about 
the efficiency of current overall aid allocation for several reasons: first, 
many authors argue that potential efficiency gains could be reaped by 
reallocating aid from relatively over-aided to relatively under-aided 
countries. Second, there is the perception that the poorest and most vul-
nerable countries are being abandoned by donors. Third, neglecting some 
recipients can generate negative cross-border spillovers that threaten the 
effectiveness of aid programmes in other countries and undermine the 
achievement of global public goods.
Aid is not the only resource that can be harnessed to achieve develop-
ment goals. Domestic resources, migrants’ remittances or private invest-
ment flows might sometimes be better suited for meeting the financing 
needs of developing countries. In some cases, excessive quantities of aid 
– or aid badly delivered – might even negatively affect development out-
comes. While it is important to keep in mind that more aid is not always 
better, this consideration underlines the importance of an efficient alloca-
tion of aid both across and within countries.
In academic and policy papers, the problem of “aid orphans” is generally 
mentioned only in passing and without specifying what is meant by the 
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term. Indeed, there is still no agreed definition of what constitutes an “aid 
orphan”, or agreement on which criteria should be used to assess whether 
a country is receiving “insufficient” amounts of aid. Proponents of needs-
based approaches to aid allocation will argue that the poorest countries 
that receive small shares of aid are under-aided with respect to their 
needs. On the other hand, supporters of a performance-based approach to 
aid allocation will argue that more resources should be directed to strong 
performers that are considered able to use aid effectively. Because there 
is no universally accepted optimal allocation against which to assess the 
actual distribution of aid, there is also no consensus on what constitutes 
an aid orphan.
In 2010 the OECD proposed a methodology that compares actual aid allo-
cations to low-income countries against four different aid allocation for-
mulas drawn from both needs-based and performance-based approaches 
to aid allocation. By combining needs-based and performance-based 
approaches, the OECD started regularly compiling a “watch list” with 
countries that might be considered under-aided according to at least 
two different allocation models. By showing that it is possible to iden-
tify recipients that can be considered under-aided according to different 
allocation approaches, the OECD watch list provides a helpful basis for 
discussing the phenomenon of under-aided countries.
If one accepts the OECD list of potentially under-aided countries, it 
appears that the group of “aid orphans” is composed in large part of frag-
ile states in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, given that the share of 
aid going to fragile countries has actually been growing in recent years, 
the problem of being under-aided seems to concern a sub-set of fragile 
states, rather than the group as a whole.
The existence of under-aided countries is not attributable to one major 
trend influencing overall aid allocations, but rather to a combination of 
different factors. There are a plethora of different approaches, goals and 
interests that produce current allocation patterns. On the one hand, a gen-
eral move towards greater performance-based selectivity induces donors 
to direct lower volumes of aid to countries with relatively bad institu-
tions. On the other hand, needs still play an important role in determining 
aid allocations, and there is also an increasing attention to fragile states. 
Finally, donors’ political and commercial interests – and their historical 
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ties with specific developing countries – influence resource distribution 
as well. This produces a complex pattern of aid allocation, which benefits 
well-run countries but also low-performing ones that have a particular 
importance for donors from a security, political, commercial or historical 
point of view. Countries that could use aid effectively but that do not fall 
into one of these categories might thus not receive sufficient aid.
The lower attractiveness of some recipients for donors combines with a 
general lack of coordination among donors, which produces inefficient 
concentrations of resources in some “darling” countries while other 
recipients that also have relatively high needs and performance remain 
neglected. This is mainly due to the fact that donors do not take into 
account other donors’ allocations into their own allocation criteria and 
procedures. Lack of donor coordination might become an even more 
serious problem for allocative efficiency in the context of initiatives to 
reduce aid fragmentation. Donors’ efforts to concentrate their aid in a 
limited group of partner countries might cause a worsening of the aid 
orphans phenomenon if concentration is uncoordinated and all donors 
choose the same partner countries.
The phenomenon of under-aided countries is attributable predominantly 
to neglect by bilateral donors. Multilateral donors appear to be less biased 
against countries with relatively bad institutions, as well as less influ-
enced by commercial, political and historical factors in their aid allo-
cations. Allocations by multilateral donors seem to be, to some extent, 
compensating for neglect by bilateral donors, but only in some coun-
tries, and often not enough. Their compensatory role does not appear to 
be driven by a conscious effort to allocate larger shares of their aid to 
countries that receive disproportionally low amounts of aid from bilateral 
donors, but is rather a result of the use of allocation formulas.
Non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors may also be 
compensating for the relative neglect by DAC donors by allocating larger 
shares of aid to under-aided countries. However, the role of Arab and 
Latin American donors in countries identified as “under-aided” appears 
to be rather limited, as both groups focus predominantly on their neigh-
bours, whereas the countries in the OECD watch list are located in SSA 
and in South East Asia. New Asian donors, on the other hand, some-
times focus on fragile states that appear to receive relatively low shares of 
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DAC aid. As for private aid, the little evidence available on its allocation 
does not suggest that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or private 
foundations might be targeting countries neglected by official donors.
In conclusion, the existence of countries that can be considered under-
aided with respect to both needs and performance points to underly-
ing weaknesses in the aid architecture. In particular, the phenomenon 
exposes a general lack of coordination among donors concerning 
allocation decisions, and a reluctance by bilateral donors to engage in 
low-performing countries that have limited strategic importance for 
donors.
Under-aided sectors
The existence of under-aided sectors can undermine aid effectiveness for 
two main reasons: first, aid might be very effective in currently neglected 
sectors. Because of decreasing returns to scale and high transaction costs 
in sectors where large numbers of donors are engaged, “orphan” sectors 
might present better opportunities for effective aid interventions. Second, 
the existence of spillovers across sectors suggests that neglecting certain 
areas might have negative consequences on the development of a country 
as a whole, and even undermine progress in the targeted sectors.
Defining an under-aided sector is a difficult task. Adopting needs- or 
 performance-based approaches would require comparing the need for – 
or the impact of – aid across different sectors. However, this is almost 
impossible. Considering the challenges of comparing performance and 
needs across sectors, the efficiency of sector aid allocation can be assessed 
at the country level, with reference to its alignment to recipient coun-
tries’ national development strategies. A sector would thus be considered 
under-aided if the gap between the external funding envisaged for that 
sector in national strategy papers and the aid volume actually received 
is substantially larger than for other sectors. Such an approach implies 
that the identification of “under-aided” sectors will be country-specific. 
However, donor preferences tend to be similar across countries and some 
sectors (such as agriculture, productive infrastructure, and water and san-
itation) tend to attract fewer donors and to receive disproportionally low 
amounts of aid in many countries.
Elena Pietschmann
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)6
As was the case for under-aided countries, the relative neglect of some 
sectors is the result of a number of different factors. The need to produce 
visible results induces donors to choose interventions with the highest 
visibility in order to demonstrate the successes of their engagement and 
guarantee continued funding. Concerns about visibility play a role in the 
relative neglect of some sectors, not only because they make the less- 
visible sectors unattractive, but also because – by making donors reluctant 
to exit visible sectors – they pose serious obstacles for the achievement 
of in-country DoL. Donors’ cross-sector aid allocation is also influenced 
by factors such as commercial interests, the quest for energy security, the 
fight against illegal immigration, the attempt to avoid the spread of infec-
tious diseases, etc. The lack of clear links with these objectives might 
make some sectors less attractive than others for donors. Moreover, the 
absence of strong national and international institutions responsible for 
a certain area can result in some sectors being left out of the develop-
ment agenda. Another reason for donors to direct low shares of aid to 
a sector might be the perception that aid programmes in that sector are 
not particularly effective. Finally, risk-pooling and herding behaviour can 
also induce donors to focus on the same sectors while neglecting others. 
These different factors often influence one another. For example, the lack 
of clear links with well-being in donor countries might hinder the emer-
gence of strong advocacy campaigns and the creation of international 
institutions that could increase taxpayers’ support for interventions in a 
specific sector. In turn, this makes the sector less relevant in terms of 
visibility.
Sectors neglected by DAC donors sometimes receive funding from 
emerging and private donors whose priorities and allocation patterns dif-
fer to some extent from those of traditional donors. Notably, emerging 
donors tend to focus on the sectors of productive infrastructure and agri-
culture. But this compensatory role does not appear to be sufficient or to 
cover all under-aided sectors, and non-DAC donors are not active in all 
countries.
Steps have been taken towards the establishment of an in-country DoL 
that aims at addressing the problem of darling and orphan sectors. How-
ever, the lack of incentives both on the donors’ and on the recipients’ side 
has largely hampered implementation of DoL arrangements.
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Under-aided sub-national regions
From an aid-effectiveness perspective it is not sufficient to look at coun-
tries only, because countries often include a wide variety of different 
regions with different characteristics and degrees of need. Not differenti-
ating between areas within a country bears the risk of overlooking areas 
where aid could be particularly effective and missing opportunities for a 
more efficient allocation of aid. Moreover, uncoordinated donors might 
be focusing on the same regions while neglecting others, leading to an 
inefficient allocation of the total country envelope. There might thus be 
under-aided regions even in countries receiving relatively large amounts 
of aid. If donors fail to coordinate the distribution of their aid across 
sub-national regions as well as across countries and sectors, this would 
imply that the costs from the lack of coordination are even higher than 
currently estimated.
Besides its relevance for the efficiency of country-level aid allocation, 
sub-national allocation patterns are also relevant from a risk-perspective. 
Inequalities in the distribution of domestic and foreign resources across 
a country’s territory can easily create tensions between regions and even 
lead to conflict. Regional inequalities are especially dangerous when they 
coincide with divisions along ethnic or religious lines. Given that for-
eign aid accounts for a sometimes very large percentage of government 
expenditures, aid might have an important role in this respect. However, 
donors’ influence on the direction of aid flows at the sub-national level 
might be limited due to both their desire to promote ownership, and to 
aid fungibility.
Some key issues that donors might consider when allocating aid at the 
sub-national level include the degree of need in various regions, the 
degree and nature of spillovers between urban and rural areas, the partner 
government’s resource allocation patterns, allocation patterns by other 
donors active in the same country and the existence of inter-regional ten-
sions.
Despite its importance for aid effectiveness, the distribution of aid across 
sub-national regions receives very little attention in both development 
theory and practice. It is absent from papers and discussions on aid allo-
cation. It is not mentioned in most donors’ policy documents and does 
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not appear to be an integral part of DoL efforts. Moreover, development 
targets and country aid allocation formulas are based on national aver-
ages, which might set perverse incentives for donors and recipient gov-
ernments to neglect certain regions.
Evidence on country-level geographical aid allocation is very scarce. 
There is evidence of insufficient attention being given to the cross- 
regional distribution of aid in several post-conflict countries. But, in 
general, the review of available evidence on sub-national aid allocation 
paints a mixed – and certainly incomplete – picture. Further research is 
needed before the efficiency of current sub-national aid allocation pat-
terns can be assessed.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Similarities and interrelations can be identified between the phenomena 
of under-aided countries, sectors and sub-national regions. Some recip-
ients are less attractive than others for donors. This can be due to the 
relatively greater challenges associated with delivering aid to some coun-
tries, sectors or regions, but it can also be linked to the low priority some 
recipients or sectors represent in donors’ eyes. Combined with a lack 
of coordination among development actors, this can lead to the relative 
under-funding of some recipients, thereby undermining the efficiency of 
overall aid allocation.
Donors should make increased efforts for addressing the challenges asso-
ciated with delivering aid to certain countries / sectors / regions. In this 
sense, the focus should be on finding the right type of aid and delivery 
channel, rather than on increasing aid volumes. Concerning aid volumes, 
donor coordination in aid allocations is key. Ongoing efforts to achieve 
a better DoL at all levels represent an important step in this direction. 
However, DoL processes also require donors to reduce the number of 
countries and sectors they are engaged in. This risks exacerbating the 
problem of under-aided recipients if specialisation occurs without coor-
dination among donors. If DoL processes are to tackle the problem of aid 
orphans, it is crucial that the two processes of donor specialisation and 
coordination go hand in hand.
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To improve coordination in aid allocation, all donors should report their 
forward spending plans to the OECD and allow the latter to make them 
public. To the extent possible, donors should also take each others’ allo-
cations into account when deciding on the distribution of their aid. Inef-
ficiencies in aid allocation at all levels are often linked to the influence 
of donors’ strategic interests in the distribution of aid. Therefore, donors 
should adopt clear allocation formulas based on needs, on performance 
or on other efficiency considerations. The use of allocation formulas does 
not guarantee that allocation decisions will be insulated from strategic 
interests, since the weights and indicators used in the formula can be 
modified in order to suit those interests. However, the adoption of clear 
allocation criteria could make politically-driven allocations more diffi-
cult to justify.
Acquiring better information on aid volumes received by countries, sec-
tors and regions will help in drawing attention to recipients that are get-
ting disproportionally low volumes of aid. However, because of the diffi-
culty to define what “insufficient aid” means, donors should avoid “auto-
matically” allocating more aid to the country / sector / region identified 
as potentially under-aided. Rather, identification of potentially under-
aided recipients or sectors should be followed by detailed case studies 
that highlight the risks and opportunities of directing larger volumes of 
aid to those recipients / sectors.
Greater transparency in aid allocations could help in making progress 
on all of the dimensions discussed above. First, it would facilitate donor 
coordination by allowing donors to take each others’ allocations into 
account in their own funding decisions. Second, it would facilitate the 
identification of under-aided countries, sectors or sub-national regions. 
Third, it would provide partner governments and the civil society in both 
recipient and donor countries with the necessary information to raise 
questions and demand accountability when the distribution of aid seems 
to be driven by strategic interests rather than by efficiency considerations.
Given their increasing relevance, non-DAC official and private donors 
should disclose more information on aid allocations as well. Here, the 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 
could play an important role. Capitalising on its inclusive character, the 
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GPEDC could foster greater engagement by non-traditional donors in 
information-sharing and coordination efforts.
Some interrelations exist between DoL processes taking place at differ-
ent levels. For example, international DoL might result in the emergence 
of orphan sectors or regions within countries where donor exits occur. 
Thus, a well-developed in-country coordination mechanism must be in 
place in order to make sure that remaining donors fill in the funding gaps 
that might result in some sectors or regions. The more advanced donors’ 
sectoral or regional specialisation, the more likely it will be that a donor’s 
exit from the country will have a serious impact on funding received by 
the sectors or regions that used to be covered by the exiting donor. Com-
bining cross-country, in-country and cross-sector DoL can be challeng-
ing. For example, a donor’s sectoral specialisation might not always be 
in line with the different national priorities of the recipient countries the 
donor chooses to focus on. The existence of linkages and possible trade-
offs between different levels of aid allocation underlines the importance 
of implementing the three aspects of DoL in an integrated way, rather 
than independently from each other.
Overall, the phenomenon of under-aided countries, sectors and sub- 
national regions is a result of the slow pace at which donor coordina-
tion, harmonisation and alignment are progressing. It will thus not be 
sufficient to develop ad hoc solutions for directing larger amounts of aid 
to the specific countries / sectors / regions that will, from time to time, 
be identified as under-aided. Rather, the international community should 
address the underlying weaknesses in the aid architecture, of which aid 
orphans are just a symptom. This will be more challenging, but it is also 
likely to bring benefits that go beyond the phenomenon of aid orphans to 
other dimensions of aid effectiveness.
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1 Introduction
This study is centred on the concept of allocative efficiency and provides 
an analysis of the phenomenon of under-aided countries, sectors and sub- 
national regions. Against the current backdrop of declining aid budgets 
(OECD 2012b, 15–16), the efficient allocation of aid is of crucial impor-
tance for aid effectiveness. Aid effectiveness depends not only on how well 
resources are used, but also on how efficiently they are allocated across 
recipients and uses (Bourguignon / Platteau 2012, 4). The issue of “under-
aided” recipients is thus attracting increasing attention in both development 
theory and practice, as the possible existence of “aid orphans” would imply 
inefficiencies in the overall allocation of aid resources: first, many authors 
argue that potential efficiency gains could be reaped by reallocating aid from 
relatively over-aided to relatively under-aided countries (e.g. Bigsten / Plat-
teau / Tengstam 2011; Bigsten / Tengstam 2012; Utz 2010). Second, there 
is the perception that the poorest and most vulnerable countries are being 
abandoned by donors (Mold / Olcer / Prizzon 2008, 2; World Bank 2011a, 
201). Third, neglecting some recipients can generate negative cross-border 
spillovers that threaten the effectiveness of aid programmes in other coun-
tries (World Bank 2002; Marysse / Ansoms / Cassimon 2006, 12; World 
Bank 2011a, 277; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 14) and undermine the 
achievement of global public goods (Gunning 2004, 52).
Despite these concerns, the problem of “aid orphans” is generally men-
tioned in academic and policy papers only in passing and without specifying 
what is meant by the term (Brown / Swiss, forthcoming, 2). At high-level 
international forums on aid effectiveness held in Accra (2008) and Busan 
(2011), the donor community committed to “address the issue of countries 
that receive insufficient aid” (AAA § 17d; BPd § 25c), but without clari-
fying how these countries should be identified. While important steps have 
recently been undertaken by the OECD to identify countries that can be con-
sidered “under-aided” (Utz 2010; OECD 2011c; OECD 2013a), the alloca-
tion patterns and underlying reasons leading to their neglect have not been 
sufficiently explored, and it remains unclear what should be done to address 
the problem of under-aided recipients.
Existing work has predominantly focused on the issue of under-aided coun-
tries. However, the OECD calls attention to the fact that the phenomenon 
not only concerns countries receiving insufficient aid, but also neglected 
geographical regions within a country, as well as sectors and sub-sectors 
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(2010b, 43). Under-aided sectors or regions might exist even within coun-
tries that receive large amounts of aid. Therefore, it seems necessary to 
broaden the perspective on aid orphans by investigating other relevant – but 
under-researched – dimensions of “orphanhood”.
Extending the analysis to under-aided sectors and sub-national regions is 
important also because the phenomenon of under-aided recipients and uses 
is closely linked to the process of division of labour, which donors have 
committed to implement at multiple levels simultaneously (Schulz 2007, 
2). As stated in the Accra Agenda for Action, DoL is aimed at achieving 
“improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and 
across countries” (AAA §17). It is important to understand how the three 
interconnected processes of cross-country, in-country and cross-sector DoL 
impact on the phenomenon of under-aided recipients at all levels.
The difficulty of defining what “under-aided” means is a recurrent challenge 
throughout the chapters of this study. However, some preliminary clarifica-
tions can already be made: first, the concept is here understood as a relative 
one, meaning that recipients are considered to be under-aided not in abso-
lute terms, but only relative to other recipients. Second, the phenomenon of 
under-aided recipients is discussed from an efficiency rather than from an 
equity perspective. This means that a country / sector / region receiving little 
aid is defined as under-aided only if it is considered able to use additional 
aid effectively. Third, the analysis is limited to development aid1 and does 
not cover other resource flows to developing countries.2 At the same time, 
the availability of other resources beyond aid for financing development 
is one of the criteria that can be used to assess a country’s need for aid. 
Fourth, more aid is not always better. In some cases, too much aid – or aid 
1 Although there is evidence for the existence of aid orphans and darlings regarding the 
distribution of humanitarian aid as well (Vollmer 2012, 51–52; Darcy / Hofmann 2003, 
10), the analysis will be limited to development aid. Humanitarian aid follows other, more 
unpredictable allocation patterns, and its objectives differ from those of development aid 
(Darcy / Hofmann 2003, 9). Moreover, the discussion presented in this study is embedded 
in the context of efforts to rationalise aid allocation, and these initiatives focus predomi-
nantly on development aid.
2 Although the importance of ODA for developing countries is shrinking due to increased 
financial flows generated by foreign direct investments and remittances, for most low- 
income countries, aid continues to be the main source of external financing (OECD 
2012a). This is especially the case for fragile states (OECD 2012a, 45) and low-income 
countries (UN 2011).
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badly delivered – might even negatively affect development outcomes.3 This 
consideration makes it even more important to analyse how aid might be 
allocated efficiently, both across and within countries. Finally, an important 
remark is that the “optimal” amount of aid will also be dependent on the 
type of aid and the delivery channel used. Also, different country character-
istics might call for different types of aid, rather than different aid volumes. 
However, while references to the important link between amount and type of 
aid are made throughout the study, an analysis of “under-aided” recipients 
implies a focus on aid volumes, rather than on aid modalities.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: in the second chap-
ter, a section on ongoing efforts by the international community to ration-
alise aid allocation provides the necessary background for analysing the 
phenomenon of under-aided recipients. The chapter also discusses the con-
cept of allocative efficiency and reviews different existing approaches to 
aid allocation. The third chapter analyses the phenomenon of under-aided 
countries. It reviews efforts to identify countries receiving insufficient aid 
and then focuses on a list of potentially under-aided recipients proposed 
by the OECD (2013a). The analysis then concentrates on allocation pat-
terns that direct aid away from the countries identified as under-aided, and 
discusses the current and potential impact of international DoL efforts on 
the phenomenon of under-aided countries. A fourth chapter focuses on aid 
orphans at the sector level. The chapter deals with the sharp drops in aid 
volumes experienced in certain sectors and with donors’ tendency to con-
centrate in “darling sectors” while neglecting other areas. Reasons behind 
this phenomenon are discussed, as well as possible implications, not only 
for the efficiency of allocation but also in terms of alignment, harmoni-
sation and country ownership. The fifth chapter discusses the importance 
of aid allocation across sub-national regions and identifies approaches that 
might be applied to this level of aid allocation. Following, it reviews avail-
able evidence on the distribution of aid across geographical regions at the 
sub-national level. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented. These 
draw on the similarities between under-aided recipient and their determi-
nants at different levels, and highlight the interrelations between the differ-
ent dimensions of aid allocation.
3 Excessive aid flows might create problems of aid dependency, leading to difficulties 
in macroeconomic management and undermining recipient governments’ incentives to 
strengthen their tax bases and develop accountability to their citizens (Clemens / Radelet 
2003; Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 2006; Moyo 2009).
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Specific policy recommendations for under-aided countries, sectors and 
regions are included at the end of every chapter. The analysis focuses on aid 
allocations by donors reporting to the Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD. However, despite limited availability of information on allo-
cation patterns by non-DAC donors, and due to their growing relevance, 
each chapter also presents a section assessing the role played by emerging 
and private donors in the phenomenon of under-aided recipients.
2 Background and conceptual discussion
2.1 Chapter overview
This chapter aims at setting the stage for an analysis of the phenomenon 
of under-aided recipients. After outlining current efforts undertaken by the 
international community to rationalise aid allocation, it discusses the con-
cept of allocative efficiency. Following, different conceptual approaches to 
aid allocation and their practical implementation are reviewed, as well as the 
trade-offs that might arise between them.
2.2 Background to the study: aid fragmentation and DoL 
initiatives
Recent attention to the phenomenon of under-aided recipients is linked to 
commitments undertaken by the international community to rationalise aid 
allocation. These initiatives are predominantly focused on improving alloca-
tive efficiency through a better DoL at the international, in-country and sector 
levels. While international or cross-country DoL might have important conse-
quences for countries receiving insufficient aid (Utz 2010, 25; OECD 2013a, 
16), the phenomenon of under-aided sectors and sub-national regions is largely 
affected by in-country and sectoral DoL (EC 2007; Frot / Santiso 2010). Links 
between DoL and under-aided recipients are analysed in more detail in later 
chapters. However, a brief overview of current international commitments and 
initiatives to rationalise aid allocation is necessary to understand the context in 
which the discussion on the phenomenon of aid orphans takes place.
Many official donors today give aid to more than a hundred countries (Frot 
2009, 3) and emerging countries and private donors are increasingly engag-
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ing in development cooperation as well (Fengler / Kharas 2011, 6), resulting 
in a very fragmented aid landscape. Fragmentation refers to the problem that 
individual donors tend to be engaged in too many countries, and spread their 
aid across too many sectors, which produces high transaction costs on both 
sides of the aid relationship (OECD 2011d, 3). For donors, spreading their 
aid across too many recipients is inefficient due to the fixed costs associated 
with the planning and the implementation of an aid intervention. For partner 
countries, receiving assistance from large numbers of donors with different 
management practices leads to high administrative burdens. Furthermore, 
the presence of many actors undermines aid effectiveness by blurring lines 
of accountability (Davies / Klasen 2013, 2–3). While an excessively low 
number of donors in each country can also harm aid effectiveness by giving 
the donor monopoly power (Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010; OECD 
2011d), the evidence suggests that substantial savings could come from 
reducing fragmentation and from a better coordinated aid allocation among 
donors, both across and within countries (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 
2011; Bigsten / Tengstam 2012; Knack / Smets 2012; Anderson 2012, 2).
Increasing concerns over the negative impact of fragmentation on aid effec-
tiveness have led donors to commit to – in a series of high-level international 
forums on aid effectiveness in Paris (2005),4 Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) 
– the establishment of a DoL framework across countries, within countries 
and across sectors. These three levels of aid allocation are interconnected 
and mutually influential (Hartmann 2011, 5). DoL refers to the process of 
streamlining and coordinating donor assistance, with the aim of reducing 
transaction costs, avoiding duplication of efforts and ensuring good cover-
age for all recipients and sectors (OECD 2009a). Among other things, this 
requires reducing the number of donors in overcrowded “aid darling” coun-
tries and sectors, while increasing engagement in “aid orphans” (EC 2011, 
3). Both the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership Document 
assert donors’ commitment to “address the issue of countries that receive 
insufficient aid” (AAA § 17d; BPd § 25c). At the same time, however, the 
Accra Agenda for Action (AAA § 17a) also states that “new arrangements 
on the division of labour will not result in individual developing countries 
receiving less aid” (AAA § 17a).
4 The Paris Declaration commits to “[e]liminate duplication of efforts and rationalize donor 
activities to make them as cost-effective as possible” (PD, § 3). These commitments were 
reiterated in Accra and Busan.
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Related to these commitments, in 2007 the European Union (EU) adopted 
the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (CoC), 
which encourages EU donors to concentrate their aid on fewer recipients by 
establishing priority countries for their bilateral aid programmes. The CoC 
also asks donors to specialise in a number of sectors (both within countries 
and globally) where they have stronger expertise and a comparative advan-
tage, while becoming a “silent partner” (i.e. delegating their assistance to 
other donors) in other sectors. Specialisation is supposed to be pursued in 
close coordination with other donors (EC 2007). Similar recommendations 
are expressed in the OECD’s International Good Practice Principles for 
Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity (OECD 2009a).
Since 2008, 14 EU member states and the EU have taken steps to implement 
the CoC in 30 recipient countries in the frame of the European Union’s 
Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour (OECD 2011a, 68). Among 
the different dimensions of DoL, donors have focused predominantly on 
in-country DoL, perceived as politically less sensitive than cross-country 
DoL (Corre / Mackie / Trenner 2008, 22; Grimm / Schulz 2009; Mackie 
2013, 4–5). However, progress on DoL has been slow and is currently stall-
ing, both across and within countries (EC 2011, 7; Mackie 2013, 15).
2.3 The concept of allocative efficiency and why it matters 
for aid effectiveness
Discussions on how to rationalise aid allocation held at high-level forums 
on aid effectiveness underline the close link between aid allocation and the 
aid-effectiveness agenda. Indeed, aid effectiveness depends not only on 
adopting the right aid modalities, but also on how well aid resources are 
allocated across recipients and uses. Tierney et al. (2011, 11) even argue 
that the efficient allocation of aid is “the most important link in the chain 
of aid effectiveness.” Allocative efficiency (aid is allocated where it has the 
largest impact) is distinct from operational efficiency, which refers mainly 
to aid modalities (resources are used in a way that maximises results per 
unit of spending) (IDD and associates 2007, 37). Both are important for aid 
effectiveness.
An efficient allocation is not necessarily an equitable or a balanced one 
(Guillaumont 2008, 26). The phenomenon of under-aided recipients and 
uses can be discussed from an equity or from an efficiency perspective. 
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Based on normative considerations, it can be argued (Llavador / Roemer 
2001; Cogneau / Naudet 2004) that cross-country aid allocations should 
strive to establish equal opportunities for countries to achieve poverty 
reduction. From this perspective, aid allocation should be guided by the 
aim of achieving redistributive justice across countries, rather than by the 
objective of having the largest possible global impact on poverty reduction 
and other developmental goals. In the framework of the aid-effectiveness 
agenda, however, it is more relevant to analyse the problem of aid orphans 
from an efficiency perspective. An “under-aided” recipient should thus not 
be equalled to a country receiving little aid in absolute terms. It might be 
efficient to allocate only low shares of aid to countries or sectors where it 
is unlikely to have a large impact (Mürle 2007, 28). Countries, sectors or 
sub-national regions receiving little aid are defined as under-aided only if 
these are considered able to use additional aid effectively.
However, achieving allocative efficiency is difficult because it requires com-
paring the impact of aid across recipients and uses and allocating resources 
where they promise the highest returns (Fan / Saurkar / Shields 2009, 526). 
Such comparisons are, theoretically and empirically, extremely problematic, 
and made even more complex by the existence of spillovers across coun-
tries and sectors. Thus, for the moment, no “optimal aid allocation” can be 
determined.
2.4 Different approaches to aid allocation
In the absence of a known “optimal allocation”, different approaches to 
cross-country aid allocation coexist, based either on recipients’ needs or on 
performance. There are valid theoretical arguments for both perspectives, 
and the empirical evidence is insufficient to assess their relative merit (Guil-
laumont 2008; Anderson 2008).
The following sections review both needs- and performance-based 
approaches to aid allocation, identifying first the underlying principles, 
and then giving some examples of their practical implementation. These 
approaches have been developed with reference to cross-country aid allo-
cation. However, later chapters discuss their applicability to the allocation 
of aid resources across sectors and sub-sectors as well as between different 
sub-national entities such as regions, provinces or districts.
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2.4.1 Needs-based allocation principles
The approach to allocate aid according to needs reflects the idea that the 
expected impact of aid is largest where recipients exhibit the greatest need 
for it. However, it is not clear what type of need or deprivation this alloca-
tion should be based on. Needs-based approaches can be based on a large 
variety of different criteria, and these will result in widely varying distribu-
tions of aid across countries.
Country-based needs: Donors could allocate aid according to different 
degrees of need across countries. The term “need” might refer to income 
poverty, but also to other dimensions of human development such as health 
or education (Guillaumont 2008, 16). There are several reasons why direct-
ing larger shares of aid to countries with the highest needs could produce an 
efficient allocation.5
First, because the poorest countries do not have sufficient domestic 
resources to achieve poverty reduction and other development goals on 
their own, aid is considered to make a larger difference there (Wood 2006). 
Ceriani and Verme (2013, 3) argue that donors should consider the distri-
bution of incomes not only below but also above the poverty line, since 
this determines the recipients’ monetary capacity to achieve poverty reduc-
tion via internal redistribution of incomes. Second, aid might have a greater 
developmental impact by raising consumption in stagnant recipients than 
by accelerating growth in countries that would be growing anyway (Carter 
2012, 2). Third, reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
might require focusing on countries that are farther off from MDG targets 
(UN Millennium Project 2005; Bourguignon / Sundberg 2006, 5). Fourth, 
the most deprived recipients can offer the greatest scope for large improve-
ments through cost-effective interventions. Activities in better-off recipients 
are likely to be more costly on average because often the most cost-effective 
interventions have already been implemented (UNICEF 2010, 3).
5 Allocating larger shares of aid to the neediest countries is also argued for by authors tak-
ing an equity approach to aid allocation (e.g. Llavador / Roemer 2001; Cogneau / Naudet 
2004). However, these authors base their argument not on the idea that the impact of aid 
will be larger in the neediest countries, but on the belief that the principle of redistributive 
justice requires allocating larger shares of aid to countries that face greater developmental 
challenges.
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Number of people in need: Rather than considering the needs of coun-
tries at an aggregate level, donors could allocate their aid according to 
the number of people in need who live in them (Development Initiatives 
2013, 95). A very different distribution of aid across countries will emerge 
if donors consider the number of poor people living in a country rather 
than the poverty of the country itself, expressed in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita (Coudouel / Hentschel / Wodon 2002, 30–35). 
This approach might result in large aid shares for middle-income countries 
(MICs), which have more domestic resources to tackle poverty than low- 
income countries (LICs), but also high absolute numbers of people in need. 
Although the poor used to be concentrated predominantly in LICs, the share 
of the world’s poor living in MICs has been rising over the last two decades. 
In 2010, 65.5 per cent of the global population of people living on less than 
US$ 1.25 a day was found in MICs, as compared to only 26.5 per cent in 
2005 (Chandy / Gertz 2011).
However, the distribution of aid across countries based on the number of peo-
ple in need largely varies, depending on which needs are taken into account. 
For example, in 2005 sub-Saharan Africa received 23 per cent of total official 
development assistance (ODA) and East Asia 15 per cent. Were aid alloca-
tions derived from the number of people living on less than US$ 2 a day in 
each region, SSA should have received 17 per cent and East Asia 31 per 
cent. Shifting the poverty line to US$ 1 daily would have resulted in 26 per 
cent for SSA against 23 per cent for East Asia (Kenny 2006, 13–15). Allo-
cating according to the number of people without access to health or educa-
tion would have resulted in yet another, different distribution of ODA shares. 
Although patterns of income poverty tend to resemble patterns of deprivation 
in other dimensions of human development,6 there are important discrepan-
cies as well, especially with regards to education (Sumner / Kanbur 2012, 5).
Density of people in need: There is an argument for directing resources 
predominantly to places where people in need are concentrated, in order 
to exploit economies of scale (Van de Sijpe 2010, 17). It is much more 
6 An analysis carried out by the World Bank showed that substituting “GNI [gross national 
income] per capita” with “under-5 mortality” as a measure for needs in the allocation 
formula used by its International Development Association (IDA) would result in only 
minimal changes to the cross-country allocation of these resources (IDA 2009, 14–15). 
However, this might also be due to the fact that in IDA’s formula, the “needs” compo-
nent plays a small role compared to the “performance” component in determining cross- 
country allocations.
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cost-efficient to provide services in densely populated urban areas than in 
rural ones (Kitchen / Slack 2006, 1).7 Similarly, donors could target densely 
populated countries.
Exceptional needs: Donors might also consider that aid can have a large 
impact in countries that have exceptionally high needs due to special cir-
cumstances. There is evidence that, due to the large financial resources 
needed for reconstruction, aid is particularly effective in promoting growth 
in countries recovering from war, especially between the fourth and the 
seventh year of peace (Collier / Hoeffler 2002, 8–9; Elbadawi / Kaltani / 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Demukaj 2011). Aid is also expected to have a large 
impact in countries whose economies face exogenous shocks in exports 
or in agricultural production. Here, aid can lower the risk of a shortfall of 
resources (Guillaumont 2008, 16; Collier / Dehn 2001, 10; Gunning 2008). 
However, the evidence points merely to a positive impact of aid on eco-
nomic growth in these contexts, whereas the effect on poverty reduction 
and other dimensions of human development is less clear. Moreover, these 
might not be the only circumstances that increase the potential impact of 
aid. Allocating larger shares of aid to countries recovering from war and/or 
affected by structural economic vulnerability would likely result in more aid 
going to fragile states (Guillaumont 2008, 18; McGillivray 2005, 1).
2.4.2 Performance-based allocation principles
The alternative approach is to allocate aid according to recipients’ perfor-
mance, assuming that the impact of aid will be larger if it is allocated to 
countries that are more likely to use it efficiently. Made popular by the World 
Bank’s Assessing Aid report in 1998,8 performance-based approaches to aid 
7 For example, the cost of supplying piped water is, on average, US$ 0.70–0.80 per cubic 
metre in urban areas, as compared with US$ 2 in sparsely populated rural areas (World 
Bank 2013, 9).
8 Based on findings that aid works best in countries with good policies (Burnside / Dollar 
1997), the Assessing Aid report (World Bank 1998, 3) argues that aid should be directed 
in prevalence to poor countries characterised by relatively good governance. Good eco-
nomic and financial policies in the partner country were identified as being particularly 
important for aid to be effective in promoting growth. The report calculated that by chang-
ing the principle guiding aid allocations from equity to performance-based selectivity, 
a US$ 10 billion increase in aid would lift 25 million people a year out of poverty, as 
compared to only 7 million people with equity-based allocations.
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allocation maintain that aid should be allocated predominantly to better- 
governed countries where aid is considered to be more effective (Burn-
side / Dollar 1997; Collier / Dollar 2001). Different performance-based 
approaches consider the following.
Institutional quality: Directing aid predominantly to recipients with rela-
tively good institutions is justifiable because these countries are better able 
to absorb aid and use it efficiently (Carter 2012, 30). The literature empha-
sises different aspects of institutional quality and governance, notably rule 
of law and levels of corruption (Bräutigam 2000); the quality of recipient 
countries’ economic policies (Burnside / Dollar 1997) and budgetary sys-
tems (Bourguignon / Leipziger 2006); the degree of personalism in the 
institutions (Wright 2010); but also the government’s aversion to inequality 
(Kanbur / Tuomala 2003). Depending on the aspect emphasised, this might 
result in different cross-country allocations (Kenny 2006, 7). Following 
these criteria, donors can allocate larger shares of aid to countries that fare 
better in one or all of these dimensions, or even focus exclusively on a small 
selection of countries with strong institutions (McGillivray 2005, 1; Beynon 
2001).
Critics of this type of approach argue that the quality of governance in 
recipient countries should influence the choice of aid instruments and the 
channel of delivery, rather than the volume of aid provided (Guillaumont 
2008, 11; Dietrich 2011). However, the choice of aid modalities and that 
of aid volumes can be seen as interconnected decisions that should both be 
made dependent on governance assessments. So, for example, some argue 
that well-governed countries should receive more aid, over longer periods, 
through direct budget support, whereas poorly governed countries should 
get limited amounts of aid, for short periods, and oriented towards improv-
ing governance (ODI 2006, 4).
Development results achieved: Instead of selecting recipients based on 
institutional quality, some authors have suggested directing aid to countries 
where good development results have been achieved in the past (Kanbur 
2005, 132). Van de Walle (2005, 159–160) argues that making allocations 
dependent on outcomes will result in aid being directed predominantly 
towards countries where strong and willing governments foster fast progress 
on human development. The cross-country distribution of aid would thus 
resemble closely the one derived from an assessment of recipients’ insti-
tutional quality. However, this might not always be the case, since some 
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countries with weak institutions might still be very effective in promoting 
human development (ODI 2004, xiii). For example, recent evidence shows 
that countries with weak institutions such as Nepal or the Central African 
Republic (CAR) have made particularly fast progress on MDG targets 
(Hailu / Tsukada 2011, 8–11). Allocating aid according to past outcomes is 
still likely to result in larger aid shares to countries with good institutions, 
but it would avoid underestimating the potential impact of aid in countries 
that might use aid efficiently, despite their weak institutions.9
The downside of this approach is that outcomes do not necessarily indicate 
good use of aid resources, but can simply be the result of unrelated external 
factors. Therefore, results might not always tell us where aid is having the 
largest positive impact (Leeuw / Vaessen 2009, 21–22). Moreover, a good 
past performance record is no guarantee that recipients will use future aid 
receipts efficiently (Kanbur 2005). Finally, making aid allocations depend-
ent on outcomes is likely to increase aid volatility (World Bank 2009, iii).
2.4.3 Trade-offs between different approaches to aid 
allocation
Donors face difficult choices when deciding how to distribute their aid across 
recipients and uses because needs- and performance-based approaches 
are fundamentally incompatible. Whereas needs-based approaches would 
allocate larger shares of aid to the neediest countries, performance-based 
approaches would direct aid predominantly to countries with good institu-
tions where aid can be expected to be used more efficiently, and thus ben-
efit a larger number of people in need (Guillaumont 2008, 6–8). Because 
the quality of institutions tends to be lower in the poorest countries (Kau-
fmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006), performance-based approaches imply a 
considerable shift in allocation patterns away from the neediest recipients 
(Bourguignon / Platteau 2012, 3). This often produces a difficult trade-off 
9 The World Bank conducted an analysis on how the cross-country distribution of its con-
cessional resources would look if development outcomes (results) were used instead of 
measures of institutional performance to determine allocations. The results indicate that 
if allocation was based on changes in the Human Development Index (HDI), the share of 
resources from IDA flowing to least-developed countries (LDCs) would grow from 49 per 
cent to 63 per cent, and Africa’s share would rise from 48 per cent to 52 per cent.
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between assisting many people in need and assisting the neediest (Benson / 
Epprecht / Minot 2009).
There can be trade-offs also between different needs-based approaches, 
since middle-income countries with many people in need are often not those 
where the most in need live (Sumner / Kanbur 2012). Both these trade-offs 
boil down to the question: Should aid assist many people in need, or mainly 
the neediest? These conflicting objectives become particularly problematic 
because poor people are increasingly concentrated in fragile states with bad 
institutions and in middle-income countries (see figure below).
Figure 1:  Where do the world’s poor live? (% of global population of 
people living on less than US$ 1.25 a day)
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There can also be a trade-off between achieving allocative efficiency in the 
short- and in the long term. In the short term, it may be efficient to direct 
most resources to recipients where aid has the largest immediate impact. 
However, negative cross-border spillovers from neglected recipients in a 
range of areas, including security, health, the environment, and trade (Jones 
/ Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 14; Marysse / Ansoms / Cassimon 2006, 12; 
World Bank 2011a, 277), might lead to such an allocation being inefficient 
in the long term.
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2.4.4 Practical implementation of different aid-allocation 
approaches
In practice, distinguishing between needs- and performance-based 
approaches to aid allocation is less straightforward than in theory. Most 
donors apply a combination of different approaches, resulting in real-world 
allocation patterns that diverge from pure needs- or performance-based 
approaches. Performance-based allocation formulas generally assign a con-
siderable weight to needs as well (Beynon 2001, 4). Moreover, even donors 
that allocate according to institutional quality make a distinction between 
LICs and MICs. “Low-income” or “least developed”10 status of countries is 
thus also central in targeting development assistance, based on the argument 
of greater need in these countries (Sumner / Kanbur 2012, 6).
However, different donors attach varying degrees of importance to needs and 
performance, respectively. For example, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) uses a needs-based formula that weighs population 
size and income per capita.11 Some donors have started taking other types 
of need into account as well. The United Kingdom, for example, included 
the Human Development Index (HDI), which reflects needs in health and 
education as well as income poverty, as an important criterion in its alloca-
tion decisions. UNDP is considering introducing this indicator in its country 
allocation formula as well (OECD 2011c, 8). In contrast, the World Bank’s 
International Development Association (IDA) allocates according to a per-
formance-based formula12 that attaches great importance to institutional 
quality, measured by the recipient’s Country Policy and Institutional Assess-
10 The United Nations’ Committee for Development Policy defines LDCs using the three 
following indicators: (a) GNI per capita; (b) Human Assets Index; and (3) Economic 
Vulnerability Index (IDA 2009, 15).
11 The UNDP-TRAC1 formula used by UNDP weighs population size and income per cap-
ita, resulting in larger shares of aid for poorer and more populous countries. However, a 
ceiling for population size introduces a bias towards smaller countries (OECD 2013a, 21).
12 IDA’s allocation formula is based on the “poverty-efficient” aid allocation model devel-
oped by Collier and Dollar (2001), which weighs institutional performance, GDP per 
capita and population size.
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ment (CPIA) score13 (OECD 2013a, 10). The European Development Fund 
and most multilateral development banks have adopted formulas similar to 
IDA’s (Guillaumont 2008, 2–4).
Among bilateral donors, some (e.g. the United Kingdom) make use of an 
allocation formula that includes needs and performance (Anderson 2008, 22) 
or plan to introduce one (e.g. France). However, even when donors have a 
formula, they frequently deviate from it when additional information on the 
likely effectiveness of aid to specific countries is available (Wood 2006, 5). 
Most bilateral donors do not make use of allocation formulas (Utz 2010, 4). 
For bilateral donors, it is more common to define a list of “priority coun-
tries” that are expected to receive the majority of ODA. The selection of these 
countries is generally made on the basis of a set of criteria, including needs 
and performance. However, political and commercial interests, as well as his-
torical ties, are sometimes also explicitly listed among the criteria that can 
influence the choice of partner countries, as is the case, for example, for Aus-
tria, Denmark and the Netherlands. The distribution of aid among the priority 
countries is generally made using similar criteria as for country selection, and/
or is based on proposals from country offices (Anderson 2008, 24).
Allocation patterns suggest that some donors, such as the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, assign more weight to recipients’ institutional quality 
than others, such as France and Japan (Thiele / Nunnenkamp / Dreher 2007, 
1; Clist 2011, 42; Rogerson 2005, 540). Although the United States gener-
ally counts among donors whose allocation patterns are not particularly influ-
enced by institutional assessments of recipient governments, its Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) is one of the clearest examples of bilateral 
aid allocation based on performance. The MCC was specifically designed to 
target a small set of countries that meet demanding criteria in terms of insti-
tutional performance (Hicks / Parks / Tierney 2005, 3; Tierney et al. 2011, 4).
13 The CPIA rates countries on an annual basis using 16 criteria grouped in four clusters, 
namely: economic management; structural policies; policies for social inclusion and 
equity; and public sector management and institutions. Each of the 16 criteria is graded 
by World Bank staff on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high) (World Bank 2011b, 69–70). IDA’s 
allocation formula also includes a series of exceptions to the performance-based rule 
(such as a special clause for allocating larger shares of aid to post-conflict countries) that 
allow redistributing resources to the neediest and most vulnerable countries. However, 
even with these exceptions, well-performing countries still receive the lion’s share of 
IDA’s resources (Leo 2010, 14).
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3 Under-aided countries
3.1 Chapter overview
This chapter discusses the phenomenon of under-aided countries. After hav-
ing reviewed the literature on aid orphans, a group of countries are exam-
ined that can be considered under-aided according to multiple approaches. 
Allocation patterns by DAC and non-DAC donors that lead to the relative 
neglect of those countries are analysed, followed by a discussion on the 
risks and opportunities associated with allocating larger shares of aid to the 
countries identified as under-aided. The last section presents some conclu-
sions and policy recommendations for addressing the problem of under-
aided countries.
3.2 Why could the existence of under-aided countries 
undermine aid effectiveness?
The possible existence of “under-aided” recipients has been attract-
ing increasing attention because it raises a number of concerns: first, the 
phenomenon would imply inefficiencies in the overall allocation of aid 
resources. Many authors argue that potential efficiency gains could be 
reaped by reallocating aid to relatively under-aided countries (e.g. Bigsten / 
Platteau / Tengstam 2011; Bigsten / Tengstam 2012; Utz 2010). This is par-
ticularly relevant against the current background of falling ODA budgets 
(OECD 2013b), which increases the importance of allocating scarce aid 
resources more efficiently across recipient countries.
Second, there is a perception that the poorest and most vulnerable countries 
are being abandoned by donors. Declining aid budgets create a double chal-
lenge for recipients considered “difficult partner countries”14 (DPCs): not 
only is there less aid in absolute terms, but there is also pressure on donors 
to reduce their relative share of aid to DPCs in total aid allocations in order 
to make the best use of scarce aid resources. Risk-averse donors already tend 
to shun fragile and low-performing recipients (World Bank 2011a, 201), and 
there is concern that aid will be reduced most sharply in the poorest and 
14 Levin and Dollar (2005, 7) refers to difficult partnership countries as low-income countries 
with weak institutions, defined as those with CPIA scores in the bottom two quintiles.
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most vulnerable countries (OECD 2013b; Mold / Olcer / Prizzon 2008, 2). 
Because they might lead donors to neglect the neediest countries, current 
calls for greater performance-based selectivity in aid allocation are increas-
ingly seen as a threat to aid effectiveness, even if they derive – at least in 
part – from the intention to make a better use of aid resources (ODI 2004, 
xiii; Anderson / Christiansen / Putnam 2007; McGillivray / Feeny 2008).
Third, abandoning certain recipients might bring about serious risks in 
terms of conflict and negative spillovers in a broad range of areas, includ-
ing security, health, trade opportunities and the environment. Such negative 
spillovers can undermine development in neighbouring countries (World 
Bank 2002; Marysse / Ansoms / Cassimon 2006, 12; World Bank 2011a 
277; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 14). Neglecting some countries 
might also hinder the achievement of global public goods such as the erad-
ication of certain diseases or the protection of the environment (Gunning 
2004, 52).
Concerns have been expressed not only about “insufficient” amounts of aid 
received by some countries, but also about the excessively low number of 
donors engaged in certain recipient countries. Indeed, limited competition 
among donors might give monopoly power to donors providing large shares 
of a recipient’s aid. This might put donors in a position to influence domestic 
policy-making and deliver prevalently tied aid. Moreover, countries rely-
ing on only a few donors are likely to experience higher aid volatility than 
other recipients (UN 2011, 28; Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010; OECD 
2011d).
3.3 Identifying under-aided countries
At the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, donors com-
mitted to 
accelerate efforts to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient 
assistance, agreeing – by end of 2012 – on principles that will guide our 
actions to address this challenge. (BPd §25c) 
However, no such principles have been developed yet. The lack of clear 
guidelines for aid allocation makes it difficult to define what “under-aided” 
means, and thus to identify aid orphans (Utz 2010, 1–3; OECD 2013a, 8–9).
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The term “aid orphans” often appears in academic and policy papers, but it 
is generally used without specifying what is meant by it.15 Indeed, there is 
still no agreed definition of what constitutes an “aid orphan”, or agreement 
on what criteria should be used to assess whether a country is receiving 
“insufficient” amounts of aid. Because there is no universally accepted opti-
mal allocation against which to assess the actual distribution of aid, there 
is also no consensus on what constitutes an aid orphan (OECD 2011a, 70).
Proponents of needs-based approaches to aid allocation will argue that 
the poorest countries that receive small shares of aid are under-aided with 
respect to their needs. But these recipients often cannot be considered 
under-aided from a performance-based perspective due to the weakness 
of their institutions. On the other hand, supporters of a performance-based 
approach to aid allocation will argue that more resources should be directed 
to strong performers that are considered more likely to use aid effectively. 
But often these are not the countries most in need. The following sections 
review existing attempts to identify under-aided countries.
3.3.1 Brief literature review on under-aided countries
A number of studies (McGillivray / Feeny 2008; Bigsten / Platteau / Teng-
stam 2011; Levin / Dollar 2005; Marysse / Ansoms / Cassimon 2006) have 
identified imbalances in aid allocations. However, the actual distribution of 
aid is assessed against one chosen allocation approach or formula. There-
fore, the various countries defined as under-aided by these authors might not 
be considered under-aided if one takes a different approach to aid allocation.
The term “aid orphans” was first introduced by Levin and Dollar (2005, 17), 
who assess aid allocations to DPCs between 1992 and 2002 against an allo-
cation formula that takes into account recipients’ population size, GDP per 
capita and institutional quality. The study finds that DPCs as a group receive 
lower volumes of aid per capita than recipients with better institutions. 
However, the authors argue that directing smaller shares of aid to DPCs is in 
line with performance-based approaches to aid allocation. The problem of 
imbalanced aid allocations seems to concern not the DPC group as such, but 
rather a sub-group of countries within the DPC category. While some “aid 
15 Brown and Swiss (forthcoming (b)) offer an exhaustive review of the term’s use in aca-
demic and policy papers.
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darlings” among the DPCs receive considerably higher aid flows than their 
needs and institutional quality would predict, the analysis identifies a group 
of countries – mostly francophone and located in West and Central Africa – 
that receive little aid compared to their income, population and the quality 
of their institutions (Levin / Dollar 2005, 18). Aid flows to these countries 
were also found to be twice as volatile as those going to other DPCs (Levin 
/ Dollar 2005, 24). These findings point to imbalances in aid allocation that 
do not seem to be attributable to needs- or performance-based considera-
tions. However, the paper is fundamentally an assessment of actual allo-
cation patterns against a specific allocation formula. Changing the weight 
given to needs as compared to institutional quality in the allocation formula 
used to assess actual allocation patterns might lead to different conclusions 
about which countries might be considered under-aided.
McGillivray and Feeny (2008) analyse aid flows to fragile states for 2004 
and argue that disproportionally large amounts of aid have gone to highly 
fragile countries – those in the bottom CPIA quintile, where aid is sup-
posedly much less effective than in slightly more stable countries. Highly 
fragile countries such as Burundi and the Solomon islands received almost 
twice as much as what the authors consider to be the “optimal” amount of 
aid, whereas those countries that were not highly fragile, such as Guinea, 
received less than what they could efficiently absorb. Here again, although 
the findings suggest that there might be inefficiencies in global aid alloca-
tions, the assessment is based on the authors’ own judgment of the “opti-
mal” volume of aid for each country.
Corre, Mackie and Trenner (2008) define under-aided countries as coun-
tries that meet all of the following criteria: HDI below 0.5 (the average for 
developing countries being 0.69); fewer than 20 active donors; and less than 
US$ 50 of aid per capita (the average aid per capita being US$ 53 for least- 
developed countries (LDCs) and US$ 80 for SSA countries). The study 
finds a number of what they call “marginalised countries”, mostly in West 
and Central Africa.16 Although the authors argue that the recipient’s absorp-
tive capacities and institutional quality should be taken into account for allo-
cating aid efficiently (Corre / Mackie / Trenner 2008, 21), the approach they 
16 The report analyses aid allocation for 2005/2006 and identifies the following countries 
as being under-aided: Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, the CAR, Chad, Korea 
(People’s Republic) and Somalia.
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take for identifying under-aided countries is an exclusively needs-based 
approach.
Bigsten, Platteau and Tengstam (2011, 147–152), identify aid orphans and 
darlings emerging from EU allocation patterns (ODA from EU member 
countries and the Commission for 2009). The paper first assesses EU allo-
cation patterns against needs and finds such a large number of over- and 
under-aided recipients that, according to the authors, almost half of the total 
volume of aid should be reallocated. However, the authors argue that the 
countries identified as potentially under-aided according to needs cannot be 
considered aid orphans without taking the quality of their institutions into 
account. Thus, in a second step, the paper compares CPIA scores across 
countries identified as over- or under-aided with respect to their needs, and 
argues that aid should be reallocated from the worst-performing aid darlings 
to the best-performing orphans. The “good” aid orphans still have lower 
institutional quality than the “bad” aid darlings, but only slightly. In con-
trast, their needs are much higher. Therefore, reallocating from “bad aid 
darlings” to “good aid orphans” would result in increased value (which the 
authors estimate at almost EUR 7.8 billion) for the same volume of aid 
(Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011, 135). Despite the two-step analysis, 
however, the assessment on whether or not countries are receiving insuffi-
cient aid is still based on one specific allocation formula. The study identi-
fies aid orphans based on an extension of the Collier-Dollar (2002) formula 
that weighs a country’s CPIA score, GDP per capita and population size.17 
Moreover, limiting the analysis to allocation patterns by EU donors raises 
doubts over whether countries identified as under-aided might be considered 
aid orphans, since non-EU donors might be compensating for low levels of 
EU aid flow to those countries.
Bigsten and Tengstam (2012, 11–17) partly address this last concern by 
applying the outlined methodology to assess aid allocation in 2009 for all 
DAC donors. The authors find that aid orphans and darlings exist also with 
respect to allocations by all DAC donors, and estimate the potential savings 
from reallocation at US$ 19,491 million.
17 Based on findings by Clemens and Radelet (2003), the authors include a measure of 
declining returns to aid in the Collier-Dollar formula by assuming that the positive impact 
of aid falls to zero when aid reaches 10 per cent of a recipient country’s GDP.
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All these studies highlight inefficiencies in aid allocations, but they are 
always assessing actual allocations against one chosen allocation model. 
Therefore, countries identified as receiving insufficient aid might not be 
considered under-aided according to different approaches to aid allocation. 
Brown and Swiss (forthcoming, 10) note that because of the arbitrariness 
with which authors assess actual allocation patterns, studies dealing with 
the phenomenon of under-aided countries come up with very different and 
often contradictory lists of “aid orphans”. The authors thus argue that the 
term has lost meaning and should be dropped.
3.3.2 The OECD watch list: combining needs- and 
performance-based approaches
The OECD recently made important steps forward in bringing some clarity 
to the debate on under-aided countries. The methodology it proposes works 
towards establishing a common understanding of countries that might be 
considered under-aided (OECD 2011c; 2013). First presented in a paper 
by Utz (2010), this methodology compares actual aid allocations to low- 
income countries against four different aid-allocation approaches. Two of 
the approaches are needs-based (the equal aid per capita and the UNDP 
TRAC1 allocation formulas); two are performance-based (the Collier- 
Dollar (2001) poverty-efficient allocation and IDA’s performance-based 
allocation)18; two are purely theoretical (the equal aid per capita and the 
Collier-Dollar poverty-efficient allocation formulas); two are currently used 
in practice (the UNDP TRAC1 formula and IDA’s performance-based allo-
cation). Actual allocations to low-income countries are assessed against all 
four of these allocation models. For each allocation model, a country is 
identified as under-aided if actual aid receipts are below the benchmark allo-
cation by at least one percentage point of GDP.
The models used for compiling the list do not represent all the possible 
approaches to aid allocation. For example, approaches that suggest allo-
cating larger shares of aid to countries affected by structural vulnerability 
or that find themselves in a post-conflict phase are not included, whereas 
18 These performance-based allocation approaches are not “pure”, since besides the recipi-
ents’ institutional quality, they also take needs into account, measured as GDP per capita 
and population size.
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the evidence suggests that aid is particularly effective in countries with 
these characteristics (Collier / Hoeffler 2002, 8–9; Elbadawi / Kaltani / 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Demukaj 2011; Guillaumont 2008, 16; Collier / 
Dehn 2001, 10; Gunning 2008).
By combining needs-based and performance-based approaches, the 
OECD started regularly compiling a “watch list” of potentially under-
aided countries. Countries that can be considered under-aided according 
to both needs-based and performance-based approaches to aid allocation 
are highlighted as requiring special attention by the international com-
munity, but some attention is also recommended for countries identified 
as under-aided according to two allocation models derived from the same 
approach.
The latest list of potentially under-aided countries (OECD 2013a) was 
compiled on the basis of Country Programmable Aid (CPA)19 flows, plus 
humanitarian assistance and food aid for 2011. The following countries 
were identified as under-aided:
19 The OECD defines CPA as a subset of ODA reflecting the volume of aid that consti-
tutes a cross-border flow and is subject to multi-year planning at the country or regional 
level. CPA is calculated by excluding from ODA the following categories of resource 
flows: unpredictable aid flows (such as humanitarian aid and debt relief); aid that entails 
no cross-border flows (such as administrative costs; scholarships for foreign students 
in donor countries; initiatives to promote development awareness; research; and costs 
related to refugees in donor countries); aid that is not included in inter-governmental 
co-operation agreements (such as food aid; aid from local governments; core funding to 
NGOs; equity investments; aid that flows through secondary agencies; and aid that is not 
allocated to a specific country or region) (OECD 2011c, 18). Using CPA instead of ODA 
volumes to identify “under-aided” countries means that the phenomenon is discussed 
more from the recipient than from the donor perspective.
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Table 1: List of potentially under-aided countries
Country* Equal 
aid per 
capita
UNDP’s 
TRAC1 
aid allo-
cation
Poverty- 
efficient 
aid allo-
cation
IDA’s  
perfor-
mance- 
based aid 
allocation
Number 
of bench-
marks
Estimated 
average fund-
ing gap (US$ 
billion)**
Actual  
aid  
volume
(US$ 
million)
Fragile 
state
Madagascar X X X X 4 885 395 X
Malawi X X X X 4 434 772 X
Bangladesh X X X 3 3,190 2,222 X
Gambia X X X 3 40 138
Guinea X X X 3 449 314 X
Niger X X X 3 452 643 X
Togo X X X 3 201 278 X
Nepal X X 2 427 1,001 X
CAR X X 2 38 263 X
Chad X X 2 75 507 X
Comoros X X 2 40 45 X
DRC X X 2 266 2,221 X
Eritrea X X 2 256 133 X
Guinea- Bissau X X 2 25 104 X
Zimbabwe X X 2 291 680 X
Burkina Faso X X 2 309 982
Ethiopia X X 2 988 3,483 X
Senegal X X 2 1 1,007
Tanzania X X 2 315 2,406
Uganda X X 2 733 1,533 X
11 countries 
***
 3  4  4 0 1 -  6
Total:  
31 countries
18 17 16 9 - - 22
* Countries in bold are considered under-aided according to both performance- and needs-
based  approaches.
**  The funding gap is an average of the four different funding gaps (actual aid received 
minus the aid volume a country should receive according to each different allocation 
formula).
***  These countries are: Benin, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Laos, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zambia (underlined countries are also fragile states).
Source: Author’s own table based on augmented OECD (2013a, 10)
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Countries are ranked according to the number of criteria under which they 
can be considered under-aided, not according to the size of their estimated 
funding gaps.20 Under-aided countries figuring in the list can be divided into 
three main groups: those identified as under-aided by both performance- and 
needs-based approaches to aid allocation, those that can be considered to 
be receiving insufficient aid according to only needs-based approaches and 
those defined as under-aided only according to performance-based models. 
Important differences between these groups of countries are discussed in the 
last part of this chapter. For the moment, however, it is more relevant to con-
centrate on the common characteristics among countries in the watch list. 
Indeed, one of the advantages of the OECD methodology is that, by grouping 
together countries considered to be receiving disproportionately small shares 
of aid, some common traits emerge: first, 22 out of the 31 countries in the 
watch list are fragile states. Of the eight countries flagged as requiring special 
attention from the international community, seven are fragile states and all 
are LDCs. Secondly, almost all potentially under-aided countries are located 
in SSA, which might be surprising given that SSA is the region receiving the 
largest share of ODA (35 per cent) (Development Initiatives 2013, 57).
Awareness of the watch list still seems to be limited. In general, the issue of 
under-aided countries does not appear to be a particularly pressing concern 
for donors, and those who do show interest in the topic generally understand 
under-aided countries to be mostly fragile states that receive low absolute 
volumes of aid, such as the CAR or Chad, rather than as countries that are 
thought to be able to use larger volumes of aid efficiently. The presence in 
the OECD watch list of recipients such as Bangladesh, which count many 
active donors and receive large absolute volumes of aid, is perceived by 
many as going too far from the original concept of an “aid orphan”.
However, by showing that it is possible to identify recipients that can be 
considered under-aided from different perspectives, the OECD watch list 
provides a helpful basis for discussing the phenomenon of under-aided 
countries. The four models used by the OECD to compile the list do not 
reflect all the possible approaches to aid allocation, but they represent the 
main ideas underlying needs- and performance-based perspectives. There-
20 Even among the countries identified as “requiring special attention”, the order of coun-
tries changes significantly if they are ranked according to the average funding gap per 
capita. For the first nine countries, the order would be: 1. Guinea; 2. Madagascar; 3. Togo; 
4. Bangladesh; 5. Niger; 6. Gambia; 7. Malawi; 8. Nepal; 9. Burkina Faso.
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fore, this chapter bases the analysis of under-aided countries on the list of 
countries that can be considered under-aided according to these four mod-
els. The following sections analyse allocation patterns and underlying rea-
sons that might lead to the relative neglect of the countries presented in the 
OECD list of potentially under-aided countries.
3.4 Underlying causes for the emergence of under-aided 
countries
3.4.1 Performance-based selectivity
The observation that most countries in the OECD watch list are fragile 
states21 seems to be in line with claims that donors increasingly target aid 
to well-run countries. The end of the Cold War allowed donors to allocate 
aid based on more developmental criteria, rather than directing it to corrupt 
but geopolitically important dictatorships (Bräutigam / Knack 2004, 275). 
Moreover, since the late 1990s, donors have been attaching growing impor-
tance to the institutional environment in partner countries when distributing 
aid across recipients (McGillivray 2005, 1; Levin / Dollar 2005; Bermeo 
2008; Claessens / Cassimon / Van Campenhout 2009).
Performance-based selectivity in aid allocation has been explicitly adopted 
by the World Bank’s IDA and by most other multilateral development 
banks (Guillaumont 2008, 10–11). It is more difficult to assess the degree 
of performance-orientation in allocation patterns by bilateral donors, both 
because bilateral donors rarely have clear allocation formulas, and because 
these donors seem to differ considerably regarding the importance they 
attach to institutional performance (Thiele / Nunnenkamp / Dreher 2007, 1; 
Clist 2011, 42). In general however, it seems that also bilateral donors are 
shifting towards more performance-based allocation patterns (Tierney et al. 
2011, 4; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 13). Bourguignon and Leipziger 
(2006) find that donors tend to give even more importance to the quality 
of governance when allocating aid across countries at lower income levels.
At the same time, other studies (Nunnenkamp / Thiele 2006; Easterly / 
Pfutze 2008; Easterly / Williamson 2011, 40) do not support the argument 
21 The World Bank identifies as fragile states the countries with a CPIA score below 3.2.
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that institutional quality is increasingly influencing aid allocation patterns. 
A number of empirical studies find that the levels of corruption in recipient 
countries, for example, do not play a role in aid allocation (Alesina / Weder 
1999; Neumayer 2003; Isopi / Mattesini 2010). Although donors sometimes 
react to undemocratic changes in recipient countries by withdrawing or 
reducing aid, overall democracy and the respect of human rights seem to 
influence aid allocation less than what donors’ emphasis on democracy and 
human rights would suggest (Carey 2007).
Thus, although donors seem to be increasingly influenced by the quality 
of institutions in partner countries, there is no single consistent allocation 
pattern across donors or time periods (Winters 2010, 430). Besides recipient 
countries’ institutional performance, other factors influence the distribution 
of aid resources, including attention to needs (Nunnenkamp / Thiele 2006); 
an increasing concern for fragile states (OECD 2012a, 49); and a host of 
political and commercial interests (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011, 152–
153). Combined with a general lack of coordination, these multiple factors 
contribute to the emergence of a global aid allocation pattern that diverges 
from what would be in line with performance-based approaches (Rogerson 
2005, 540). Thus, the existence of under-aided countries might not be attrib-
utable to one major trend influencing overall aid allocations, but rather to a 
combination of different factors.
A brief review of the factors that influence aid allocations besides institu-
tional performance – completed with an analysis of the degree of donor 
coordination in aid allocations – provides a better understanding of the role 
these elements play in the phenomenon of under-aided countries.
3.4.2 Needs-based allocations
The observation that a relatively small group of very poor countries appears 
to be under-aided does not necessarily imply that overall aid allocations are 
not needs-oriented. Even authors presenting evidence for a general move 
towards performance-based allocation models (Levin / Dollar 2005; Ber-
meo 2008; Claessens / Cassimon / Van Campenhout 2009) assert that needs 
still play an important role in aid allocations.
Gunning (2008, 3–4) highlights three main factors that work against perfor-
mance-based selectivity in aid allocations: first, most donors seem to think 
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that rigid performance-based selectivity would mean that aid goes to the 
countries that need it least. Second, it seems unjust to abandon poor people 
just because they had the bad luck of being born in a place with inefficient 
institutions. Third, the incentive structure in the aid system pushes donor 
agencies towards disbursing rather than withholding aid in order to guaran-
tee future funding for their organisations.
Wood (2006) gives a different reason for donors’ reluctance to fully embrace 
performance-based approaches to aid allocation. She observes that South 
Asia receives a smaller share of total aid than what would be in line with the 
Collier-Dollar formula, whereas Africa receives a disproportionally large 
share. The author argues that perceptions on future poverty levels are impor-
tant as well for taxpayers in donor countries. The belief that, in the absence 
of aid, poverty will decline more rapidly in better-governed Asian countries 
than in Africa induces donors to allocate more aid to Africa than to Asia.
Allocation patterns suggest that needs play a particularly important role for 
multilateral donors (Easterly / Williamson 2011, 32). Although it is true 
that the World Bank and most other multilateral banks allocate aid using a 
 performance-based formula, the evidence indicates that multilateral donors 
as a group are less biased than bilaterals against difficult partnership coun-
tries (OECD 2011b, 7; Bermeo 2008, 41).
Global funds such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria; the GAVI Alliance for vaccines and immunisations; and the 
Global Environmental Fund also allocate relatively large shares of aid to 
difficult partner countries with high needs (OECD 2012a, 61–62). Alloca-
tion patterns by these highly specialised funds tend to be driven by specific 
needs rather than by measures of institutional quality in recipient countries 
(Harmer 2004, 8).22 Moreover, the global nature of their goals gives them an 
incentive not to neglect any needy country.
22 These highly specialised funds allocate mostly based on project-specific demand, with-
out country limits. Performance also plays a large role, but is understood as programme 
performance rather than related to the quality of recipients’ institutions. This allocation 
model often results in large aid flows to fragile states (OECD 2011b, 7). For example, the 
GAVI Alliance adopts a results-based approach, in that the volume of resources disbursed 
to a recipient depends on the number of children that have been immunised. Using this 
system, GAVI directed its resources for child immunisation predominantly to low-income 
countries under stress and fragile states (CEPA 2010, 36).
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3.4.3 Increasing attention to fragile states
Fragile states have been receiving increasing attention over the last years 
(World Bank 2011a). Between 2000 and 2010, aid per capita to fragile states 
grew by 46 per cent, whereas it only increased by 27 per cent in non-fragile 
states. Even after excluding debt relief, which accounts for a large part of 
the increase in aid receipts by fragile states, the share of aid allocated to 
these countries has been growing over the last decade (OECD 2012a, 49). 
Efforts for finding ways to engage with fragile states are sometimes directly 
linked to the aid orphans phenomenon. For example, a report by the French 
aid agency Agence Française de Développement (AFD) argues that these 
efforts are 
aimed at counteracting the negative consequences of ‘performance-based 
aid’, a doctrine that in less than a decade has made ‘aid orphans’ of the 
worst-performing countries. (Châtaigner / Gaulme 2005, 3)
Increases in aid to fragile states were especially high for low-income states 
in SSA (OECD 2012a, 49). Why then are almost all the countries in the aid 
orphans watch list fragile states in SSA? This also seems to contrast with 
Utz’s (2010, 19) finding that being fragile does not make a country more 
likely to receive insufficient aid.
A closer look at the distribution of aid among fragile countries brings 
more clarity to the issue: in 2010, 49 per cent of ODA to 47 fragile states 
was directed to only seven “donor darlings”: Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Haiti, Pakistan, Gaza and Iraq (OECD 
2012a, 49). Because the United States is by far the largest aid provider to 
fragile states (OECD 2012a, 50), much of this is attributable to the large 
volume of US aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.23 However, the seven 
donor darlings were also top receivers of aid by EU institutions (Gavas 
2011). The problem of being under-aided thus seems to concern a sub-set of 
fragile states, rather than the group as a whole.
Several studies (Anderson / Christiansen / Putnam 2007; Macrae / Harmer 
2004; World Bank 2011a, 23; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 24–26; 
Guillaumont 2008, 12) point to imbalances in the distribution of aid across 
fragile states, and claim that a strong focus on post-conflict countries has 
23 Detailed information on US aid to these countries can be found at: http://gbk.eads.
usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html.
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led donors to neglect low-performing countries that are not critically frag-
ile. Levin and Dollar (2005, 19) find that between 1992 and 2002, among 
DPCs (all other things being equal) post-conflict countries received around 
30 per cent more funding per capita than non-post-conflict ones. The report 
Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States and Situations (OECD 2010a, 43) observes large imbalances in aid 
allocations across fragile states and expresses serious concern about the 
extremely weak implementation of the principle of “avoiding pockets of 
exclusion”. For example, in 2008 the CAR, where 67 per cent of the popula-
tion lives under the US$ 1 poverty line, received US$ 53 per capita of ODA. 
In contrast, Timor-Leste, where the percentage of the population living on 
less than US$ 1 per day is 53 per cent, received US$ 251 per capita (OECD 
2010a, 38–39).
An overwhelming focus on post-conflict countries within the larger group of 
fragile states might not necessarily be inefficient. Harmer (2004, 39) points 
out that while donors face difficulties in understanding what needs to be 
done in environments of “protracted crisis”, post-conflict contexts present 
reconstruction priorities that are relatively easy to identify. It might also be 
that donors are focusing on post-conflict countries in order to take advan-
tage of the windows of opportunity that post-conflict environments some-
times offer (World Bank 2011a, 249; World Bank / AfDB 2011, 8). Donors 
might also be allocating their aid in line with the finding (Collier / Hoeffler 
2002) that aid tends to be more effective in post-conflict settings.
However, if larger aid flows to post-conflict countries, as compared to other 
fragile states, were guided by the findings of the aid-effectiveness litera-
ture, these higher aid flows should be sustained for a longer period than is 
currently the case. Instead, although the literature suggests that aid to post- 
conflict countries is particularly effective between the fourth and the seventh 
year of peace (Collier / Hoeffler 2002, 8–9), donors tend to start reduc-
ing the level of funding in post-conflict countries already before that time 
(OECD 2010a, 35). Moreover, even among post-conflict countries there are 
differences in treatment (Boyce / Forman 2010, 12). For instance, Afghan-
istan, Timor-Leste and Bosnia received disproportionally high amounts of 
aid as compared to other post-conflict countries in similar conditions. Such 
imbalances are due to the geopolitical importance that donors attribute to 
stability in the above countries (Collier / Hoeffler 2002, 2).
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Donors’ security interests often shape the allocation of aid across fragile 
countries (Macrae / Harmer 2004, 13). It is indicative that after 9/11, bilateral 
aid from DAC countries to the Middle East grew dramatically, from US$ 5 
billion in 2001 to US$ 27 billion in 2005 (Nielson / Powers / Tierney 2009, 
19–20). The already quoted report by the French aid agency AFD explicitly 
states that one of the drivers behind increased levels of funding to fragile 
states is the recognition that some of these countries pose high global security 
risks (Châtaigner / Gaulme 2005, 3). Jones, Riddell and Kotonglou (2004, 23) 
argue that concerns about terrorism play a particularly important role, with 
aid being directed more in accordance with the perceived security threats than 
with the different levels of need across countries. Thus, neglected recipients 
are likely to be countries whose fragility is not perceived as being particularly 
relevant for donor countries’ security (Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 6).
3.4.4 Donors’ strategic interests
Besides security concerns, other strategic interests shape aid allocations. 
A large number of empirical studies find that aid allocations by bilateral 
donors are influenced by the desire to gain political influence in certain 
countries (Alesina / Dollar 2000, 40), commercial interests (Neumayer 
2003; Knack / Rahman 2008, 2–3; Hout 2007), colonial ties (McGilli-
vray / Oczkowski 1992; Vázquez 2008) and geographical proximity (Clist 
2011, 42). Moreover, cross-country aid allocations tend to be affected by a 
small-country bias, with larger countries receiving lower levels of aid per 
capita than smaller countries with similar needs (Utz 2010, 5). Concerns 
about visibility also influence aid allocations (Vollmer 2012). Hoeffler and 
Outram (2011) estimate that roughly half of the predicted value of aid is 
determined by factors such as colonial history and geopolitical ties.24
24 It is often argued (e.g. Headey 2008; Powell / Bobba 2006, 21) that politically or com-
mercially motivated aid is not effective in promoting development in recipient countries. 
However, depending on the type of political and commercial interest at stake and on the 
aid modality used, the influence of strategic interests in aid allocation does not necessarily 
mean that aid is not aimed at achieving development results in the targeted countries. Ber-
meo (2010) argues that donors pursue “strategic development”, meaning that development 
in recipient countries has a strategic importance for donors. In an increasingly globalised 
world, donor countries will be affected by a growing range of positive and negative spillo-
vers from developing countries, ranging from security to issues concerning migration, dis-
eases, trafficking, pollution, trade opportunities, etc. Therefore, Bermeo argues that donors 
will pursue development in partner countries, but that they will target their aid predomi-
nantly towards recipients whose spillovers are more likely to affect donor countries.
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Although colonial ties and commercial interests affect allocation patterns of 
bilateral rather than of multilateral donors, the latter are not as free from the 
influence of strategic interests as they claim (Winters 2010, 423; Mascar-
enhas / Sandler 2006, 356; Nielson / Powers / Tierney 2009, 25–26). Mul-
tilateral allocation patterns are often influenced by political economy var-
iables such as a country’s political and economic connection to the United 
States and other major shareholders (Barro / Lee 2005; Schneider / Tobin 
2010, 4). Still, strategic interests and concerns about visibility seem to affect 
allocation patterns by multilateral donors to a much lesser extent than what 
is the case for bilaterals (Öhler 2013, 6).
Bigsten, Platteau and Tengstam (2011, 152–153) directly link the emergence 
of aid orphans to the weight that political and commercial interests have in 
aid allocation patterns. The desire to gain political influence and commer-
cial opportunities in certain countries keeps donors from reallocating aid to 
less important countries, even when those are identified as under-aided with 
respect to both their needs and their performance.
Strategic interests can be linked to the emergence of aid orphans also for a 
different reason: they might lead bilateral donors to establish a “lead donor-
ship” in countries with which they have longstanding ties (Steinwand 2013, 
3–5). This makes recipients vulnerable to drops in aid from the lead donor. 
Aid tends to be more volatile in countries with dominant donors. In particu-
lar, countries with high two-donor concentration ratios (i.e. a large share of 
aid is provided by the two biggest donors) are more likely to be affected by 
high aid volatility (Hudson / Mosley 2007). Jones, Riddell and Kotonglou 
(2004, 8) argue that the disproportionally low share of funding received by 
West African countries where France was the lead donor is mainly due to 
reductions in French aid. However, the authors also remark (Jones / Riddell 
/ Kotonglou 2004, 8) that declining resource flows from the former colo-
nial power were accompanied by drops in aid receipts from other bilateral 
donors and from IDA. The observation that those countries saw their aid 
being cut also by donors besides France suggests that other reasons – linked 
to the countries’ characteristics rather than to France’s aid allocation pat-
terns – contributed to these recipients being under-aided. However, specific 
reasons might also have led to drops in aid by those countries, and case 
studies would be necessary to understand these.
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3.4.5 Lack of donor coordination
Besides the country’s characteristics, aid volumes received by a given coun-
try can be determined by the degree of donor coordination in cross-country 
aid allocations. Many authors identify the lack of coordination among donors 
as one of the main factors leading to some countries receiving insufficient 
aid (Utz 2010, 19; OECD 2011c, 12; Rogerson 2005; Bigsten / Platteau / 
Tengstam 2011, 152–153; Anderson 2012, 2; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 
2004). This is mainly due to the fact that donors do not take into account 
other donors’ allocations into their own allocation decisions (OECD 2011c, 
12). Donors generally fail to take into account allocation patterns by other 
donors when deciding on the distribution of their own aid resources. This 
leads them to concentrate on the same countries while neglecting others 
(OECD 2011a, 70; Brown / Swiss 2013). Some donors included the number 
of donors active in a certain recipient country among the criteria used to 
guide the selection of partner countries. However, this is only one of many 
criteria considered and plays a minor role. More common is the practice of 
discussing country exits with other donors, although this is done in a rather 
ad hoc manner and does not always result in well-coordinated actions.
Donor coordination could mitigate the phenomenon of under-aided coun-
tries by enabling individual donors to allocate larger shares of aid to coun-
tries that receive disproportionally low amounts of aid from other donors. 
Instead, donors tend to do the opposite. The evidence suggests that donors 
are affected by herding behaviour in their aid allocations (Desai / Kharas 
2010; Barthel 2012; Steinwand 2013, 8; Frot / Santiso 2009; Powell / Bobba 
2006). Desai and Kharas (2010, 10) describe herding as: 
an under-investigated but common phenomenon in official foreign assis-
tance that can contribute to cascades in withdrawals of aid, or alterna-
tively, countries being given aid in excess of their absorptive capacity.
Herding implies that donors actually do take other donors’ allocations into 
account when distributing their own aid, but in a way that worsens – instead 
of mitigating – the aid orphans / aid darlings divide. Davies and Klasen 
(2013) find that for an average donor, a 1 per cent increase in aid by another 
donor to a given country produces about 0.3 per cent increase in own aid 
allocations to that country. The herding effect is particularly strong for allo-
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cations to orphan countries,25 inducing donors to collectively shun them. 
Donors are particularly reluctant to direct aid to recipients that other donors 
have abandoned (Davies / Klasen 2013, 25).
Herding behaviour can be attributed to the influence of strategic interests 
in donors’ allocation patterns (Mascarenhas / Sandler 2006, 356; Powell / 
Bobba 2006). Frot and Santiso (2009, 25) link the phenomenon to donors’ 
fear of missing out on commercial and political opportunities in countries 
assisted by other donors. Cutrone (2012) argues that this is especially the 
case if donors are competing for influence in the recipient country.26 Barthel 
(2012) also argues that the fact that a recipient is allocated large volumes of 
aid by other donors is interpreted as a signal that aid programmes are par-
ticularly effective in that country. Herding is found to affect mostly bilateral 
donors. This is not only because multilaterals are less influenced by strate-
gic interests, but also because the use of allocation formulas reduces their 
discretion in aid allocations27 (Davies / Klasen 2013, 8, Barthel 2012; Frot 
/ Santiso 2009).
Lack of communication and coordination among donors could become an 
even more serious problem in the context of a move towards greater selec-
tivity in aid allocations (Mürle 2007, 30; Davies / Klasen 2013, 2; Anderson 
2012, 2). Jones, Riddell and Kotonglou (2004, 28) point out that uncoordi-
nated efforts by individual donors to allocate their own aid efficiently might 
have a perverse impact on global allocation patterns. If donors use similar 
criteria for selecting partner countries and do not coordinate, aid selectivity 
could result in a general neglect of the majority of needy countries while 
over-aided strong performers experience diminishing – or even negative – 
returns on aid (OECD 2003a, 2). This could lead to particularly sharp drops 
in aid receipts for low-performing and fragile states (Anderson 2012, 2; 
25 Aid orphans are defined by the authors as countries receiving less ODA than a formula 
based on GDP, population size and institutional quality would predict.
26 When donors are not competing with each other for strategic influence, in some cases 
diverging strategic interests can even partly substitute for a lack of formal coordination 
mechanisms. This was the case during the cold war, when the definition of clear spheres 
of influence allowed donors to avoid excessive fragmentation and duplication of efforts 
(Steinwand 2013, 35).
27 However, the use of allocation formulas does not guarantee that allocation decisions will 
be insulated from political interests, since the weights and indicators used in the formula 
can be modified in order to suit those interests (Banful 2011).
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Brown / Swiss 2013), or for countries that are not relevant for donors’ for-
eign policy interests (UN 2011, 28).
Low numbers of donors in certain countries might become a problem in the 
context of initiatives to reduce aid fragmentation. Donors’ efforts to reduce 
fragmentation by concentrating their aid in a limited group of partner coun-
tries might cause a worsening of the aid orphans phenomenon if concen-
tration is uncoordinated (Anderson 2012, 2). This appears to be a real risk, 
since the selection of partner countries as a result of DoL efforts is not 
taking place in consultation with other donors (Grimm / Schulz 2009, 9). 
For the moment, however, efforts to increase concentration have been very 
limited, and cross-country DoL appears to be stalling (Brown / Swiss 2013); 
Aldasoro / Nunnenkamp / Thiele 2009, 13). Imbalances in aid receipts seem 
thus to be linked to low amounts of aid allocated from donors to certain 
countries, rather than to insufficient numbers of donors engaged in those 
countries (Corre / Mackie / Trenner 2008).28
Achieving coordination in aid allocation is difficult because aid allocation 
is considered to be a sovereign policy, thus justifying unilateral decisions 
(Grimm / Schulz 2009, 9). Donors prepare the selection of partner countries 
on the basis of criteria, but the eventual decision is of a political nature 
(Mürle 2007, 27). Strategic interests hinder the establishment of a coordina-
tion framework (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011, 152–153). Moreover, 
a lack of transparency in aid allocation patters makes it difficult for donors 
to coordinate their allocations. Only 23 out of 40 donors surveyed for the 
OECD survey of donors’ forward spending plans declared themselves will-
ing to make their forward spending plans publicly available. Reasons given 
for this reluctance included uncertainties about future aid budgets and the 
belief that their own channels of communication already provide sufficient 
transparency (UN 2012, 19).
At the same time, coordination alone would not necessarily solve the 
problem of under-aided countries. Coordinated donors might still allocate 
according to shared strategic interests, whereas increasing the development 
28 The number of donors engaged in a country does not necessarily reflect aid volumes. 
The distribution of aid across countries occurs in a two-step process: first, donors select 
partner countries; then they allocate aid across the selected countries (Mürle 2007, 27). 
This means that donors can be engaged in a large number of countries while still directing 
most of their aid to a certain subset of recipients (Frot 2009, 3).
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impact of aid requires coordinated allocations to be based on criteria such 
as needs and performance.
3.4.6 Interrelations between the factors underlying the 
phenomenon of under-aided countries
The sections above have sketched the different approaches, goals and 
interests that produce current allocation patterns. On the one hand, a gen-
eral move towards greater performance-based selectivity results in lower 
levels of funding for difficult partner countries. On the other hand, a host 
of other factors such as attention to fragile states, responsiveness to needs 
and political economy reasons influence resource distribution as well, 
so that actual aid allocation patterns are not in line with either perfor-
mance-based or needs-based approaches. This produces a complex pattern 
of aid allocation, which benefits well-run countries but also low-perform-
ing countries that have a strategic importance for donors. Countries that 
could use aid effectively but that do not fall into either of these catego-
ries do not receive sufficient aid (Rogerson 2005, 540; Corre / Mackie / 
Trenner 2008, 24). The lower degree of attractiveness of some recipients 
for donors combines with a general lack of coordination among donors, 
causing inefficient concentrations of resources in some “darling” coun-
tries and the neglect of other recipients that also have relatively high needs 
and performance.
Strategic interests contribute to inefficiencies in aid allocations in two ways: 
first, by inducing donors to allocate aid according to criteria different from 
poverty or performance, the influence of self-interested motives creates 
inefficiencies in aid allocations by individual donors – at least with respect 
to their stated developmental goals. Second, they make donors reluctant 
to release control over the distribution of aid resources, thereby hindering 
efforts to increase coordination and transparency in aid allocations.
3.5 Multilateral donors’ compensatory role for under-aided 
countries
The phenomenon of under-aided countries seems to be attributable mostly 
to neglect by bilateral donors (Levin / Dollar 2005; OECD 2013a, 14; Utz 
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2010, 20–21; Davies / Klasen 2013, 25; Christensen / Homer / Nielson 2011, 
2046–2051). Multilateral donors appear to be less biased against low- 
performing countries (OECD 2011b, 7; Bermeo 2008, 41), less influenced 
by strategic interests (Öhler 2013, 6) and less affected by herding behaviour 
(Davies / Klasen 2013, 8, Barthel 2012; Frot / Santiso 2009).
The eight countries that, according to the aid orphans watch list, can be con-
sidered under-aided with respect to both needs and performance received 
on average 53 per cent of their aid from multilateral donors – a much higher 
share than the global average of 36 per cent (OECD 2013a, 11). This was the 
case also for countries identified as under-aided in previous OECD watch 
lists.29 An extreme case is Togo, where 78 per cent of aid received between 
2005 and 2010 came from multilateral agencies (OECD 2013a, 14). As for 
countries considered under-aided, according to only one approach, a com-
parison of the watch list with the 2012 DAC report on multilateral aid shows 
that the share of the country envelope provided by multilateral donors is even 
greater for the group of countries considered to be under-aided only from a 
needs-based approach, whereas this tendency seems to be less pronounced 
for countries considered under-aided only according to performance-based 
approaches, as the table below shows.
29 For the OECD watch list compiled using CPIA for 2010, the average share of aid received 
from multilateral donors for the nine potentially under-aided countries was even higher, 
at 55 per cent.
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Table 2:  Bilateral vs. multilateral donors’ engagement in under-aided 
 countries (Country Programmable Aid, 2010 disbursements)
Country* Equal 
aid per 
capita
UNDP’s 
TRAC1 
aid allo-
cation
Poverty- 
efficient 
aid allo-
cation
IDA’s  
perfor-
mance- 
based aid 
allocation
Number 
of bench-
marks
Share of aid 
received by 
multilateral 
institutions*
Number 
of  donors 
 engaged 
 (bilateral/ 
multilateral)**
Madagascar X X X X 4 60.0 12/13
Malawi X X X X 4 53.3 14/15
Bangladesh X X X 3 61.5 18/16
Gambia X X X 3 76.2 6/15
Guinea X X X 3 74.7 10/14
Niger X X X 3 67.1 17/15
Togo X X X 3 83.4 10/14
Nepal X X 2 55.2 18/17
CAR X X 2 82.9 14/15
Chad X X 2 75 507
Comoros X X 2 70.7 3/12
DRC X X 2 70.9 20/15
Eritrea X X 2 89.1 10/12
Guinea- Bissau X X 2 73.2 9/12
Zimbabwe X X 2 54.8 21/14
Burkina Faso X X 2 62.3 16/16
Ethiopia X X 2 64.0 21/17
Senegal X X 2 50.0 17/17
Tanzania X X 2 47.7 16/17
Uganda X X 2 47.1 20/17
11 countries 
***
 3  4  4 0 1 -
Total:  
31 countries
18 17 16 9 - -
* 26 multilateral agencies are covered
** Only DAC donors are covered
***  These countries are: Benin, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Laos, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zambia (underlined countries are also fragile states)
Source: Author’s own table based on OECD (2013a, 10) and OECD (2012b)
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These patterns might only signal that under-aided countries are receiving 
lower levels of funding than other countries from bilateral sources. How-
ever, there is evidence suggesting that multilaterals are also compensat-
ing by allocating greater shares of aid to recipients neglected by bilateral 
donors. In their analysis of aid flows to difficult partner countries, Levin and 
Dollar (2005) find that bilateral donors assigned DPCs 58 per cent less aid 
than their population, poverty and institutional performance would suggest. 
On the other hand, multilateral donors allocated 34 per cent more than the 
expected volume to these recipients. However, the compensatory role played 
by multilateral donors seems not to have been sufficient, since, overall, these 
countries received 43 per cent less aid than suggested by the size of their 
populations, the levels of their poverty and the quality of their institutions. 
Utz (2010, 22) argues that multilateral aid seems to partly compensate for 
neglect by bilateral donors in 25 per cent of the cases, and this result holds 
both for the entire group of countries identified as under-aided and for the 
subset of fragile states.
Multilateral donors seem thus to be compensating for neglect by bilateral 
donors, but not for all countries and not enough. Moreover, multilateral 
donors’ compensatory role does not appear to be driven by a conscious effort 
to allocate larger shares of their aid to countries that receive disproportion-
ally low amounts of aid from bilateral donors. Indeed, allocations by multi-
lateral donors are in large part determined by allocation formulas that allow 
only limited flexibility in allocation decisions (Davies / Klasen 2013, 8).
Multilateral donors play an important role in low-performing countries also 
because much of the bilateral aid that goes to these countries flows through 
multilateral agencies (OECD 2013a, 14). These often represent a channel for 
bilateral donors to assist low-performing countries through earmarked fund-
ing (i.e. aid that bilateral donors allocate to specific projects implemented 
by multilateral institutions). In 2010, 12 per cent of total ODA (US$ 16.7 
billion), though counted as bilateral, was channelled through and imple-
mented by multilateral agencies. Over half of this earmarked funding went 
to fragile and conflict-affected low-income countries (OECD 2011b, 4). 
Moreover, bilateral donors increasingly provide aid to fragile states through 
multi-donor trust funds that collect contributions from many donors and 
administer them under a single governance structure, generally managed 
by multilateral donors such as the World Bank (Barakat / Rzeszut / Martin 
2012, 10).
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3.6 The potential compensatory role of donors not reporting 
to the DAC
Analyses of aid allocations and its efficiency are generally based on data 
from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database30 (Niel-
son / Powers / Tierney 2009, 4). This is the case also for the OECD watch 
list. However, neglect by donors reporting to the DAC could be, at least in 
part, compensated by aid flows from other donors, such as emerging coun-
tries and private actors.
It is estimated that new donors such as China, India and Brazil provide 
around US$ 15 billion yearly, and that this flow could grow to more than 
US$ 50 billion by 2025 (Kharas / Rogerson 2012, 14). Flows from private 
sources also account for considerable aid volumes. The Index of Global 
Philanthropy and Remittances estimates that in 2010, total private aid from 
all private donors amounted to US$ 56 billion, an increase of US$ 3 billion 
from the previous year. This includes funding from NGOs, foundations, cor-
porations, universities and religious organisations (Hudson Institute 2012). 
The total funding gap for all aid orphans in the OECD list is estimated to be 
US$ 11.8 billion, or 12 per cent of total country programmable aid (OECD 
2013a, 19).31 Given the large size of the gap, it is unlikely that other donors 
could be filling it unless they concentrated the majority of their resources in 
the countries figuring in the watch list. However, the increasing weight of 
non-traditional donors requires taking their allocation patterns into account 
when assessing whether or not a country can be considered over- or under-
funded.
Unfortunately, information on aid allocation by non-DAC official and pri-
vate donors is very scarce (Sinha / Hubbard 2012; Lundsgaarde et al. 2012, 
69). Emerging donors often do not have data of the quality expected by the 
DAC reporting system, or may be reluctant to share politically or commer-
cially sensitive information about their allocation patterns (Lawson 2013, 
21). Some new donors, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are eager to keep 
30 Beyond the members of the DAC and most major multilateral organisations, the follow-
ing countries also report their aid to the DAC: Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Rus-
sia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates.
31 This figure represents an average of the total funding gaps for all under-aided countries 
according to the four different allocation models used in the OECD methodology.
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allocation patterns secret in order to avoid pressure from the governments 
of those countries that are receiving less than others (Nielson / Powers / 
Tierney 2009, 31). Private donors often do not have reliable data on their 
allocations. Moreover, they may be reluctant to report the data they have 
for fear that they will not compare favourably to other reporting NGOs, and 
because of the possible consequences of such reporting on their fundraising 
activities (Lawson 2013, 22). Lack of reliable information on the distribu-
tion of non-DAC aid makes it difficult to properly assess their role in the 
phenomenon of aid orphans.
3.6.1 Cross-country aid allocation by official donors not 
reporting to the DAC
Official donors that do not report to the DAC are mainly Arab oil-producing 
countries and emerging economies in Latin America and Asia. The role 
of Arab and Latin American donors in countries identified as under-aided 
appears to be rather limited, as both groups focus predominantly on their 
neighbours in the Middle East and in Latin America, respectively (Krage-
lund 2008, 259–262), whereas under-aided countries are located in SSA and 
in South East Asia.
New Asian donors, on the other hand, might be providing a compensatory 
role for the countries on the watch list. For these donors as well, aid flows 
appear to be directed mostly towards neighbouring countries (Dreher / Nun-
nenkamp / Thiele 2011), with the objective of exploiting positive spillo-
vers and mitigating conflict and instability in fragile states (Kharas / Rog-
erson 2012, 14). Although this suggests that security concerns influence aid 
allocations from traditional and non-traditional donors alike, geographical 
proximity might induce new donors to concentrate on fragile states that are 
not considered security priorities by DAC donors.
As for allocation patterns by Asian donors in Africa, the extent to which 
emerging donors might be compensating for neglect by DAC donors is 
unclear. Kragelund (2008, 577) finds that, in Africa, emerging donors tend 
to concentrate on the same donor darlings as DAC donors, directing most 
of their aid to countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique. At the 
same time, the author also notes that some new donors also give aid to 
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countries that tend to be neglected by DAC donors.32 For African countries, 
a particularly important donor is China, which in 2009 allocated 45.7 per 
cent of its aid to the continent (Grimm et al. 2011, 8). Opinions diverge with 
regards to China’s allocation patterns in Africa. Some (Lum et al. 2009; 
CCS 2008; Berthélemy 2009; Taylor 2007) argue that Chinese aid is pre-
dominantly allocated to resource-rich and strategically important countries, 
regardless of the quality of their governance. Dreher and Fuchs (2011) find 
no evidence that Chinese allocation patterns are primarily driven by the 
search for natural resources. However, their results indicate that democracy 
and good governance did not play a role in China’s cross-country alloca-
tions. Berthélemy (2009, 15) remarks that Chinese disinterest in recipient 
countries’ institutional quality results in large shares of Chinese aid being 
directed towards low-performing recipients that receive little aid from tradi-
tional donors. Asche and Schüller (2008, 84) describe the Chinese approach 
in Africa as driven by the search for strategic gaps, niches and fissures. This 
could lead China to allocate larger shares of aid to countries neglected by 
DAC donors. On the other hand, Bräutigam (2011) does not see China as 
being radically different from traditional donors in its allocation patterns.
In conclusion, among donors that do not report to the DAC, only emerging 
Asian donors might be compensating sometimes for neglect by traditional 
donors, and mainly in fragile countries. Kharas and Rogerson (2012, 14) 
claim that, considering the difficulties faced by traditional donors in provid-
ing assistance to fragile states, new donors could have a particularly impor-
tant role in those countries. However, Berthélemy (2009, 15) points out that 
new donors’ engagement in countries characterised by weak institutions 
might undermine attempts by DAC donors to provide strong incentives for 
reform.
The rise of emerging countries could also produce increased aid flows 
towards fragile and low-performing recipients in three indirect ways: first, 
although they still prefer channelling aid through their bilateral programmes 
(Xu 2012, 2), new donors are increasingly contributing to multilateral agen-
cies (OECD 2011b, 6; OECD 2012b, 17), and these tend to allocate rela-
tively large shares of aid to low-performing countries (OECD 2011b, 7). 
Second, by graduating to MIC status, emerging economies are freeing up 
32 Among the countries in the OECD watch list, Burkina Faso is a priority country for India 
and Taiwan; Malawi for Taiwan; Togo for Saudi Arabia; and Madagascar for Thailand 
(Kragelund 2008, 578).
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much of IDA’s resources, which will likely be reallocated to fragile states 
(Severino / Moss 2012). The same can be said about aid coming from other 
sources as well. Finally, traditional donors might be induced to engage more 
in difficult partner countries if they fear that emerging donors might gain 
large political and commercial influence in those countries (Tierney et al. 
2011, 10).
3.6.2 Cross-country aid allocation by private donors
Despite the growing role played by aid from private sources, the literature 
on cross-country allocations is mostly limited to ODA. The little evidence 
available deals with allocation patterns by NGOs and does not suggest that 
private aid might be targeting countries neglected by official donors. With 
the exception of Nancy and Yontcheva (2006), who find that European 
NGOs allocate predominantly based on needs and that they even direct aid 
to recipients neglected by official donors, most of the evidence suggests 
that NGOs are following rather than substituting ODA (Dreher / Mölders 
/ Nunnenkamp 2007; Koch et al. 2011; Koch 2007). Koch (2007) argues 
that NGOs’ tendency to concentrate on the same countries as official donors 
contributes to the aid darling / aid orphan divide. The author finds that while 
recipients such as Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, India, Moldova and the 
CAR are widely neglected by bilateral donors and NGOs alike, countries 
such as Uganda, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Peru see concen-
trations of both bilateral and NGO aid (Koch 2007, 17).
The pressure for achieving quick results in order to obtain access to funding 
induces NGOs to prefer engaging in relatively well-performing countries 
(Monteiro 2007), and NGO engagement in difficult environments tends 
to be concentrated in high-profile countries such as Afghanistan or Haiti 
(World Bank 2011a, 183). Moreover, risk-pooling and economies of scale 
make it attractive to implement activities in countries where other NGOs 
are operating, which leads to the formation of clusters of NGOs (Koch 
2007, 3).33
33 NGOs’ tendency to concentrate in the same countries might be increasing efficiency if, as 
pointed out by Koch (2007, 3), clustering creates economies of scale that reduce the cost 
of delivering aid. Therefore, imbalances in the distribution of NGO aid are not necessarily 
inefficient per se. What seems to be problematic is the tendency of NGOs and official 
donors to neglect the same set of countries.
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With regards to private foundations, most of these appear to be concentrated 
predominantly on middle-income countries and tend to avoid engaging in 
LICs (Marten / Witte 2008) or in politically unstable environments (Esser / 
Bench 2011, 16). In general, private donors’ compensatory role for coun-
tries neglected by DAC donors seems to be rather limited.
3.7 Should more aid be allocated to aid orphans?
Up to this point, the analysis has treated the countries in the watch list as 
a homogeneous group. The fact that most countries in the list are fragile 
and located in SSA made it relevant to discuss how these common char-
acteristics might be influencing the volume of aid they receive. However, 
assessing whether more aid should be directed to countries identified as 
potentially under-aided is not possible without highlighting the differences 
between them. As Jones, Riddell and Kotonglou (2004, 23) point out, the 
group of under-aided countries also presents broad differences that call for 
different forms of engagement by donors. From the perspective of the effi-
cient allocation of aid, these differences have to be taken into account not 
only to understand which instruments might work best in the different envi-
ronments, but also to assess whether or not it would make sense to allocate 
larger shares of aid to these countries (ODI 2006, 4).
3.7.1 Countries considered under-aided by both needs- and 
performance-based approaches
Obviously, the first group is the least controversial. The fact that these 
recipients are considered under-aided both from a needs-based and from a 
performance-based perspective suggests that they could use increased levels 
of aid efficiently. Increasing the level of funding for the countries in this first 
group seems to be associated with low levels of risk and with opportunities 
for efficiency gains. Bigsten, Platteau and Tengstam (2011, 147–152) esti-
mate at EUR 7.8 billion the increased value for EU aid that would come from 
reallocating EU aid from low-performance aid darlings to neglected coun-
tries with high needs and relatively good institutions (Bigsten / Platteau / 
Tengstam 2011, 147–152). Prizzon and Greenhill (s.a., 4) point out that 
carrying out the reallocation from orphans to darlings proposed by Big-
sten, Platteau and Tengstam (2011, 147–152) represents by far the largest 
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source of efficiency gains that would come from a full implementation of 
the aid-effectiveness agenda.
3.7.2 Countries considered under-aided only according to 
performance-based approaches
Some of the countries in this group, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, were 
among the top 20 aid receivers in 2010 (UN 2012, 15) and are actually con-
sidered aid darlings by some (Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 27). Direct-
ing larger amounts of aid to countries that already receive more than other 
countries with equal or higher needs can be criticised on equity grounds. 
But the potential risks and opportunities associated with increased volumes 
of aid to these countries can also be discussed from an efficiency point of 
view.
Every country, even the best-performing one, has limited absorptive capac-
ities, which implies that aid will have decreasing returns to scale (McGilli-
vray 2003, 20; Bourguignon / Sundberg 2006, 4). Jones, Riddell and Koton-
glou (2004, 27) point out that, because of this reason, increased aid, for 
example to Uganda, might not be very effective. Decreasing returns to scale 
are already integrated in the Collier-Dollar (2001) formula34 included in 
the OECD methodology as one of the models used to identify under-aided 
countries. However, the Collier-Dollar model does not take aid dependency 
into account. Excessive aid flows might create difficulties in macroeco-
nomic management and undermine the recipient government’s incentives to 
strengthen its own tax base and develop strong accountability chains to its 
citizens (Clemens / Radelet 2003; Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 2006; 
Moyo 2009). This, however, will depend on the type of aid: for example, 
a country can readily absorb larger amounts of debt relief, which does not 
imply additional expenditures for the government. Proposed ceilings on 
34 The “growth-efficient allocation” proposed by Collier and Dollar (2000) works with the 
assumption that aid has decreasing returns to scale. The allocation model aims at equal-
ising the marginal effectiveness of aid across countries, meaning that every extra aid-
unit in any country will reduce poverty by the same amount as in any other recipient. 
The weight given to institutional performance in the proposed allocation formula implies 
that aid should be allocated predominantly to countries with good institutions. However, 
decreasing returns to scale also imply that it would be inefficient to concentrate aid only 
on a small number of strong performers.
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aid levels should thus consider different types of aid separately (Lensink / 
White 1999, 22–23). Also, aid can be delivered in ways that increase recip-
ient countries’ absorption capacities and limit aid-dependency problems 
(Lensink / White 1999, 22–23; Bourguignon / Sundberg 2006).
3.7.3 Countries considered under-aided only according to 
needs-based approaches
A clear risk associated with engaging in countries from this last group is that 
aid might not be very effective in weak institutional environments (Winters 
2010, 427). Increased volumes of aid can even have negative consequences 
in fragile states due to low absorptive capacities in these countries (McGil-
livray 2005, 4). A recent experience by the World Bank in Chad is a good 
example of how engagement in those environments can result in massive 
failures: revenues from a World Bank-financed pipeline project that were 
supposed to finance health and education were instead used by the recipient 
government to buy arms (European University Institute 2009, 25). How-
ever, focusing on recipients that minimise the risk of failure and reputational 
risks for donors might also lead to inefficient allocations in terms of pov-
erty reduction (Svensson 2005). Inefficiencies from neglecting recipients 
considered to be poor performers might arise from underestimations of the 
performance of the recipient, of the potential for implementing successful 
aid programmes and of the risks associated with non-engagement.
a. Underestimating the recipient’s performance
It might be that some countries are not considered under-aided according 
to performance-based approaches only because donors underestimate these 
countries’ performance. Assessing the quality of governance is a very com-
plex task (Fukuyama 2013), and donors might easily underestimate the abil-
ity of a recipient to use aid effectively. A recent report on budget support 
to fragile states by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and 
the European Commission acknowledges that systematic assessments of 
the volume of aid in the form of budget support a country can effectively 
absorb are rare (World Bank / AfDB 2011, 20). Even when proper assess-
ments are carried out, donors tend to overlook countries where weak mac-
roeconomic management coexists with relatively well-functioning institu-
tions, and where aid could be effective in promoting human development 
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(ODI 2004, xiii). Moreover, perceptions of a recipient’s performance might 
in part reflect the country’s political, security and/or aid relations with the 
donor community. Donors might label a recipient as a poor performer as an 
excuse for not engaging in the country (ODI 2004, xiii). Recent evidence 
(Hailu / Tsukada 2011, 11–12) shows that countries with very low CPIA 
scores, such as the CAR, were among the top performers in making progress 
towards the MDGs.35 Given the difficulty of assessing performance, there 
is an argument for increasing aid volumes for countries whose per capita 
aid receipts are far below the average aid receipts for countries with similar 
degrees of need, even if they present relatively low CPIA scores (Utz 2010).
b. Underestimating the potential for effective aid in difficult environments
The evidence suggests that aid can be very effective in post-conflict contexts 
(Collier / Hoeffler 2002, 8–9; Elbadawi / Kaltani / Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; 
Demukaj 2011) and in countries affected by structural vulnerability (Collier 
/ Dehn 2001, 10; Guillaumont 2008, 16; Gunning 2008). Post-conflict coun-
tries and countries affected by structural vulnerability are likely to be coun-
tries with bad institutions (Guillaumont 2008, 18; McGillivray 2005, 1). 
Collier and Chauvet (2004) find that aid other than technical assistance can 
have a very large impact in LICUS countries. McGillivray and Feeny (2008) 
find that, once highly fragile countries (those in the bottom CPIA quintile) 
are excluded, the average impact of aid programmes does not differ between 
fragile and non-fragile countries. The OECD claims that the success rate 
of aid programmes in fragile states has been improving over the last two 
decades and is increasingly comparable to that in more stable environments 
(OECD 2012a, 63). Still, aid programmes will arguably fail more often in 
fragile than in non-fragile states. But when they succeed, the returns are 
likely to be far greater because the needs also are (World Bank 2011a, 218).
35 Hailu and Tsukada (2011, 8–11) assess progress towards the MDGs across countries and 
rank Burkina Faso as top performer, followed by Angola and the CAR. Most of the top 
20 performers are LDCs in SSA, but among LDCs in Asia, Nepal and Myanmar (both 
countries on the OECD watch list) stand out. Comparing this ranking with the aid orphan 
watch list, it can be observed that whereas Burkina Faso and Nepal are considered under-
aided also from a performance-based approach, the CAR and Myanmar, with a CPIA 
score of 2.8 and n.a., respectively, are not.
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c. Underestimating the risks of non-engagement
Accountability to domestic constituencies leads donors to concentrate on the 
risk of engagement in badly run countries rather than on the risks of inaction 
(World Bank 2011a, 201). The risks associated with non- engagement, how-
ever, suggest that neglecting countries where aid is less effective might not 
be efficient in the long term. Boyce and Forman (2010, 14–15) argue that 
even if one accepts that aid in difficult environments is much less effective, 
an argument can still be made for increased engagement in fragile states if 
carefully delivered aid can help prevent conflict. Although the assumption 
that aid can prevent conflict is questionable, allocating aid to  low-performing 
countries might still be an efficient choice if one considers the phenomenon 
of downward spirals, which often lead to the worsening of conditions in 
fragile states (World Bank 2011a). It is possible that aid will be less effec-
tive once a country has started on a downward spiral. In this case, waiting 
until the recipient’s needs become so large that they cannot be overlooked 
would not be an efficient use of aid resources. Collier and Chauvet (2004, 
5) estimate the costs of falling into LICUS status to be on average US$ 82 
billion, a figure greater than the annual global aid budget. These costs are 
born in large part by the country’s neighbours. Indeed, neglecting a country 
might generate negative spillovers that undermine the effectiveness of aid 
programmes in other countries (Marysse / Ansoms / Cassimon 2006, 12; 
World Bank 2011a, 277; Jones / Riddell / Kotonglou 2004, 14; Gunning 
2004, 52).
However, as McGillivray (2005, 4) points out, risks alone do not provide an 
argument for allocating more aid to countries with bad institutions if donors 
are not able to deliver aid effectively in those contexts. Rather, acknowl-
edging the risks associated with non-engagement should encourage greater 
efforts in developing effective aid instruments for working in difficult envi-
ronments.
3.8 Conclusions and policy recommendations for under-aided 
countries
Diverging opinions on how aid should be allocated make it difficult to 
assess which countries receive insufficient aid with regards to an efficient 
allocation of aid resources. However, it is also possible (OECD 2013a) to 
identify a group of countries that can be considered under-aided accord-
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ing to formulas derived from both needs-based and performance-based 
approaches to aid allocation. If one accepts the OECD watch list, it appears 
that the group of potentially under-aided countries is composed in large part 
of fragile states in SSA. The existence of countries that can be considered 
under-aided with respect to both their needs and their performance points to 
underlying weaknesses in the aid architecture. In particular, the phenome-
non exposes a general lack of coordination among donors concerning allo-
cation decisions, and a reluctance to engage in low-performing countries 
that have limited strategic importance for donors. This causes inefficiencies 
in the cross-country allocation of total aid resources.
Four important steps to address the problem of under-aided recipients are: 
agreeing on clear principles for identifying under-aided countries; improv-
ing donor coordination; leveraging additional funding; and engaging more 
in difficult environments.
3.8.1 Agreeing on a common definition of “under-aided” 
countries
Addressing the problem of under-aided countries first requires developing a 
common understanding of who they are, and how to identify them. Donors 
have committed in Busan to agree by end of 2012 “on principles that will 
guide our actions to address this challenge” (BPd §25c). Defining such 
principles is the first – overdue – step.
The OECD watch list that monitors potentially under-aided countries repre-
sents a useful instrument for the international community to work towards 
a common understanding of what “insufficient aid” means. However, the 
OECD itself stressed that the watch list needs to be complemented with 
a case-by-case analysis of flagged countries, and cannot serve as the only 
tool used for identifying recipients receiving insufficient aid. A country’s 
presence on the list does not necessarily mean that the country receives 
low volumes of aid or that it could efficiently use more aid. Moreover, the 
reasons for disproportionally low amounts of aid receipts can differ widely 
from country to country, ranging from limited absorptive capacity for aid, 
to lack of strong political and commercial ties to donor countries, to unco-
ordinated aid allocations, to donors’ reactions to undemocratic changes in 
receiving countries. These different causes call for very different responses. 
Donors should thus avoid “automatically” allocating more aid to the coun-
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tries on the list. Rather, detailed case studies should be conducted in order to 
identify the specific causes of relatively low aid volumes and highlight risks 
and opportunities of directing larger aid flows to those recipients. Closer 
examination of potentially under-aided countries will also allow for taking 
into account other criteria that are not considered in the watch list, such 
as a country’s economic vulnerability, as well as the availability of other 
resources beyond aid for financing development. Case studies will also 
enable a better assessment of the countries’ performance beyond the CPIA 
index, which might not be a sufficient predictor for absorption capacities.
Besides complementing it with case studies, as proposed by the OECD, the 
watch list could be enhanced in two ways: first, it could give equal weight to 
needs and to performance. At the moment, one of the two allocation formu-
las used to represent the needs-based allocation approach, is the “equal aid 
per capita” allocation formula, which is, strictly speaking, not needs-based. 
To make it more needs-based, the “equal aid per capita” allocation formula 
could be substituted with “equal aid per poor person”.
Second, the watch list could be completed by a second list that highlights 
the most serious cases of “insufficient aid”. Countries in the watch list are 
ranked not according to the size of their estimated funding gaps, but on the 
number of criteria under which they can be considered under-aided. This 
means that the list is not suited for setting priorities by highlighting the most 
urgent cases of “insufficient aid”. This second list would be compiled using 
the same criteria and methodology, but rank countries on the basis of their 
per capita average funding gap.36
Many donors understand “under-aided countries” in a much more literal 
sense than the OECD: as countries receiving low absolute volumes of aid or 
36 Since the funding gap depends on the size of the country and of its population, it should 
be calculated per capita and not in absolute terms. This ranking should also be limited 
to countries considered under-aided according to both needs- and performance-based 
approaches. The funding gap is calculated as an average of the funding gaps derived from 
each of the four allocation formulas considered in the OECD methodology. Allocations 
in one formula could thus heavily bias the overall results. For example, if the funding gap 
is 5 billion for one formula and 0 for the other three models, the average gap would still 
be 1.25 billion, even though the remaining three formulas would suggest that the country 
is not under-aided. Restricting the ranking to countries identified as under-aided by both 
needs- and performance-based approaches would avoid that countries are identified as 
under-aided according to only one model figure in the ranking before countries consid-
ered under-aided from multiple perspectives.
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where few donors are active. Since these are mostly fragile states, there is a 
tendency to equate the problem of “under-aided” countries with that of frag-
ile states. However, the problem of under-aided countries seems to concern 
a sub-group of fragile states that lack strategic importance for donors, so the 
phenomenon is unlikely to be addressed by allocating larger shares of aid to 
the group of fragile states as a whole. Strengthening the needs component of 
the watch list and creating a ranking that highlights urgent cases might help 
in creating momentum and making the list more compelling and intuitive 
for policy-makers.
3.8.2 Improving coordination in cross-country aid allocations
The identification of under-aided countries should be coupled with increased 
efforts by donors to coordinate their aid allocations. Identifying under-aided 
countries is a retrospective exercise, and inefficiencies in aid allocation have 
already occurred once those countries are recognised as aid orphans. There-
fore, information on aid allocations should be shared at an earlier stage, and 
donors should consider global aid allocations when deciding on the distri-
bution of their own aid resources.
Establishing an effective cross-country DoL would help in tackling the prob-
lem of under-aided countries by preventing donors from uncoordinatedly 
clustering in some countries while abandoning other recipients. However, 
efforts to reduce fragmentation in the frame of DoL might have a perverse 
effect on the phenomenon of under-aided countries if specialisation by indi-
vidual donors on a limited number of countries occurs in an uncoordinated 
manner. In order to avoid the emergence of new aid orphans and further 
reductions in aid volumes for already under-aided countries, it is crucial to 
implement the process of specialisation in a well-coordinated manner.
Donors should adopt allocation formulas that allow them to factor in infor-
mation on other donors’ allocations. This does not necessarily mean that 
donors will see their allocations determined by other donors’ allocation pat-
terns, since bilateral donors generally use allocation formulas merely as a 
guideline that allows for large amounts of discretion and flexibility in allo-
cation decisions. Rather, information on the global distribution of aid could 
be used by individual donors as a guide for an effective allocation of their 
own aid. Each donor could still unilaterally decide whether or not to take 
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this information into account when making decisions on how to distribute 
aid resources.
For “traditional donors”, the OECD could play an important role in fos-
tering this ex-ante coordination. First, it should continue pushing for a full 
disclosure of donor-specific indicative forward spending plans. Second, the 
DAC peer review could focus more on allocation decisions in its assessment 
of bilateral donors’ development cooperation systems, increasing the peer 
pressure on donors to adopt transparent allocation formulas. For European 
donors, the European Commission could also help in fostering coordination 
in aid allocation. Increased coordination and information-sharing should be 
pursued also with non-DAC official and private donors. The Global Partner-
ship for Effective Development Cooperation, which brings together all main 
development actors, should capitalise on its inclusive character to encour-
age participation in coordination efforts by non-DAC donors.
Coordination will be insufficient and difficult to achieve if strategic interests 
continue to influence aid allocations, but increasing transparency in aid allo-
cations is a good step forward. Both the sharing of forward spending plans 
and the adoption of clear allocation criteria could foster transparency and 
make politically-driven allocations more difficult to justify.
3.8.3 Finding additional sources of funding for under-aided 
countries
At the moment, even after under-aided recipients are identified, it is unclear 
who should be responsible for allocating increased aid to those countries, 
and where the funding should come from. Against the current backdrop of 
falling aid budgets, allocating more ODA to countries identified as receiving 
insufficient aid will be difficult without reducing the amounts of aid directed 
to other countries. Although studies that deal with the issue of under-aided 
countries generally recommend reallocation of aid, they also note that this 
might not be politically feasible (Levin / Dollar 2005; Bigsten / Platteau / 
Tengstam 2011, 147–152; Bigsten / Tengstam 2012, 11–17). Guillaumont 
(2008, 23) argues that changing allocation patterns will be possible only in 
the context of a scaling-up of aid, which would allow donors to modify the 
distribution of aid without reducing absolute amounts for any country or 
group of countries. Moreover, the Accra Agenda for Action clearly states 
(§17) that division of labour should not result in a reduction of aid received 
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by individual countries. Therefore, even if overfunded countries can be 
identified (e.g. Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011, 147–152), from which 
it might be efficient to reallocate aid to under-aided ones, it is necessary to 
explore other possible sources of funding that could be directed to countries 
receiving insufficient aid. Two of the recommendations expressed above can 
be helpful also from this perspective.
Reducing fragmentation: Reduced fragmentation could benefit under-aided 
countries in two ways. On the donor side, it would result in savings from 
reduced transaction costs, savings that could be allocated to under-aided 
countries. On the recipient side, reduced transaction costs would imply 
increased value, even if absolute volumes of aid remain unchanged. In line 
with efforts to reduce fragmentation, increased engagement in under-aided 
countries could also happen through delegation to other donors (although 
care must be taken to avoid that countries end up relying on an excessively 
low number of donors).
Increasing information-sharing: Besides providing the basis for effective 
coordination, increased information-sharing could improve the predictabil-
ity of aid flows (OECD 2012b, 19–20). This would benefit, in particular, 
under-aided countries, which experience volatility rates twice as high as 
other LICs. Adopting conservative estimates, the World Bank (2011a, 196) 
calculates that reducing volatility by 30 per cent would provide an addi-
tional value of US$ 27–39 million yearly to each fragile and/or conflict- 
affected recipient country. As noted above concerning reduced fragmenta-
tion, increased predictability would increase value even if absolute amounts 
of aid were maintained.
A large share of funding received by aid orphans already comes from mul-
tilateral sources. However, multilateral donors already resent the pressure of 
being forced to increasingly engage in difficult partnership countries where 
bilateral donors are terminating aid programmes (OECD 2011b, 7). They 
might thus be reluctant to assume the role of funders of last resort. Since 
multilateral agencies are likely to keep playing a crucial role in delivering 
aid to low-performing and fragile states, bilateral donors could direct fund-
ing to under-aided recipients by making earmarked contributions to multi-
lateral donors. Resources for additional funding to multilateral organisations 
could come from the savings from reduced fragmentation mentioned above. 
Earmarked funding should have a very large thematic focus in order not to 
impose unnecessary restrictions that might undermine the work of multi-
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lateral institutions. Bilateral donors could also allocate larger aid shares to 
already defined multilateral programmes that target countries identified as 
under-aided, or to trust funds managed by multilateral organisations. Using 
the multilateral channel would be a relatively easy way for bilateral donors 
to increase assistance to low-performing recipients. Moreover, it would 
avoid increases in fragmentation that would result if bilateral donors were to 
open new programmes in under-aided countries.
Finally, both donors and partner countries should explore ways to leverage 
other sources of finance beyond aid. The scope for increasing the amount 
and/or the developmental impact of other types of public and private 
resources will vary from country to country, and should be an integral part 
of the case studies mentioned earlier. Great developmental needs do not 
necessarily have to be met by large flows of ODA, but aid could be used to 
leverage foreign direct investment, remittances and domestic resources. An 
example of the potential catalytic role of aid would be capacity development 
for improving the government’s resource mobilisation capacity. Moreover, 
aid could be used in a catalytic way for tapping resources from the private 
sector and fostering its contribution to future development achievements. 
ODA could also play a role in lowering the price that migrants incur when 
sending remittances back home.
3.8.4 Engaging in difficult environments
Most under-aided countries are fragile states, and their neglect can be, at 
least in part, attributed to donors’ reluctance to engage in difficult partner 
countries. Allocating small shares of aid to weak performers can sometimes 
be justifiable in terms of efficiency. However, the risks and opportunities 
associated with different levels of engagement in fragile states should be 
taken into account as well. Donors should assess more systematically the 
risks of not intervening, as well as the regional and global externalities that 
might result from neglecting low-performing recipients. In general, the 
problem of “under-aided” countries does not seem to be a high priority for 
donors. Creating momentum to address the problem is likely to be easier by 
highlighting the risk of non-engagement in neglected countries.
However, delivering aid effectively in difficult environments remains a 
challenge. Donors could allocate aid to regional development programmes 
such as regional infrastructure and regional administrative and economic 
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cooperation (World Bank 2011a, 283). As pointed out by Kenny (2006, 5), 
increased funding for regional and global public goods such as medical and 
agricultural research could support development in fragile states without 
involving their institutions. But this will not be a real solution for the prob-
lem of under-aided countries. Besides channelling additional aid to fragile 
states through multilateral donors and multi-donor trust funds, donors who 
are reluctant to engage directly could also create incentives for NGOs to 
focus more on difficult environments, for example by increasing the share 
of funding allocated to NGOs that work in fragile contexts. Most impor-
tantly, donors should make increased efforts towards developing appropriate 
models for working in difficult environments. Finding the right type of aid 
for delivering aid effectively to low-performing countries is not only impor-
tant per se, but might also induce donors to allocate larger volumes of aid 
to difficult partner countries. This is particularly important in view of the 
increasing concentration of the poor of the world in fragile states.
4 Under-aided sectors
4.1 Chapter overview
After underlining the importance of an efficient sectoral aid allocation for 
aid effectiveness, this chapter discusses possible approaches to cross-sector 
aid allocation, and proposes referring to national strategy documents as a 
benchmark for assessing the efficiency of sectoral aid allocation. Using the 
sector definition from the OECD-DAC CRS,37 the chapter offers an over-
view of sectors that attract relatively few donors and low volumes of ODA, 
37 The OECD-DAC CRS subdivides aid activities into the following sectors: education 
(including basic education; secondary education; post-secondary education); health (gen-
eral health; basic health); population and reproductive health; water and sanitation; gov-
ernment and civil society; conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security; other 
social infrastructure and services; transport and storage; energy generation and supply; 
banking and financial services; business and other services; agriculture; forestry; fishing; 
industry; mineral resources and mining; construction; trade policy and regulations and 
trade-related adjustment; tourism; multisector/cross-cutting (including general environ-
mental protection; and other multisector such as urban development and management; 
rural development; and non-agricultural alternative development). More detailed infor-
mation can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/purposecodessectorclassi-
fication.htm#bottom.
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completed by an assessment of the possible compensatory role played by 
official and private donors that do not report to the DAC. Possible reasons 
for donors’ tendency to crowd in some sectors while neglecting others are 
then examined. Finally, some conclusions and policy recommendations for 
under-aided sectors close the chapter.
4.2 Why could under-aided sectors undermine aid 
effectiveness?
The existence of under-aided sectors can undermine aid effectiveness for 
two main reasons: first, aid might be very effective in currently neglected 
sectors. The difficulty of comparing needs and performance across sectors 
makes it difficult to assess whether aid allocated to sectors that are cur-
rently receiving lower volumes of aid would be more effective than aid to 
other sectors. However, if the reasons for neglecting certain sectors are not 
linked to efficiency considerations, it is possible that additional aid would be 
more effective in “orphan sectors” than in overcrowded “darling sectors”. 
Decreasing returns to scale and high transaction costs in sectors where large 
numbers of donors are engaged (Álvarez /Acharya 2012, 22) lead some 
authors (Schulz 2007, 7; Frot / Santiso 2010) to argue that orphan sectors 
present better opportunities for effective aid interventions.
Second, the existence of spillovers across sectors suggests that neglecting 
certain sectors might have negative consequences on the development of 
a country as a whole (Mürle 2007, 36), and even undermine progress in 
the targeted sectors. For example, improvements in health require taking 
action on gender equality, education and job creation as well (Esser 2009). 
Neglecting investments in sectors such as infrastructure, which can gener-
ate positive externalities and help in raising productivity, might increase 
the cost of achieving results in health and education (Bourguignon / Sund-
berg 2006). This applies at the sub-sector level as well. For example, Mold, 
Olcer and Prizzon (2008) note that rural development programmes often 
fail because complementarities between promoting increased agricultural 
production and supporting the creation of a better market infrastructure 
for agricultural products are not sufficiently taken into account. Similarly, 
Samuels and Rodríguez-Pose (2013, 2) argue that it will be impossible to 
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achieve MDGs such as improved maternal and child health without allocat-
ing more resources to the fight against neglected tropical diseases (NTDs).38
4.3 Sector allocation should be assessed at the country level
The efficiency of sector allocation can be discussed at the global level 
(whether total aid for a specific sector is allocated efficiently across coun-
tries) or at the country level (whether the total country envelope is allocated 
efficiently across sectors).
Various empirical analyses (e.g. Thiele / Nunnenkamp / Dreher 2007; 
Kasuga 2008, 6–7; Nielsen 2010; Esser / Bench 2011, 18; Ravishankar et al. 
2009, 2113; Powell-Jackson et al. 2006, 1274; OECD 2012c, 5; Colclough 
2011, 5) focus on the first question and find that the cross-country alloca-
tion of total aid for a specific sector often does not reflect the distribution of 
needs in that sector across developing countries. For example, the allocation 
of aid for water and sanitation is only weakly related to the relative degree of 
need for water and sanitation across recipient countries (measured as access 
to improved sanitation or drinking water) (Zipper / Hofbauer / Verhoeven 
2010, 18; UN Water 2010, 24; OECD 2012c, 5). Countries with lower water 
service coverage do not receive more aid for water and sanitation relative 
to other countries. There is often not a good correspondence between the 
geographical distribution of a specific need across all countries, on the one 
hand, and the allocation of total aid for that sector across countries on the 
other hand.
However, this arguably is a problem regarding under-aided countries rather 
than under-aided sectors. Indeed, the largest discrepancies between the need 
for water and sanitation and aid volumes received for that sector (as a share 
of global aid allocated to the water and sanitation sector) were found in 
Chad, Togo, Somalia and Laos (OECD 2012c, 5), all of which appear in the 
OECD watch list of potentially under-aided countries (OECD 2013a, 10).
Here, an under-aided sector is not to be understood as a sector in country 
A that receives less aid than the same sector with equal or lower needs in 
country B. Rather, a sector within a recipient country might be considered 
38 The five main NTDs, accounting for about 90 per cent of the NTD burden, are: soil- 
transmitted helminth infections (ascariasis, trichuriasis, hookworm); lymphatic filariasis; 
onchocerciasis; schistosomiasis; and trachoma (Samuels / Rodríguez-Pose 2013, 2). 
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under-aided relative to other sectors in the same country. There might thus 
be “orphan” sectors within “darling” countries.
4.4 Can sectoral aid allocation be assessed by applying 
performance- or needs-based allocation approaches?
Needs- and performance-based approaches to aid allocation have been 
developed with reference to cross-country aid allocation. The following 
sections discuss their applicability to the allocation of aid resources across 
sectors and sub-sectors.
4.4.1 Applying performance-based allocation approaches to 
sectoral aid allocation
Adopting a performance-based approach to cross-sector aid allocation 
would require comparing the impact of aid across different sectors. How-
ever, this is almost impossible. Most studies that assess aid effectiveness 
do it either by analysing the impact of aggregate aid on economic growth 
in recipient countries (e.g. Collier / Dollar 2001; Dalgaard / Hansen / Tarp 
2004), or by looking at particular sectors (e.g. Christensen / Homer / Niel-
son 2010 for education; Gebhard et al. 2008 and Álvarez / Acharya 2012 
for health).
Akramov (2012) makes an attempt at comparing the relative effectiveness 
of aid to different sectors in achieving poverty reduction through economic 
growth. The author finds that aid to the productive sectors is more effective 
in promoting growth than aid targeted at social sectors, and consequently 
argues for a reallocation of aid from education to agriculture and productive 
infrastructure. At the sub-sector level, Asiedu and Nandwa (2007) find that, 
in low-income countries, aid to primary education promotes growth, whereas 
this is not the case for aid to post-primary education. In middle-income coun-
tries, on the other hand, aid to higher education enhances growth, whereas aid 
to primary and secondary education even has an adverse effect on growth.
Recently, however, an increasing number of authors (McGillivray 2003; 
Clemens / Radelet / Bhavnani 2004; Guillaumont 2008; Christensen / Homer 
/ Nielson 2010, 7) have argued that the discourse on effective aid alloca-
tion should shift away from the impact of aid on poverty reduction through 
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growth promotion. In particular, since the adoption of the MDGs, the effec-
tiveness of aid can be judged against MDG goals such as improved health 
and education, independently from its ability to foster economic growth. 
Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) show that only aid to some sectors 
can possibly have an effect on the recipient’s GDP in the short- to medium 
term, whereas it might take much longer for interventions in other sectors to 
have an impact on growth. Therefore, the authors stress the need to evaluate 
aid effectiveness based not on the ability of aid to promote growth, but on 
sector-specific outcomes such as improvements in school enrolment rates, 
reductions in child mortality, etc. But the problem remains that it is impos-
sible to compare and weigh outcomes across sectors: How much literacy 
equals a certain reduction in child mortality?
One could think that – for sectors, as for countries – aid will be more effec-
tive if there are well-functioning institutions to manage it. Thus, if the agri-
cultural ministry is better run than the health one, aid to agriculture could 
be considered potentially more effective than aid directed to the health sec-
tor. Anecdotal evidence on “islands of excellence” (Bersch / Praça / Taylor 
2012) suggests that there might be large differences in performance across 
institutions in the same country. But scarce availability of data makes it hard 
to assess the institutional quality of different public entities within develop-
ing countries (Fukuyama 2013, 8).
Another difficulty is posed by the fact that different time frames might lead 
to different conclusions about the relative performance of aid to different sec-
tors. For example, if the objective is to reduce the number of under-nourished 
children, distributing food is probably the most effective intervention within 
a short time frame. In the mid-term, however, it could be more effective to 
foster agricultural productivity. A long time-horizon, on the other hand, might 
suggest that educating women is the intervention with the largest impact on 
children’s nutrition. Similarly, MacKellar (2005, 18) notes that, over the long 
term, the most effective way to reduce deaths from injuries is not providing 
assistance to the health sector but improving workplace and road safety.39
39 One way to account for varying time frames among different uses of resources can be 
to compare the value of benefits delivered in the short term with benefits delivered after 
several years. This can be expressed by the “discount rate”: the higher the discount rate 
donors choose to adopt, the faster they will consider the value of every dollar to be dimin-
ishing, leading them to value short-term impact more highly (Development Initiatives 
2013, 99–100).
Forgotten or unpromising? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 69
Besides being difficult to answer, the question of which sectors should be 
prioritised in order to improve aid effectiveness might be misplaced. The 
existence of spillovers across areas implies that even if one was able to com-
pare performance across sectors, allocating most aid to the best-performing 
sectors and neglecting others might not be the most efficient allocation.
4.4.2 Applying needs-based approaches to sectoral aid 
allocation
Several studies compare needs in specific sectors across countries (Thiele / 
Nunnenkamp / Dreher 2007; Nielsen 2010; Esser / Bench 2011, 18; Ravis-
hankar et al. 2009, 2113; Powell-Jackson et al. 2006, 1274; OECD 2012c, 
5), but almost none compares needs across sectors within countries. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see how the need for clean water can be compared to the need 
for better health care. One study that compares needs across sectors is that of 
Kasuga (2008), who ranks needs in each sector for each recipient country by 
using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The author 
argues that a larger share of country envelopes should be directed to sec-
tors in which each specific recipient country presents particularly low WDI 
scores (relative to other sectors in the same country). The paper assesses aid 
allocation by DAC bilateral donors across eight major sectors in individual 
recipient countries against indicators that measure the recipients’ need for 
aid in each of the analysed sectors. Kasuga’s results suggest that sectoral 
allocation often does not reflect what the author calls the “national devel-
opment priorities” of recipient countries. The author argues that, due to an 
over-investment in the social sectors, most of the times sectoral allocation is 
not aligned to recipients’ needs. Kasuga importantly remarks that it is impos-
sible to compare the effectiveness of aid across sectors, and that the most 
efficient allocation will therefore be the one that is most in line with national 
priorities (Kasuga 2008, 3). However, it is unclear why he derives the recip-
ients’ national development priorities from a ranking of needs constructed 
from WDI, instead of referring to national strategy documents such as the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. National development strategies lay out 
country-owned development plans aimed at identifying receiving coun-
tries’ developmental needs and the strategies to address these (Harrison / 
Klugman / Swanson 2005, 2).
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An alternative approach for comparing needs across sectors could be to 
measure the distance from different MDGs for every recipient country. This 
would, as in Kasuga’s paper, make it possible to compare needs across differ-
ent sectors. Areas that are furthest away from reaching the respective MDG 
target would then be eligible for a larger share of the total country envelope 
(Anderson 2008, 27). However, since the MDGs are objectives adopted at 
the global level, they might not entirely reflect the specific needs and devel-
opment priorities of individual recipients (Bigsten 2006, 10). Fukuda-Parr 
(2008, 3–4) points out that using the MDGs as planning targets for resource 
allocation might lead donors to neglect individual recipients’ particular 
needs, and be in contrast with the promotion of country ownership (which 
is also an MDG goal). Given the potential discrepancies between national 
development strategies and the MDGs (Bigsten 2006, 10), and the influence 
of donors’ own priorities in shaping the latter (Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004, 
5), documents laying out national development strategies appear as the most 
reliable basis for an assessment of recipients’ specific sectoral needs.
4.4.3 Assessing sectoral allocation against national 
development strategies
Considering the challenges of comparing performance and needs across 
sectors, the efficiency of sector aid allocation can be assessed with refer-
ence to its alignment40 to the priorities laid out in the national development 
strategy papers periodically41 developed by recipient countries.
Besides offering a good basis for identifying a country’s needs, referring 
to national development strategies for assessing sectoral aid allocation can 
also be justified from a performance-based perspective. Because national 
development strategies are designed by recipient countries themselves, one 
can expect relatively high ownership for the goals expressed in those doc-
40 The first two principles of the aid effectiveness agenda are ownership (developing coun-
tries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle 
corruption) and alignment (donor countries align behind these objectives and use local 
systems) (OECD 2008). Alignment is one of the most fundamental ideas underlying the 
Paris Declaration and implies that donors should focus more on what recipient countries 
need and less on what donors themselves would like to provide (Woods 2011, 15).
41 National development strategy documents generally have a time span of four to five years, 
similar to the country strategy papers developed by most donors.
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uments (Harrison / Klugman / Swanson 2005, 2).42 Since ownership has 
been recognised as increasing aid effectiveness (Wood et al. 2011), funding 
directed to the sectors identified as national priorities by the recipient gov-
ernment can be considered more effective than aid targeted at areas where 
the recipient government will be less willing to cooperate. Misaligned aid 
can be very ineffective due to recipient governments’ unwillingness or 
inability to ensure the sustainability of aid interventions43 (Bigsten 2006, 
16–17; Easterly 2002, 10; OED 1999, 2–3). From this perspective, an effi-
cient allocation of aid would maximise alignment to the priorities laid out in 
national development strategies.
Moreover, referring to country-specific development strategy documents 
will also allow taking into account the role of private and public resources 
beyond aid. As in the case for cross-country allocations, the efficiency of 
aid allocation across sectors will also depend on the availability of other 
resources beyond aid for financing development in specific sectors. Some 
sectors might be already sufficiently targeted by private investments, for 
example, or the government might have the possibility to finance those 
through non-concessional loans instead of ODA. Assessments of this kind 
are difficult to carry out by making reference only to need indicators.
The Paris Declaration envisages that recipient countries’ strategic priorities 
identified in national strategy papers should be linked to a medium-term 
42 Opinions diverge about the degree to which national strategy documents are “owned” 
by recipient countries. Indeed, the often weak participatory nature of theses documents’ 
formulation and the influence of donors’ preferences on the process weaken the owner-
ship of national strategy documents, as will be discussed in more detail below. However, 
goals laid out in national strategy documents are still likely to present a higher degree of 
ownership than objectives set unilaterally by donors.
43 Alignment is particularly important for aid-funded infrastructural investments that 
require the government to finance subsequent operational costs. Bigsten (2006, 16–17) 
notes that because of their preference for financing infrastructure investments, donors 
tend to leave the responsibility for recurrent expenditures to the partner government. For 
example, donors generally prefer building schools to financing textbooks or teachers’ sal-
aries (Easterly 2002, 10). Since recipient governments often fail to finance maintenance 
and operational costs, this practice often results in rapidly deteriorating roads, under-
staffed hospitals, etc. (Bigsten 2006, 16–17; OED 1999, 2–3). The discussion on donors’ 
preference for infrastructure investments refers to the choice of the type of good financed 
within a specific sector, rather than to cross-sectoral aid allocation. However, the choice 
of sector is important as well, because the government can be expected to be more willing 
and able to finance recurrent expenditures of infrastructure investments in sectors that it 
considers national priorities.
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expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets (PD §14). Although 
only a minority of first-generation national strategy papers contained appro-
priate costing of activities and annual spending requirements for the differ-
ent sectors (Hester et al. s.a., 7; Bonnel / Temin / Tempest 2004, 15; IMF 
2004, 33–34; World Bank / IMF 2004, 29–30; Mullen 2005, 4–5), many 
second- and third-generation development strategies now present priority 
targets with clear financial requirements specifying the amount of external 
assistance needed (OECD 2011a, 30–31; IMF / World Bank 2007, 4). Even 
among LDCs, many countries have recently made considerable progress in 
preparing strong national development strategy documents (UN 2011, 30). 
An under-aided sector can thus be understood as a sector for which the gap 
between the external funding envisaged in national strategy papers and the 
aid volume actually received is substantially larger than for other sectors.
The volume of aid might not perfectly reflect donors’ relative efforts in dif-
ferent sectors. Indeed, some activities might be less expensive than others, 
and some of the most important activities can be very cheap (Boyce / For-
man 2010, 22). For example, food aid is cheaper than support for infrastruc-
ture, so the volume of aid might not always reflect the donor’s relative effort 
in the two sectors (Hidefumi 2008, 8). However, different average costs for 
activities in different sectors will be reflected in the financing requirements 
of national development strategies, and donors’ relative effort in a sector 
could be judged appropriate if it matches the requirements for external 
funding set out in these documents.
However, using national development strategies as a benchmark for assess-
ing aid allocation also has important drawbacks: first, because the participa-
tory nature of the national development strategy formulation process cannot 
be taken for granted (Rocha Menocal / Rogerson 2006, 12; McGee / Levene 
/ Hughes 2002, 12; IMF 2004, 24; Driscoll / Evans 2005, 7; OECD 2011a, 
32–35), these documents might omit some very urgent needs. A number of 
areas that touch on the needs of the most vulnerable groups, such as gen-
der equality, human rights and hunger, are frequently given low priority in 
national development strategies (Oxfam 2004, 6; Fukuda-Parr 2008). On 
the other hand, there can be a trade-off between broad participation in the 
process of identifying national priorities and the government’s ownership of 
the resulting strategy document. National development strategies that reflect 
the needs and views of the most vulnerable and discriminated groups in 
society might focus on areas where the government is not particularly will-
ing to cooperate.
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A second weakness of adopting national strategy documents as benchmarks 
for assessing sector aid allocations is that power asymmetries between 
donors and recipient governments can distort the definition of national pri-
orities (Walt et al. 1999, 215; Esser 2009; Sridhar 2010, 6; Fraser 2005; IMF 
2004, 23). It has been noted (Driscoll / Evans 2005, 11–12; OECD 2011a, 
31) that donors’ preference for the social rather than the productive sectors 
has encouraged prioritisation of the health and education sectors in national 
strategy papers.
Third, well-articulated national strategies against which sectoral aid allo-
cation can be assessed are lacking in some countries, especially in fragile 
states (European University Institute 2009; OECD 2011a, 43–44; UNDP 
2011, 9–11).
Finally, a focus on national strategy papers might lead donors to overlook 
the potential of investing in global and regional public goods. Recipient 
governments tend to prioritise country-specific public goods (Birdsall 2004, 
20–21), although there is widespread agreement that areas such as regional 
infrastructure – but also agricultural and medical research – tend to be 
under-aided compared to the benefits they are likely to carry (OECD 2003a; 
Birdsall 2004, 20–21; Kenny 2006, 5; Zavale et al. 2011, 44).44
Despite these drawbacks, national development strategies are arguably the 
best benchmark against which sector allocation within recipient countries 
can be assessed. Indeed, national development strategy documents offer a 
relatively good indication of sectoral needs within a specific country. More-
over, the impact of aid is likely to be higher if donors respect the principles 
of ownership and alignment. Finally, it is to these documents that donors 
have committed to align their aid.
4.5 Fungibility and the degree of donors’ influence on 
sectoral aid allocation
When analysing aid allocation across sectors, it is important to acknowl-
edge that, due to aid fungibility, donors might actually not be able to fully 
determine the use of aid resources. Fungibility means that donors cannot 
44 However, donors do consider global public goods in their allocation decisions (see section 
4.8.3).
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ensure that the allocation of aid for a certain purpose actually results in 
increased funding for that purpose (McGillivray / Morrissey 2004). The 
government might use aid money for other items, or reduce allocation of 
its own resources for the area that is already covered by aid (Boone 1995; 
Feyzioglu / Swaroop / Zhu 1998; Morrissey 2006).
Having argued that aid will be more effective the more it is aligned to 
national priorities could lead us to the conclusion that fungibility is not a 
concern. Indeed, fungibility might be seen as allowing the recipient govern-
ment to distribute aid resources in line with its own priorities. Some authors 
(McGillivray / Morrissey 2004; Mavrotas / Ouattara 2006, 21; Devarajan / 
Rajkumar / Swaroop 2007; Morrissey 2012, 15) argue that donors’ concern 
over the fungibility of aid is not fully justified and that the threat fungibility 
poses to aid effectiveness is overstated. Waddington (2004, 704) argues that 
by moving their own resources away from areas prioritised by donors, recip-
ient governments might sometimes actually be increasing the efficiency of 
overall resource allocation by avoiding duplication. For example, the author 
notes that, during the 1980s, aid for the health sector disproportionally tar-
geted primary health care, which led recipient governments to direct their 
own resources predominantly towards the neglected area of curative care.
However, governments in developing countries might pursue other objec-
tives besides development, and there is no guarantee that recipient govern-
ments will adhere to national development strategy documents in their use 
of resources (Kolstad 2005; Winters 2010, 427–428). Thus, some authors 
argue that the developmental impact of aid is reduced by recipient gov-
ernments’ tendency to shift resources away from areas targeted by donors 
(Hoven 2009; Kolstad 2005).
Not everyone agrees that aid money tends to crowd out government expend-
iture for the targeted sectors: a predominantly empirical strand of the fiscal 
federalism literature suggests the existence of the so-called flypaper effect, 
describing the tendency of federal grants to crowd in – rather than crowd out 
– expenditure by lower-tier governments on targeted areas (Aragon 2008, 
1). Tamura et al. (2005, 4) argue that the phenomenon applies also to inter-
national aid, and that aid dollars “stick where they hit”. The flypaper effect 
might weaken the effect of fungibility. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that 
aid is fungible, but not completely. Foreign aid directed to a specific sector 
thus increases funding for that sector, although often not to the full amount 
envisaged by donors (Easterly 2008, 43; Feyzioglu / Swaroop / Zhu 1998).
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Assuming that aid is in part, but not entirely, fungible suggests two consid-
erations with regards to alignment: on the one hand, because it is difficult for 
donors to eliminate fungibility by using different aid instruments (Hefeker 
2006; Gunning 2008; Leiderer 2012), the best option for dealing with fun-
gibility is to align their assistance to national priorities in order to reduce 
recipient governments’ incentives to exploit the partial fungibility of aid 
(Caputo / de Kemp / Lawson 2011, 6). On the other hand, because of the 
flypaper effect, misaligned aid can result in unsustainable and inefficient 
initiatives, as was noted in previous sections (Bräutigam 2000, 44; Mavrotas 
/ Ouattara 2006, 24; Bigsten 2006, 16–17).
In conclusion, the issue of fungibility underlines the importance of aligning 
sectoral aid allocation to the recipient’s own development strategies. Aid 
that is well-aligned to national priorities seems less likely to be diverted to 
other uses and/or to finance interventions whose effectiveness will be under-
mined by lack of sustainability.
4.6 Identifying under-aided sectors
Previous sections have argued for assessing the efficiency of sectoral aid 
allocation against its alignment to national development strategies. Because 
these are country-specific, identifying under-aided sectors is a country- 
specific exercise that goes beyond the scope of this study. At the same time, 
donors tend to consistently neglect some sectors, such as agriculture or pro-
ductive infrastructure, that are often given high priority in recipient coun-
tries’ national development strategies (UN 2011, 25–29; Fukuda-Parr 2008, 
7). Donors’ preference for the social sectors at the expense of productive 
ones hinders the alignment of external assistance (UN 2011, 26; Bigsten 
2006, 11; Wood et al. 2008, 17). The group of orphan sectors is thus likely 
to be quite similar across countries.
Therefore, sectors that donors tend to neglect at the global level are also 
those that are more likely to be orphan sectors within developing countries. 
It is thus relevant to analyse donor sectoral preferences at the global level. 
Despite variations in sector allocation across donors (Thiele / Nunnenkamp / 
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Dreher 2007, 3),45 current overall allocation of aid tends to favour social 
sectors over productive ones, as the graph below illustrates.
Figure 2: Project sector repartition, 1973–2007, commitments
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A finer breakdown shows how the sectors “government and civil society” 
and “population”, have seen their share of projects grow, whereas “agricul-
ture” and “transport and communication” experienced a dramatic decrease, 
as illustrated in the graph below.
45 The aggregated sectoral distribution of aid masks considerable variations across donors. 
For example, the share of aid allocated to the social sector from 2002 to 2004 ranged from 
23 per cent in the case of Japan to 50 per cent for Norway (Thiele / Nunnenkamp / Dreher 
2007, 3).
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Figure 3: Project sub-sector repartition, 1973–2007, commitments 
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Donors generally do not have an explicit formula for distributing aid across 
sectors (Kasuga 2008, 4). However, donors’ sectoral preferences can be 
inferred both from the distribution of donors across sectors within recipient 
countries, and from the allocation of total aid across sectors.
4.6.1 Comparing the number of donors across sectors
Frot and Santiso (2010) analyse the distribution of DAC donors across sec-
tors in all recipients for the year 2007 and note that most donors tend to 
crowd in the sectors of health, education and governance, while neglecting 
sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure and energy. The average num-
ber of donors engaged in the “education” and in the “government and civil 
society” sectors was 12, compared to only 6 for “agriculture” and “water 
and sanitation”, 5 for “transport and communications”, and 4 for “trade and 
tourism” (Frot / Santiso 2010, 29). This can lead to misalignment of external 
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assistance. For example, in Zambia, one of the countries where progress on 
in-country DoL is considered to have gone furthest (EC 2011, 7), donors 
disregarded the government’s expressed desire to have a balanced distribu-
tion of donors across sectors with a maximum of five donors for each sector. 
Instead, donors kept crowding in some sectors (e.g. “macro-economics” has 
13 active donors) and neglecting others (e.g. “housing” has no active donor) 
Leiderer (2013, 14).
The neglect of some sectors can be particularly serious in countries where 
few donors are engaged. Frot and Santiso (2010, 33–34) compare the num-
ber of donors present in each sector in Tanzania and Belize, respectively 
identified by the authors as an aid darling and an aid orphan country. The 
authors emphasise the differences between the countries, showing that for 
every sector, many more donors were engaged in Tanzania than in Belize. 
However, it is interesting to also highlight the similarities in the sectoral aid 
allocation of these two countries: in both countries, many more donors were 
engaged in the social than in the production sectors or in the sector of water 
and sanitation. Since Belize has fewer overall donors than Tanzania, this 
means that the neglected sectors have few donors in the case of Tanzania, 
none in the case of Belize.
4.6.2 Comparing aid volumes across sectors
The presence of many donors in a given sector is generally associated with 
larger volumes of funding for that sector (Christiansen et al. 2007, 40–41). 
However, looking only at the number of donors engaged in a sector might 
in some cases be misleading. Large numbers of donors do not always corre-
spond to large volumes of aid, and vice versa. In fact, while having certain 
sectoral preferences, aid agencies also tend to cover a wide range of sectors 
(Easterly 2002, 24–26). Therefore, there might be cases of under-aided sec-
tors where many donors are providing relatively little amounts of aid.46
At the global level, however, aid volumes across sectors are distributed in a 
similar way to the distribution of donors across sectors, with the productive 
46 For instance, in Malawi the “water and sanitation” and the “agriculture” sectors have 
large numbers of active donors (16 and 15 donors, respectively, against an average of 10 
donors per sector) (Government of Malawi 2010, 18), but these sectors still receive only 4 
per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, of total ODA, as compared to 32 per cent for health 
(Government of Malawi 2010, 40–42).
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sectors having experienced sharp reductions in aid volumes in favour of the 
social sectors over the last decades, and particularly since the adoption of 
the MDGs in 2000 (Anderson 2008, 7). The share of aid directed to social 
sectors quickly rose from about 20 per cent in the period 1990–1992 to 
about 35 per cent in the 2002–2004 period. This dramatic increase was the 
result of higher spending on education, health and population programmes, 
though not on water and sanitation. By contrast, funding for infrastructure 
and agriculture fell sharply (Thiele / Nunnenkamp / Dreher 2007, 3). Aid 
to the productive sectors also tends to be affected by higher volatility than 
aid to the social sectors (Hudson 2012, 20). Below is a brief description of 
funding trends for the sectors that appear to be neglected relative to other 
sectors by donors.
Agriculture: The real value of aid to agriculture has declined substantially 
over the past decades. This occurred mostly during the 1980s and the 1990s: 
the proportion of sector-allocable aid directed to the “agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries” sector first fell from the high levels of the late 1970s to only 
20.2 per cent during the 1987–1989 period, and then plummeted further to 
12.5 per cent from 1996 to 1998 (Lipton 2000). The share of ODA going to 
agriculture tends to be particularly low in fragile states. Striking examples 
are Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, where agriculture’s share of ODA is around 
1 per cent, although more than 90 per cent of these countries’ workforce 
is employed in the sector (Boyce / Forman 2010, 16–18). This trend has 
recently been reversed, with funding doubling from US$ 4 billion in the 
mid-2000s to just over US$ 8 billion in 2010. However, aid to agriculture is 
still just 5 per cent of total ODA commitments, and well below the levels it 
enjoyed in the 1970s (Elliot / Collins 2012, 2).
Productive infrastructure: Although accounting for an average of 29.5 per 
cent of ODA from DAC bilateral donors from 1973 to 1990, aid to pro-
ductive infrastructure has declined subsequently to its current level of 10 
per cent of bilateral aid (Tierney et al. 2011, 9). This has occurred despite 
repeated calls by African leaders for foreign support to meet Africa’s infra-
structure needs, which are estimated to be costing one percentage point per 
year of per capita GDP growth (Foster et al. 2008). However, aid to produc-
tive infrastructure has enjoyed a renaissance since 2004 (Nielson / Powers / 
Tierney 2009), increasing to an average of 13.6 per cent for the 2007–2009 
period, compared with an average of 10.2 per cent for the period 2002–2006 
(UN 2011, 26). In 2009, multilaterals allocated 18 per cent of their aid to 
“economic infrastructure and services” as compared to 14 per cent by bilat-
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eral donors (OECD 2012b, 68). Nielson, Powers and Tierney (2009, 29) 
argue that differences between multilateral and bilateral donors with regards 
to sectoral allocation patterns have partially prevented an even more serious 
neglect of productive infrastructure.
Water and sanitation: Despite the focus on social sectors, the provision of 
water and sanitation has been largely neglected. Of the US$ 42,447 mil-
lion bilateral DAC commitments to “social infrastructure and services” in 
2011, water and sanitation received only US$ 4,877 million (OECD 2013a). 
A recent study on foreign assistance for water and sanitation reported that 
many partner countries lamented a general under-funding of the sector by 
donors, despite the high priority assigned to the area in these countries’ 
national strategy papers (OECD 2012c, 116). Aid allocated to water and 
sanitation has been growing since 2001 at an average annual rate of 5 per 
cent in real terms, with an annual growth of 7 per cent from bilateral donors 
and of 3 per cent from multilateral donors (OECD 2010b, 2). ODA allocated 
to water and sanitation increased slightly more quickly than total ODA in 
the 2007−2010 period, but it fell again in 2011. In relative terms, the share 
of aid allocated to water and sanitation is still minimal compared with vol-
umes directed to health and education (Development Initiatives 2013, 302).
Sub-sectors: Discrepancies between national priorities and the distribution 
of aid can be observed at the sub-sectoral level as well. For example, within 
the already under-aided water and sanitation sector, sanitation accounts for 
only a small percentage of aid committed to the sector (Thiele / Nunnen-
kamp / Dreher 2006; UN Water 2010, 29).
Donors’ preference for some areas at the expense of others can be found 
also in “darling” sectors. In the education sector, for example, basic educa-
tion only accounts for 29 per cent of total aid. Very little goes to secondary 
education, whereas post-secondary education receives the largest share of 
ODA. Moreover, ODA disbursements to post-secondary education mostly 
finance scholarships in donor countries for students from developing coun-
tries (Development Initiatives 2013, 292).
In the health sector, Álvarez and Acharya (2012, 8) note that the increase in 
aid for the health sector from US$ 5.82 billion in 1990 to US$ 27.73 billion 
in 2011 was due in part to the sharp rise in funding for HIV/AIDS, whose 
share of development assistance for health went from 10 per cent in 2000 
to almost 40 per cent in 2007. The fight against HIV/AIDS also emerges 
as a clear priority from most national development strategies (Fukuda-Parr 
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2008, 7). However, donors’ preference for funding HIV/AIDS rather than 
other diseases seems to be unrelated to the importance that recipient coun-
tries assign to HIV/AIDS relative to other diseases. MacKellar (2005) finds 
that countries whose national development strategies did not prioritise 
infectious diseases are not less likely than other countries to see the devel-
opment assistance for health they receive predominantly directed to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Several studies (OECD 
2009b, 15; Fukuda-Parr 2008, 7; Sridhar 2010, 6) argue that donors’ focus 
on HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases often creates discrepancies with 
national priorities in the health sector because it leads donors to neglect 
areas such as child and maternal health. For example, in Rwanda in 2005, 
aid targeted at HIV/AIDS was 22 times the volume spent on mother-child 
health (IMF / World Bank 2007, 18).
Unlike other sectors, in the case of health it is possible to compare needs 
across sub-sectors by comparing the burden represented by different dis-
eases in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). Therefore, it 
might be that donors are not allocating in accordance with national devel-
opment strategies, but rather with the DALY measure, which offers a clear 
indicator of needs. However, this does not seem to be the case. Shiffman 
(2006) examines funding for 20 communicable diseases from 42 donor 
organisations from 1996 to 2003, and finds that financing is weakly related 
to the burden level of different diseases expressed in terms of DALY. Even 
after taking into account important elements such as projected change in 
disease incidence, health system capacities and the cost of intervention, 
striking imbalances can still be observed in allocation patterns. Acute respi-
ratory diseases, for example, represent more than 25 per cent of developing 
countries’ burden – nearly as high as AIDS – and yet less than 2.5 per cent of 
funding is invested in fighting those diseases. Measles represents more than 
9 per cent of the burden but receives only 1.7 per cent of the aid for health 
(Shiffman 2006, 88). One health sub-sector that is considered to be severely 
under-aided compared to the burden it represents is nutrition (MacKellar 
2005, 18; Levine / Kuczynski 2009; DfID 2009; 2012).
4.7 The role of donors not reporting to the DAC
As with the previous chapter on under-aided countries, the analysis up to 
this point has been based on DAC data. However, whereas some non-DAC 
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donors such as eastern European countries report their aid flows to the DAC, 
this is generally not the case for emerging powers and private donors. The 
growing relevance of new and private donors makes it important to discuss 
their sectoral allocations as well. The following sections analyse the role of 
emerging countries and private donors in the phenomenon of under-aided 
sectors.
4.7.1 Cross-sector aid allocation by official donors not 
reporting to the DAC
Middle Eastern donors and emerging economies in Latin America and Asia 
focus mainly on productive rather than on social sectors, and in particular 
on infrastructure and energy (Kragelund 2008). Many authors (Foster et 
al. 2008; Berthélemy 2009, 27–28; Commission for Africa 2010; Kharas 
/ Rogerson 2012, 14; Tierney et al. 2011, 8–9; Asche / Schüller 2008, 43) 
argue that investments in infrastructure and agriculture by new donors are, 
in part, offsetting traditional donors’ neglect of these sectors. Tierney et al. 
(2011, 8–9) calculate that since 2000, aid to productive infrastructure has 
accounted for only 10 per cent of total development assistance (excluding 
debt relief) from DAC bilateral donors. However, once multilaterals and 
donors not reporting to the DAC are included in the calculation, the share 
of ODA going to the sector rises to 15 per cent. Although the precision of 
estimates of this kind is undermined by the lack of information on non-
DAC donors’ allocations, they still suggest that these donors’ investments 
in infrastructure partially offset the decline in infrastructure projects from 
DAC donors.
Recipient countries’ governments emphasise their appreciation for Chinese 
aid in particular by pointing out that it brings much-needed investments to 
the infrastructure and the agricultural sectors (Foster et al. 2008, vii; The 
Economist 2009; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 27). Moreover, by 
creating competition among donors and strengthening the recipient govern-
ment’s bargaining position, new donors’ engagement can sometimes also 
lead DAC donors to further align their assistance to national strategies and 
priorities (Gore 2013, 777; Walshe Roussel 2013).
However, new donors’ compensatory role is limited. First, aid by new 
donors tends to be concentrated in a relatively small number of countries 
(Dreher / Nunnenkamp / Thiele 2011; Kharas / Rogerson 2012, 14). Thus, 
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sectors neglected by DAC donors remain under-aided in countries that are 
not targeted by emerging donors. Second, new donors do not cover all sec-
tors neglected by DAC donors. Focused on supporting productive rather 
than social infrastructure, emerging donors are not particularly engaged in 
water and sanitation (Foster et al. 2008, 53).
4.7.2 Cross-sector aid allocation by private donors
Similarly to official DAC donors, aid from private sources is in large part 
directed to the social sectors (Ravishankar et al. 2009, 2121; Esser 2009; 
UN 2012, 24). Most NGOs are active in the sectors of health and educa-
tion (Werker / Ahmed 2008). However, NGO aid appears in some cases to 
be directed to neglected sub-sectors within the social sectors, such as non- 
communicable diseases (Nugent 2010, 14).
As for private foundations, these focus predominantly on health (Marten 
/ Witte 2008, 85). In 2010, US foundations allocated 53 per cent of their 
resources to health, followed by the sectors “economic growth and trade” 
(21 per cent), “democracy and governance” (15 per cent), and “education” 
(8 per cent) (Hudson Institute 2012, 11–12). Despite their focus on health, 
the compensatory role of private foundations seems to be greater than that 
of NGOs. Foundations are considered to be sometimes filling a niche by 
directing their resources to areas neglected by official donors (Marten 
/ Witte 2008, 85; Lundsgaarde et al. 2012, 55–56). For example, private 
foundations played a considerable role in agricultural and medical research, 
especially concerning crop development and infectious diseases. To a lesser 
extent, foundations have also been active in the supply of water and sanita-
tion (OECD 2003b, 1). However, even if they aim at filling niches, private 
foundations’ resources are dwarfed by ODA and are certainly insufficient 
for filling global funding gaps (Lundsgaarde et al. 2012, 11; Greenhill / 
Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 30).
4.8 Underlying causes for the emergence of under-aided 
sectors
DAC donors’ tendency to neglect some sectors suggests that these areas 
present a number of characteristics that make them unattractive for donors. 
Combined with insufficient information-sharing on each others’ allocations, 
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similarities in DAC donors’ sectoral preferences make misallocation of aid 
resources more likely (Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004, 2–3). More generally, the 
overcrowding of some sectors and the neglect of others points to a lack of 
coordination among donors engaged in the same countries (Frot / Santiso 
2010). The sections below first discuss which factors shape donor sectoral 
preferences, and then how the unattractiveness of certain sectors combines 
with the lack of donor coordination.
4.8.1 Visibility concerns
Cross-sector aid allocation is influenced by donors’ need to provide visi-
ble results to their domestic taxpayers (Easterly / Williamson 2011, 27–28). 
Aid agencies are accountable to taxpayers in their home countries, but 
these rarely are in a position to properly assess the effectiveness of aid 
programmes. This induces aid agencies to choose interventions with the 
highest visibility in order to demonstrate the successes of their engagement 
and guarantee continued funding (Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Thiele 2011, 12; 
Vollmer 2012). Some sectors are more suited for this purpose than others. 
Social sectors in particular are ideal for small projects with relatively low 
fixed costs that offer the possibility to achieve easily attributable and quick 
results, whereas this is not the case for sectors such as productive infrastruc-
ture or agriculture (Frot / Santiso 2010, 30).
Schulz (2007, 6) notes that donor preferences are influenced by the appeal 
that different topics have for public opinion in the North. For example, micro-
finance and women’s empowerment were popular in the 1990s, whereas 
climate change adaptation and renewable energy are the new “sexy” areas 
every donor wants to be engaged in. The author notes that sanitation is not 
an attractive topic for northern taxpayers and has therefore been chronically 
under-aided. Indeed, visibility plays a role also at the sub-sectoral level. 
Donors appear to focus on selected targets that receive more attention in the 
public debate, such as HIV/AIDS, whereas less publicised goals such as the 
immunisation against measles remain rather neglected (Thiele / Nunnen-
kamp / Dreher 2007). Little spending on medical and agricultural research 
is also partly attributable to these areas’ lack of visibility (OECD 2003a; 
Birdsall 2004, 20–21; Kenny 2006, 5; Zavale et al. 2011, 44).
Emphasis on observable outputs not only makes some sectors more attrac-
tive than others, but also influences the types of goods financed within a 
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sector, as indicated by donors’ preference for infrastructure investments 
over financing operational costs (Waddington 2004, 703; Bigsten 2006, 
16–17). Donors tend to overspend on building schools and hospitals and 
under-spend on maintenance and staffing: building schools is a more visible 
action than financing textbooks (Easterly 2002, 10).
Emerging donors’ and private foundations’ readiness to target some neglected 
areas can be seen in light of their relative independence from the pressure 
of providing visible results. Grimm et al. (2011, 26) note that for Chinese 
taxpayers, the pressing question is why China gives aid to other countries 
while still suffering from so much poverty at home. Aid must therefore be 
justified in terms of “mutual benefits” for both the recipient country and for 
China, rather than through the achievement of development results in poor 
countries (Grimm et al. 2011, 26). This might lead Chinese aid to prioritise 
trade and resource extraction rather than the social sectors. As for private 
foundations, their independent funding sources allow them to invest in risky 
and not very visible long-term activities such as medical and agricultural 
research (OECD 2003a, 19–22). Greater independence from public opin-
ion, as compared to official aid agencies, also gives them the possibility to 
engage in sensitive areas that might contrast with certain currents of public 
opinion. This is the case for biotechnology, for example, which is an area 
where official donors are reluctant to enter due to its controversial character 
(OECD 2003a, 19–22).47
Visibility plays a role in the relative neglect of some sectors, not only 
because it makes the less-visible sectors unattractive, but also because – by 
making donors reluctant to exit visible sectors (Knack / Rahman 2008, 14) 
– it poses serious obstacles for the achievement of in-country DoL. Donor 
coordination is also made difficult by the fact that the pursuit of visibility 
encourages uncoordinated “cherry-picking” of attractive projects by donors 
(Vollmer 2012, 38).
47 However, Lundsgaarde et al. (2012, 56) suggest that there might also be an alterna-
tive explanation for private foundations’ niche-filling role: small organisations such as 
foundations have an incentive to focus on very specific neglected issues where they can 
“make a difference” and show their impact. In this case, the possibility to achieve visible 
and attributable results would play an important role in the choice of sector foundations 
engage in. Esser and Bench (2011, 17) argue that concerns about visibility and measura-
bility influence sub-sectoral allocations in the health sector by official donors and private 
foundations equally.
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4.8.2 Strategic interests
Efficient allocation across sectors is undermined by the fact that aid is a for-
eign policy tool that is shaped by commercial interests, the quest for energy 
security the fight against illegal immigration, the need for security, etc. 
(Schulz 2007, 6). Nielsen (2008) finds that whereas domestic industries in 
donor countries have only limited influence on cross-country aid allocation, 
they significantly affect the composition of aid in favour of the sectors and 
sub-sectors from which they stand to benefit most. In the health sector, for 
example, sub-sectoral allocation is influenced by the potential for pharma-
ceutical companies to profit from drug sales for certain diseases (Álvarez / 
Acharya 2012, 22).
But there is also a more subtle type of interest that influences cross-sector 
allocation: Bermeo (2010) argues that the promotion of development in poor 
countries has a strategic importance for donors due to the growing phenom-
enon of spillovers from recipient to donor countries in an increasingly inter-
connected world. Her “strategic development” argument, which refers to 
donors’ tendency to predominantly target those recipients whose spillovers 
are more likely to affect donor countries, can also help in explaining donors’ 
preference for certain sectors over others. In this sense, larger shares of aid 
would be directed to those sectors that affect well-being in donor countries 
more directly, such as environmental conservation or the control of infec-
tious diseases. The health sector offers a good example of the influence of 
strategic interests in cross-sector aid allocation: Esser (2009) argues that 
large increases in aid to the health sector can be attributed at least to some 
extent to donors’ growing fears of negative health spillovers from develop-
ing countries. This becomes particularly visible at the sub-sectoral level: 
funding for health rose largely because of increased resources directed to 
the fight against HIV/AIDS (Álvarez / Acharya 2012, 8). Aid targeted at 
controlling the disease saw a sharp increase after 2000, when the Clinton 
administration defined HIV/AIDS as a national security threat because of 
the risk that the illness could produce political instability in developing 
countries (Shiffman 2006, 82). MacKellar (2005, 25) and Feldbaum and 
Michaud (2010) argue that funding within the health sector is related to the 
perceived threat that diseases pose for donor countries, rather than to the 
burden that different diseases represent within individual recipient coun-
tries. Thus, infectious diseases received higher political attention and larger 
funding than other health priorities such as chronic diseases, road traffic 
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injuries and the social determinants of health. Neglected tropical diseases 
are mostly non-communicable, and thus do not pose a threat to health in 
donor countries (Samuels / Rodríguez-Pose 2013, 1).
The recent revival of aid to agriculture – from US$ 4 billion in the mid-
2000s to just over US$ 8 billion in 2010 – has also been linked to the sector’s 
growing importance for donor countries (Elliot / Collins 2012, 1). After 
decades of neglect, agricultural development resumed some importance in 
donor agendas in the wake of the food price spikes in the 2007–2008 period 
(Umbadda / Elgizouli 2013, 6). Political interest in agriculture was reawak-
ened also by the riots that sharp increases in food prices sparked in many 
developing countries (Barrett / Bellemare 2011, 2–3). Considerations of this 
kind might be behind the focus on agriculture by new donors as well: grow-
ing domestic demand and rising global food prices are among the reasons 
why new donors are investing in the African agricultural sector (The Econ-
omist 2009; Asche / Schüller 2008, 43). Since food security is becoming a 
pressing global issue, China has made grain production in particular a top 
priority of its aid programmes (Berthélemy 2009).
Although promoting agricultural production or fighting HIV/AIDS is also 
in the interest of recipient countries, a focus on areas that affect well-being 
in donor countries might induce donors to neglect other sectors that are also 
crucial for recipient countries’ development.
4.8.3 Organisational incentives and the institutional context
The lack of strong national and international institutions responsible for a 
certain area can also contribute to its neglect. Although the failure of assign-
ing clear responsibility is itself the result of a lack of political attention 
towards a certain area, it is also true that without responsible bodies that 
push for a certain issue, political prioritisation is unlikely to occur (Shiffman 
/ Beer / Wu 2002). Whenever responsibility for a sector does not clearly lie 
with a lead government ministry, department or agency, it becomes unlikely 
that public resources will be specifically allocated to that sector (UNDP 
2011, 6). This is the case especially for areas that are split between various 
institutional entities, which produces unclear responsibilities among minis-
tries in partner countries, within donor agencies and also at the global level.
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An example is water and sanitation, whose neglect stands in contrast with 
the current focus on social sectors. Because it includes water supply, sani-
tation, hygiene and resource management, in most countries responsibility 
for the water sector is split between different ministries (Zipper / Hofbauer 
/ Verhoeven 2010, 21). Especially in SSA, it is often not clear as to which 
institution should lead on a particular issue, for example sanitation, and 
assume responsibility for the outcome (UN Water 2010, 38–39). At the 
donor level, the interrelatedness of the water sector with many other areas 
(UN Water 2010, 14) can lead donor agencies to allocate relatively little 
funding to the sector. Indeed, the various departments that are touched by 
an issue will not have an incentive to invest in it because such spending 
will not be very effective unless investments are made also from all other 
departments involved (GDPRD 2011, 14). At the global level, only a few 
players concentrate on water and sanitation. A vertical fund exclusively ded-
icated to water and sanitation, the Global Sanitation Fund, started working 
in 2008, but with only very limited funding. The inter-agency UN Water is 
responsible for coordinating water issues, but there is no lead UN body for 
the sector at the national level (DfID 2009). A similar pattern can be found 
in the agricultural sector, in which responsibilities for the provision of agri-
cultural extension services, market infrastructure, rural roads, clean water, 
etc., are usually spread across various ministries, international organisations 
and departments within donor agencies (GDPRD 2011, 7–14).
Another example is nutrition. The neglect of nutrition is interesting because 
the area actually presents many characteristics that should make it attractive 
for donors: undernutrition is an easily understandable problem that moves 
public opinion in northern countries, not least because it affects children and 
women disproportionally (MacKellar 2005, 18). Moreover, all the available 
evidence suggests that interventions to improve nutrition are particularly 
cost-effective and are among those with the highest rates of success (DfID 
2009). But efforts to improve nutrition necessarily span different sectors, 
such as agriculture, health, gender equality, water and sanitation, etc. Evi-
dence also suggests that efforts to improve nutrition have been forthcoming 
and highly successful in the few countries where clear institutional responsi-
bilities for fighting hunger were identified (Acosta / Fanzo 2012, 18). How-
ever, both at the national and international levels, hunger generally seems to 
be “everybody’s business and nobody’s responsibility: a political, adminis-
trative and institutional orphan” (DfID 2009, 35). At the national level, the 
fact that the problem affects in particular the poorest social groups, whose 
Forgotten or unpromising? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 89
political voices and lobbying capacities tend to be weak, induces political 
leaders to assign low priority to the area (DfID 2009, 35). This is the case 
not only for undernutrition, but also for most NTDs (Samuels / Rodríguez-
Pose 2013, 1). At the international level, the different funding, technical, 
executing and opinion-shaping institutions involved have failed to unite 
and produce a cohesive message and strong advocacy campaigns (Levine / 
Kuczynski 2009, 12–14).
On the other hand, international prioritisation for certain areas can pose 
obstacles to the alignment of external assistance to recipient countries’ 
 specific priorities. International commitments oblige donors to allocate at 
least a certain amount of aid to specific areas such as climate change, mother- 
child health, etc. Donors will thus want to allocate funds to these purposes, 
independently from the priority status these areas have in recipients’ national 
development strategies.
4.8.4 Concerns about the effectiveness of aid programmes in 
certain sectors
Neglect of certain sectors can also be linked to the perception that aid pro-
grammes in those sectors are not particularly effective. Frot and Santiso 
(2010, 17–18) argue that large shifts in cross-sector aid allocation patterns 
illustrate the history of development thinking since its beginning: donors ini-
tially concentrated on agriculture and productive infrastructure, but the pro-
grammes’ high rates of failure induced donors to turn to an agenda of struc-
tural adjustments and macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s. The degraded 
status of agriculture and infrastructure is directly traceable from falling aid 
receipts to these sectors. Subsequently, disappointed by the results of this 
last agenda, donors started concentrating on institutional reform, corruption 
and democracy, as indicated by the rapid growth of the “government and 
civil society” sector.
Although the authors criticise donors’ tendency to let their allocation pat-
terns shift along with what they call “development fashions”, it actually 
seems encouraging that donors take past experiences into account and fol-
low the findings of the literature. Easterly (2008, 68–69) argues that – to 
the extent to which donors’ reluctance to invest in the agricultural sector is 
driven by past experiences of failed agricultural programmes in SSA – the 
sharp decline in aid to agriculture can be seen as a positive sign of learning 
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from mistakes. However, changes in the distribution of aid across sectors are 
often due to the appeal of a new development theory rather than to serious 
programme evaluations. A symptom of this is that development fashions 
tend to cyclically repeat themselves (Easterly 2008, 105).
While the decision to turn away from failed interventions could lead to a 
more efficient sectoral aid allocation, a number of factors might produce 
the opposite result: first, it is possible that donors neglect a whole sector, 
whereas failure is linked only to the predominant type of intervention tried 
in the sector. A different type of activity in the same sector might be more 
effective. For example, Bird et al. (2002, 22) point out that integrated rural 
development programmes have largely been a failure, but that this does not 
justify the neglect of the whole agricultural sector. Second, the short time 
frame used for assessing results is problematic for sectors where results 
might take longer to materialise (Álvarez /Acharya 2012, 31). The three-
year posting, common for most donor agency staff, contributes to this short-
term focus by creating incentives to fund quick-results projects (Develop-
ment Initiatives 2013, 102). Third, considerations of effectiveness might be 
equalled with the need to show quick results for reasons of visibility, or used 
as excuses for not engaging in sectors that are unimportant from a strategic 
perspective. At the country level, donors sometimes label recipients as poor 
performers as a pretext for not engaging in the country (ODI 2004, xiii). 
This might apply to sectors as well.
4.8.5 Risk-pooling and herding behaviour
Risk-pooling and herding behaviour might also induce donors to neglect 
certain sectors. Risk-averse donors might be reluctant to invest in a sector 
where few other donors are involved. Knack and Rahman (2008) argue that 
donors have an incentive to concentrate in areas where many other donors 
are active in order to spread responsibility for potential failure. The need 
for visibility should induce donors to focus on a sector where few other 
donors are engaged and where each donor’s activities will be more visible 
and easier to attribute. But while pressuring donors to seek projects that are 
highly visible, accountability to domestic taxpayers also makes them very 
risk-averse (World Bank 2011a, 201). With many donors engaged in a sec-
tor, responsibility will be diffused (Bigsten 2006, 4). Social sectors might 
thus be particularly attractive not only because they offer the possibility to 
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carry out visible projects with low fixed costs (Frot / Santiso 2010, 24), but 
also because large numbers of donors are present.
Moreover, it is likely that the herding behaviour observed at the country 
level (Frot / Santiso 2009; Desai / Kharas 2010; Barthel 2012) influences 
the distribution of resources across sectors as well. Esser (2009) claims that, 
in the health sector, donor priorities influence one another, producing a con-
centration of total aid flows in a relatively narrow range of areas. Shiffman 
(2006, 83) notes that fear of being left aside induces donors to focus on the 
same areas as other actors in the international community.
4.8.6 Interaction between different factors
Neglected sectors might present one or several of the characteristics outlined 
above: lack of visibility; weak strategic importance for donors; absence of a 
responsible institutional body; scarcity of examples of successful interven-
tions; and few donors engaged. These factors can also influence each other. 
Shiffman, Beer and Wu (2002) find that, in the health sector, advocacy 
campaigns and international coalitions to fight a certain disease are easier 
to form when the disease is perceived as a threat by politicians in donor 
countries. These coalitions then put the disease high on the political agenda, 
thereby contributing towards strengthening public opinion that a certain dis-
ease represents a danger that can be brought under control with effective 
aid interventions. While the authors focus on explaining the emergence of 
darling sectors, the interrelatedness they point out can be helpful for under-
standing why some sectors are neglected. Thus, a certain area’s lack of stra-
tegic importance might hinder the emergence of strong advocacy campaigns 
that could increase taxpayers’ support for interventions in the sector. In turn, 
this makes the sector less relevant in terms of visibility. Risk-pooling and 
herding behaviour might also produce a vicious circle in which sectors that 
are already neglected become even less attractive precisely because they are 
neglected by other donors.
4.9 Lack of donor coordination
In a context of similar donor preferences and herding behaviour, insuffi-
cient coordination among donors often results in overcrowded and frag-
mented sectors, on the one hand, and neglected sectors on the other (Frot / 
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 Santiso 2010; Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004, 2–3). The lack of strong and well- 
functioning coordination frameworks makes taking informed decisions 
about inter-sectoral aid allocation more difficult (Bigsten 2006; Nunnen-
kamp / Öhler / Thiele 2011). This tends to produce allocation patterns that 
do not match national priorities (Kasuga 2008, 3).
Commitments have been made to establish coordination frameworks for 
country-level aid allocations, in order to improve alignment and avoid the 
emergence of orphan and darling sectors (OECD 2008, 1–3). The EU Code 
of Conduct envisages a three-step DoL procedure: first, a mapping exercise 
should give a clear picture of different donors’ engagement in the various 
sectors. Second, recipient governments will have to express their prefer-
ences about the distribution of donors across sectors, and donors on their 
side should identify their sectoral comparative advantages. Finally, the two 
sides are expected to jointly reach an agreement on a DoL framework and 
implement it. From the perspective of each donor, in most cases this will 
require a reallocation of aid across sectors and/or the use of delegated coop-
eration (EC 2011, 6).
However, progress on in-country DoL is slow in almost all countries. Nun-
nenkamp, Öhler and Thiele (2011) find that coordination among donors 
has even weakened after the adoption of the Paris Declaration. In 2011, 
the Third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track 
Initiative on Division of Labour (EC 2011) assessed the status quo in 30 
partner countries in different regions and at varying income levels. It con-
cluded that although mapping exercises have been implemented in many 
countries, subsequent efforts in reprogramming appear to be dwindling after 
having peaked in 2009 (EC 2011, 7). Moreover, even in cases where they 
exited from overcrowded sectors, donors have rarely expressed the intention 
to increase engagement in neglected sectors (Zipper / Hofbauer / Verhoeven 
2010, 36; Christiansen et al. 2007, 54).
As was noted for the country level, half-hearted and uncoordinated efforts 
to rationalise sectoral aid allocation could be even more damaging than no 
effort at all if pursued by individual donors in an uncoordinated way. This 
is a real concern because reprogramming – when it occurs – tends to be 
unilaterally decided at donors’ headquarters (EC 2011, 7). Orphan sectors 
can emerge also from uncoordinated actions aimed at achieving a better 
DoL at the international level. The sectors where donors exiting a country 
used to be active might end up being under-aided if remaining donors do not 
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coordinate their allocations with the exiting donor. This was the case with 
the Swedish exit from Honduras, for example. Sectors such as human rights, 
politico-electoral capacity-building and transparency were abandoned after 
the Swedish exit. Despite the importance given to the area by the recipi-
ent government, other donors have not shown a willingness to engage in 
the sectors in which Sweden terminated its programmes (Puerto Gómez / 
Schulz 2009, 19).
Obstacles to the establishment of a well-functioning DoL can be found both 
on the side of the donors and of the partner governments. The following two 
sections briefly review both.
4.9.1 Obstacles to the implementation of DoL commitments 
on the donor side
Most of the factors and incentives responsible for producing a situation 
that calls for better donor coordination are, at the same time, undermining 
coordination efforts. In-country DoL requires donors to exit overcrowded 
sectors and enter under-aided ones. But the higher visibility, priority and 
perceived effectiveness that characterise darling sectors make individual 
donors reluctant to abandon them (Knack / Rahman 2008, 14; Hartmann 
2011, 8). Improved information coming from mapping exercises seems 
insufficient if the same structure of incentives is maintained in the aid 
architecture (Schulz 2007, 7; Vollmer 2013). In general, because of vested 
interests, visibility and accountability to domestic taxpayers, donors are 
reluctant to share power and to release control over their funding (Woods 
2011, 7). But there are also obstacles that are more specific to in-country 
DoL.
To start with, reaching an agreement over sector definitions has proven dif-
ficult (Mürle 2007, 23). Identifying each donor’s comparative advantage in 
different sectors is also problematic, given the absence of an independent 
evaluator and of clear assessment criteria (Schumacher / Sawadogo 2010, 
67). Consequently, establishing the respective roles for donors in the differ-
ent sectors is a sensitive and thorny issue (Schulz 2007, 6). Similarities in 
donors’ sectoral preferences and concerns about visibility make it difficult 
to reach an agreement on sector leadership, because donors often want to 
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lead in the same sectors (Weingärtner 2008).48 Technical issues such as dif-
ferences in programming cycles, but also lack of trust, make donors reluc-
tant to delegate aid programmes to other donors (Zipper / Hofbauer / Ver-
hoeven 2010, 37). Moreover, aid agencies’ staff is often not engaged in the 
process, and perceives tasks related to DoL as being additional workloads 
of low priority (Christiansen et al. 2007, 67).
Another problem is that too much decision-power lies at the headquarters 
(HQ) level: sector allocation happens in consultation with the partner coun-
try, but HQs play a decisive role. HQs tend to pursue a certain coherency 
in their programmes across recipient countries, and this might lead them 
to support always the same sectors, even if national priorities and DoL 
arrangements differ among countries (Vollmer 2013, 29; Zipper / Hofbauer 
/ Verhoeven 2010, 33). An evaluation of the Paris Declaration identified 
HQs’ insistence on their distinctive activities for reasons of visibility among 
the main reasons behind extremely limited progress on DoL arrangements 
(Wood et al. 2011, 26–27). A strong role for HQs might be necessary in order 
to allow individual donors to specialise in a smaller range of sectors, which 
the European CoC defines as an integral part of DoL (EC 2007). Mürle 
(2007, 36–37) argues that it would be inefficient for all donors to build up 
sectoral capacities in all sectors. Sectoral specialisation at a regional or even 
global scale would allow donors to develop a strong expertise and benefit 
from economies of scale. Moreover, in-country DoL would be facilitated 
because it would be easier to identify comparative advantages. However, 
some sectors might be left behind if HQs decide unilaterally on specialisa-
tion without taking other donors’ sectoral allocation and the national priori-
ties of recipient countries into account.
Challenges to coordination seem to affect bilateral donors more than multi-
lateral ones: analysing coordination across sectors and sub-national regions, 
Öhler (2013 14) finds that, due to reasons of political and commercial com-
petition, bilateral donors coordinate among themselves less than multilat-
eral donors. He also finds that bilateral donors coordinate more with multi-
lateral donors than among themselves.
48 In Malawi, for example, six donors were claiming leadership roles in sectors such as 
“economic governance” and “education”, whereas no donor wanted to lead in sectors 
such as “tourism” or “wildlife and culture”. A minimum of two leaders is considered to 
be necessary for guaranteeing the continuity of aid programmes (Government of Malawi 
2010, 38).
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The growing number of donors involved, including private and emerging 
donors, makes agreeing on a DoL framework more challenging. Fengler and 
Kharas (2011, 6) argue that, while coordinating an expanding number of 
actors is increasingly difficult, the nature of the challenge has not changed. 
However, it seems reasonable to think, as Nunnenkamp, Öhler and Thiele 
(2011, 12) remark, that the presence of many donors will also weaken incen-
tives to engage in costly coordination efforts, since improved coordination 
is a public good and the individual benefits for each actor will be reduced.
Aid from vertical funds such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria flows largely outside the recipient country’s budget processes and 
poses a particularly serious obstacle to alignment and harmonisation (Dri-
scoll / Evans 2005, 15; IMF / World Bank 2007, 18). China and other impor-
tant new donors have not even been fully integrated into DoL negotiation 
processes (Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Thiele 2011, 13) and do not seem eager 
to participate in what they perceive as a DAC-led process (Kragelund 2008, 
580; Xu 2012, 2; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 30). Some (Chigunta 
/ Matshalaga 2010, 13; EC 2011, 2) point out that donors that are not even 
formally integrated in DoL processes represent a serious obstacle to the 
achievement of an efficient sectoral allocation within countries. However, 
progress in terms of donor specialisation and coordination is currently held 
back, mainly by weak engagement from both traditional donors and partner 
governments (Bigsten 2006). Moreover, other authors (Berthélemy 2009, 
15; Burnet 2011, 181) maintain that, because of their focus on areas that 
tend to be neglected by traditional donors, emerging donors’ activities pose 
relatively few challenges to within-country DoL.
4.9.2 Obstacles to the implementation of DoL commitments 
on the recipient’s side
Partner country leadership is the first of the International Good Practice 
Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity 
(OECD 2009a). The difficulties encountered by donors when trying to 
define their respective roles and comparative advantages suggest that recip-
ient countries could facilitate DoL processes by giving clear indications on 
the distribution of donors across sectors. Although still weak, incentives 
for promoting better coordination are stronger for the recipient government 
than for donors (Woods 2011, 13).
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However, aid dependency makes recipient countries reluctant to take on a 
leadership role in DoL processes. Partner governments are cautious about 
asking donors to exit overcrowded sectors because of the fear that this will 
result in reduced overall funding (Schulz 2007, 5).49 For the partner coun-
try, it is not obvious that increased coordination among donors will lead 
to better alignment to the country’s needs (Bigsten 2006, 15; UNDP 2011, 
7). On the contrary, it could lead to a “donor cartel” that imposes its own 
preferences and conditions (Rocha Menocal / Rogerson 2006, 9). Politi-
cians in recipient countries also often have weak incentives to rationalise 
aid allocation because uncoordinated and intransparent allocations make it 
easier to use aid resources for corruption and patronage networks (Moss / 
Pettersson / van de Walle 2006, 10; Knack / Rahman 2008, 13–14). Lack 
of transparency in aid allocation also undermines recipient governments’ 
ability to steer the process. Governments often struggle to acquire precise 
information on how much aid is invested in their country, by whom and for 
what purposes (Publish What You Fund 2010, 1).
Widespread lack of country ownership in the process was identified as a 
major obstacle for DoL efforts (EC 2011, 10). Progress on donor coordina-
tion varies across countries, and tends to be greater where strong govern-
ments show a willingness to push for better coordination, as was the case, for 
example, in Rwanda and in Cambodia (OECD 2011a, 68). Kasuga (2008, 
14–16) finds that high- and middle-income East Asian countries where gov-
ernments have taken on leadership in the distribution of aid programmes 
across different sectors are the only cases where sectoral aid allocation is in 
line with national priorities.
4.10 Conclusions and policy recommendations for under-
aided sectors
Given the difficulties of comparing needs and performance across sectors, 
this chapter proposed assessing the sectoral distribution of aid resources 
49 For example, the Government of Malawi states in bold letters that it is “against asking 
development partners to withdraw from a sector and against the introduction of a maxi-
mum number of sectors per development partner” (Government of Malawi 2010, 38). The 
government recognises that neglected sectors are also those where donors have the least 
experience and explicitly expresses the concern that exiting from darling sectors might 
not be followed by engagement in under-aided ones (Government of Malawi 2010, 17).
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against its alignment to recipient countries’ priorities, as expressed in 
national development strategy documents. A sector would thus be con-
sidered under-aided if the gap between the external funding envisaged in 
national strategy papers and the aid volume actually received were substan-
tially larger than for other sectors. Such an approach implies that the identi-
fication of “under-aided” sectors is country-specific, and identifying under-
aided sectors would be difficult in countries lacking financially detailed 
strategy documents. However, in general, sectors such as agriculture, pro-
ductive infrastructure, and water and sanitation tend to attract fewer donors 
and receive disproportionally low amounts of aid. Because donors tend to 
neglect those sectors at a global level, it is also likely that these will be the 
sectors that are identified as under-aided in country-specific analyses.
Sectors neglected by DAC aid sometimes receive funding from emerging 
and private donors whose priorities and allocation patterns differ to some 
extent from those of traditional donors. But this compensatory role does not 
appear to be sufficient or to cover all under-aided sectors. Steps have been 
taken towards the establishment of an in-country DoL that aims at increas-
ing aid effectiveness and addressing the problem of darling and orphan sec-
tors. However, a lack of incentives, both on the donors’ and on the recipi-
ents’ side, has hampered implementation. The two most important steps for 
addressing the problem of under-aided sectors are improving coordination 
and leveraging additional funding.
4.10.1 Improving donor coordination in cross-sector allocation
Addressing the problem of orphan sectors will require action that goes 
beyond increasing aid volumes for the specific sectors that are currently 
under-aided. Shifting development fashions and donor priorities might 
change the spectrum of neglected sectors in the future. For one reason or 
another, some sectors will always be less attractive than others. A strong 
DoL framework would help to avert gaps in aid allocation, independent of 
whichever sector is identified as under-aided.
Mapping of donor activities across sectors is the first step of the DoL pro-
cess and has taken place already in a good number of countries (EC 2011, 
7). This good practice should continue, and donor mappings should be reg-
ularly updated. As recommended by the International Good Practice Prin-
ciples for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity (OECD 
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2009a), data systems should display donors’ activities in the frame of the 
recipient government’s development programmes and multi-year expendi-
ture frameworks. Information on donor interventions should show how the 
different activities fit with the country’s strategies and how they contribute 
to the national budget.
Such a system would allow for linking reallocation decisions to under-aided 
sectors with ongoing programming processes by the national government 
in the affected sectors. This would improve the timing of reallocations – a 
necessity that has been sometimes emphasised (e.g. Zipper / Hofbauer / 
Verhoeven 2010, 37). The importance of integrating information about aid 
programmes into national planning frameworks highlights the close link 
between DoL and alignment.
Although being aware of other donors’ planned sectoral allocations is cru-
cial to avoid funding gaps, sharing information also on the results of past 
aid programmes would help in identifying comparative advantages. Inde-
pendent evaluations and the development of good indicators for all sectors 
would allow for assessing each donor’s performance and facilitate the distri-
bution of roles among donors. However, this might also show that only a few 
donors have expertise in orphan sectors. Thus, assessments of comparative 
advantages should give importance also to commitments of future engage-
ment, as pointed out by Mürle (2007, 15).
The main challenge remains that donors show little engagement in achiev-
ing a better DoL and tackling the problem of under-aided areas. Donors 
have shown a willingness to improve information-sharing and undergo 
mapping exercises, but reallocation to the identified under-aided sectors is 
hindered by donors’ preference for some sectors, and by a lack of institu-
tional incentives to push for reallocation, especially at the HQ level. Greater 
independence from HQs’ sectoral priorities would enable country offices to 
take action once under-aided areas are identified. The necessity of delegat-
ing more responsibility for sectoral reallocation to embassies and country 
offices is stressed both by the OECD (2009a) and by the Monitoring Report 
of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity 
(EC 2009, 7).
More importantly, partner countries should take the lead in the DoL process. 
Recipient countries should, first of all, make sure their national strategy doc-
uments are well-costed and prioritised, in order to facilitate donors’ align-
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ment to national priorities. Detailed documents with clear requirements 
 concerning the sectoral allocation of aid will also offer recipient govern-
ments a tool for demanding accountability from donors when the cross- 
sector distribution of aid is not aligned to national strategies. Fragile states 
and other countries with weak institutions might need assistance from donors 
in developing such documents. Partner countries could then set up aid- 
coordination agencies that would provide data on “who does what where” 
and flag under-aided sectors, as proposed by Fengler and Kharas (2011, 6). 
They should also play a greater role in identifying different donors’ compar-
ative advantages. Partner countries could push for the bottom-up approach 
proposed by De Renzio and Rogerson (2005), in which recipients define 
who should give aid where, taking into account differences among donors 
related to volume, type, timeframe and reliability of aid flows, but also to 
professional experience, the willingness of different aid agencies to respect 
ownership, the level of mutual trust and the performance record of past 
interventions.
Donors can encourage recipient governments to take on the leadership of 
DoL efforts in a number of ways: first, donors should address concerns 
about decreases in overall funding volumes by stressing that DoL processes 
will not result in reduced country envelopes. They should underline their 
commitment to the principle set in the Accra Agenda for Action (§17a) that 
division of labour processes should have no impact on overall aid volumes 
for individual countries. This will not help in addressing concerns within 
ministries of currently privileged sectors, which might still worry about 
reductions in aid volumes to their own sector. However, assurances that the 
total country envelope will not be reduced might foster engagement by min-
istries of neglected sectors, which are likely to see an increase in their aid 
receipts as a consequence of DoL, and by the ministry of finance, which 
could gain a better overview and a larger say over the use of aid money. 
Second, partner governments’ engagement can be strengthened by reinforc-
ing the link between DoL and alignment. Integrating information on donor 
activities in national planning and budget processes can help in highlighting 
the potential for DoL to improve the alignment of foreign assistance with 
national priorities. Third, the international community should show greater 
openness towards recipient governments’ assessments of different donors’ 
comparative advantages. When needed, they should also encourage and 
assist partner countries in undertaking those assessments.
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Strengthening the recipient government’s leadership role in the DoL process 
might also help in encouraging non-DAC donors to take part in the process. 
New and private donors should increase their involvement in DoL efforts, 
and might be more inclined to do so if the agenda is not perceived as being 
steered and dominated by DAC donors. Recognising emerging donors’ com-
pensatory role in neglected sectors should give traditional donors an incen-
tive to foster their inclusion in DoL negotiation frameworks. DAC mem-
bers and partner countries should continue to encourage emerging donors’ 
participation in peer reviews of DAC donors’ aid performance as well as 
in coordination activities, as suggested by Kragelund (2008, 580). Private 
donors and vertical funds should be integrated into DoL processes as well. 
The relatively narrow spectrum of sectoral engagement that characterises 
both these types of actors will often pose a limit to their possibilities for 
reallocation. But their inclusion into DoL frameworks is important in order 
to obtain a clear picture of over- and under-aided sectors.
4.10.2 Leveraging additional funding for under-aided sectors
A better DoL across sectors can improve aid effectiveness in darling sectors 
as well by reducing the number of donors and the related transaction costs 
(Álvarez /Acharya 2012, 22). However, transaction costs in darling sectors 
could be brought down also through increased levels of coordination among 
donors active in those sectors. Instead, DoL implies a certain degree of real-
location from over-aided sectors to under-aided ones. To the extent to which 
the cost of reallocation for darling sectors is set off by decreased transaction 
costs and reduced duplications, this will not result in reduced aid (in terms 
of value) for these sectors. But there will likely also be many cases where 
darling sectors lose out due to reallocation.
Even when donors exit overcrowded sectors as a result of DoL, they rarely 
show willingness to enter unattractive sectors. But addressing the problem 
of under-aided sectors might not necessarily require changing the distri-
bution of donors across sectors. Funding for neglected areas can be raised 
without increasing the number of donors active in those sectors, for example 
through delegation. In this case, delegation could be used as an instrument 
for phasing-into a sector, rather than phasing-out. In sectors where they do 
not have a particular strategic interest, donors might be less reluctant to 
delegate their aid programmes to others. Moreover, bilateral donors could 
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direct more resources to neglected areas through multilateral donors. Chan-
nelling larger shares of aid through budget support can also increase the 
level of funding for under-aided sectors without changing the distribution 
of donors across sectors. However, the number of donors engaged in an area 
should not be too low, as insufficient competition among actors can decrease 
the quality of aid provided (Frot / Santiso 2009, 22). For sectors where weak 
capacities for managing aid discourage donor engagement, capacity devel-
opment programmes could be directed at improving the conditions for aid 
implementation within those sectors.
Particular attention should be paid to cross-cutting issues such as nutri-
tion and rural development, for which there is no clear responsibility at the 
national and/or international levels. The OECD (2009a) encourages lead 
donors in the different sectors involved to make sure that areas that span 
various sectors are not neglected. But donors could also consider identifying 
specific lead donors for cross-cutting issues in order to define clear respon-
sibilities for these areas.
Addressing the phenomenon of under-aided sectors and ensuring good cov-
erage of all areas identified as priorities by partner countries is important not 
only from the point of view of an efficient cross-sector allocation: it would 
also prove donors’ commitment to the principles of ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation and mutual accountability.
5 Under-aided sub-national regions
5.1 Chapter overview
This chapter treats the topic of aid allocation across sub-national regions. 
After highlighting the importance of this level of aid allocation for aid effec-
tiveness, the chapter discusses the lack of attention given to the topic in both 
development theory and practice. A section underlining the limitations that 
donors are likely to face when trying to determine the cross-regional distri-
bution of aid resources is followed by an effort to identify criteria that could 
guide donors’ allocations across sub-national regions. Then, the scarce evi-
dence available on aid allocation patterns at the sub-national level by DAC 
and non-DAC donors is reviewed. Finally, some conclusions and policy rec-
ommendations for cross-regional aid allocation close the chapter.
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An analysis of the sub-national distribution of aid resources can be carried 
out at various geographical levels. The smaller the examined sub-national 
entities, the better-targeted aid allocation can be. The evidence shows that 
substantial differences in needs exist even between geographical units of 
very small scale such as the county or the village (Simler / Nhate 2005; 
Gräb / Grimm 2009). However, the aim of this discussion is to highlight the 
relevance of the sub-national distribution of aid for improving the efficiency 
of allocation, rather than to define the spatial level at which the needs anal-
ysis should be carried out. The term “region” is used here for referring to 
large- and medium-scale sub-national units, which, depending on the coun-
try, are also called “districts”, “provinces”, etc.
5.2 Why could under-aided regions undermine aid 
effectiveness?
From an aid-effectiveness perspective, it is not sufficient to look at countries 
only, because countries often include a wide variety of regions with different 
characteristics and degrees of need (World Bank 2009, 84–92). Not differ-
entiating between areas within a country bears the risk of overlooking areas 
where aid could be particularly effective and missing opportunities for a 
more efficient allocation of aid. Accurately targeting extreme poverty within 
countries will be key for the goal of ending poverty by 2030 (Development 
Initiatives 2013, 30).
Moreover, uncoordinated donors might be focusing on the same regions 
while neglecting others, leading to an inefficient allocation of the total 
country envelope. There might thus be under-aided regions even in coun-
tries receiving relatively large amounts of aid (Öhler 2013, 2). If donors 
fail to coordinate the distribution of their aid across sub-national regions 
as well as across countries and sectors, this would imply that the costs 
of failed coordination are even higher than currently estimated (Powell / 
Findley 2011, 3).
Besides the possibility of identifying opportunities for a more efficient allo-
cation of aid, analysing sub-national allocation patterns is also relevant from 
a risk-perspective. Inequalities in the distribution of domestic and foreign 
resources across a country’s territory can easily create tensions between 
regions and even lead to conflict (Stewart 2001). Regional inequalities are 
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especially dangerous when they coincide with divisions along ethnic or reli-
gious lines (Stewart 2005; Langer / Stewart / Venugopal 2010). Given that 
foreign aid accounts for a sometimes very large percentage of government 
expenditures (Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 2006, 3), it is important to 
look at the role of aid in this respect.
5.3 Sub-national aid allocation: a neglected topic in 
development theory and practice
Aid allocation at the sub-national level appears to be a widely neglected 
issue in both development theory and practice. Throughout the literature 
on aid allocation, it is extremely rare to find mention of the sub-national 
distribution of aid resources. When the issue is raised, it is generally 
to point out the lack of attention given to the topic. Powell and Findley 
(2011, 8) argue that the findings of the literature on aid allocation could 
be undermined by the choice of the country as the only unit of analysis. 
For example, the literature might find that aid allocations are needs-based 
because aid is directed in prevalence to the poorest countries, but donors 
might not be targeting the neediest regions within those countries. On the 
other hand, allocation patterns that direct large shares of aid to middle- 
income countries might be more needs-oriented than they appear if, at 
the sub-national level, donors are targeting those regions that are most 
in need. Moreover, it has been suggested (Dionney / Kramonz / Roberts 
2013, 5) that inefficient allocation of aid resources across sub-national 
regions may be one of the reasons why previous studies have found that 
apparently successful aid interventions had little development impact on 
the country as a whole.
As for development practice, several observations suggest that donors 
assign low priority to the cross-regional distribution of aid resources, and 
this could undermine allocative efficiency: first, cross-country aid alloca-
tion formulas are based on national averages and generally do not take 
the sub-national dimension into account. This could inadvertently set per-
verse incentives for recipient governments to neglect certain regions. Cur-
rent allocation formulas that assess needs exclusively at the national level 
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might induce governments to neglect some regions in order to drive up the 
country’s needs and make the country eligible for larger volumes of aid.50
Second, the MDGs set targets and indicators of progress at the country level, 
which might contribute to withdrawing attention from the sub-national 
dimension. Often, progress at the national level fails to be reflected equally 
throughout sub-national regions (Development Initiatives 2013, 96). A 
UNICEF (2010) analysis of progress towards the MDGs in 68 developing 
countries shows that measures of progress based on national averages often 
conceal large – and sometimes widening – disparities in various dimensions 
of poverty within countries.51 The report criticises donors’ focus on the “low 
hanging fruit” of easy-to-reach communities in order to make quick gains 
towards the MDGs, and argues that it will be more costly – and in some 
cases impossible – to reach the MDGs without specifically targeting those 
neglected sub-national regions that are lagging behind (UNICEF 2010, 1).
Third, the issue of regional inequalities is absent from donors’ main policy 
documents. Higgins, Bird and Harris (2010, 7) review the policy papers 
from most major donors and find that only the Australian Agency for Inter-
national Development refers to the issue of sub-national spatial disparities. 
This suggests that regional inequalities are not a policy priority for donors. 
Failure to take regional inequalities into account might undermine aid 
50 This applies not only to needs-based but also to performance-based allocation formulas: 
performance-based formulas used by IDA and by most other multilateral banks typi-
cally consider national per capita income, population size and a country’s CPIA score. 
Recipient governments’ sub-national resource allocation patterns and their stance towards 
regional inequalities are not taken into account when evaluating governance. The CPIA 
does consider “equity of public resource use under policies for social inclusion”, but this 
refers more to equity between social groups than between geographical or administrative 
regions (World Bank 2011b, 69–70). Hence, widening regional inequalities would not 
directly affect the assessment of a country’s institutional performance. On the other hand, 
high poverty in certain regions would drive down the national average income. From the 
recipient government’s perspective, neglecting some regions would thus be rational, in 
that it would keep the country’s need indicators high without lowering the government’s 
performance score.
51 Nepal offers a good example for this type of uneven progress: between 1996 and 2000, the 
country figured as a good performer thanks to an increase in its national HDI from 0.325 
to 0.466. In the meantime, however, HDI for the far-western and mid-western regions, 
where the Maoist insurgence took shape, was worsening, and was between 45 per cent 
and 35 per cent of the HDI rate in the capital city, Kathmandu (Murshed / Gates 2005, 
124–125).
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effectiveness, particularly in fragile contexts (OECD 2011b; Stewart 2005; 
Langer / Stewart / Venugopal 2010).
Fourth, in-country DoL efforts focus almost exclusively on the distribution 
of donors across sectors (Grimm / Schulz 2009). Documents that set out 
a strategy for establishing in-country DoL are silent on the cross-regional 
distribution of donors and aid programmes.52 Although mapping exercises 
showing the distribution of donors across sectors have been carried out in 
many countries (EC 2011), these have not touched on the distribution of 
donors across regions. However, the fact that two donors are engaged in the 
same sector within a country does not imply duplication of efforts if the two 
donors are active in different regions (Öhler 2013, 3).
5.4 Recipient governments’ allocation patterns and donors’ 
influence on sub-national aid allocation
One of the most important comparative advantages of aid in reaching the 
poor is that it can be targeted specifically to people and places not suffi-
ciently covered by governments and markets. At the same time, aid is often 
a small resource, even in countries with large aid receipts. Therefore, aid 
should be allocated where it can bring about the most value added in the 
context of other resources (Development Initiatives 2013, 94).
The efficiency of sub-national aid allocation should be assessed in the wider 
context of the distribution of resources within a country by the central gov-
ernment. Varying degrees of need among regions are largely determined 
by the distribution of other domestic and foreign resources beyond aid by 
the national government (Kanbur / Venables 2005). This is even more so in 
developing countries and transition economies, where sub-national govern-
ments depend heavily on federal transfers to cover spending. In these coun-
tries, intergovernmental transfers finance about 60 per cent of sub-national 
expenses, compared with about a third in member countries of the OECD 
52 The EU CoC (EC 2007) does not mention the question of donor coordination in aid alloca-
tion across sub-national entities. The International Good Practice Principles for Country- 
Led Division of Labour and Complementarity (OECD 2009) only mentions it briefly in 
principle 3: “Partner countries and donors should commit to avoiding duplication and 
fragmentation and ensuring the optimal use of development resources in the locations, 
sectors and thematic areas where they work and in the aid modalities through which they 
channel their assistance” (OECD 2009) [author’s emphasis].
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(World Bank 2009, 248). Dependency on central government transfers is 
particularly pronounced for rural and economically disadvantaged regions 
that have thinner tax bases than better-off regions (Yatta / Vaillancourt 2010, 
34).
Large imbalances in the sub-national distribution of resources exist in many 
countries (World Bank 2009, 248; Bird et al. 2002; Kanbur / Venables 2005). 
This is often due to entrenched patronage structures that shape the govern-
ment’s allocation patterns (Bräutigam 2000, 35; Svensson 2005, 27; Keefer / 
Khemani 2003; Magaloni 2006; Easterly / Levine 1997, 21–22). But neglect 
of certain regions might also be a reflection of governments attending to the 
preferences of a majority that lives in other parts of the country (Bird et al. 
2002, 3; World Bank 2009, 249; Bird / McKay / Shinyekwa 2010, 27).
Donors might have a compensatory effect on inefficient or unequal domestic 
resource distributions by allocating their aid in a way that helps to improve 
overall allocative efficiency and/or balances spatial inequalities. But aid 
might also do the opposite, thereby producing inefficiencies and aggravat-
ing regional disparities. Stewart (2005) claims that where imbalances in the 
allocation of domestic resources exist, donors should try to mitigate them 
through their own aid budgets. However, donors might not be able to prevent 
political leaders in recipient countries from directing aid resources preva-
lently to their regions of support, which are often also their home regions 
(Hodler / Raschky 2011). Although the recipient government’s power to 
decide on the distribution of resources across its territory is an important 
element of national sovereignty, it also restricts donors’ ability to determine 
within-country aid allocation patterns.
Limitations on the influence of donors when it comes to the cross-regional 
distribution of aid resources can be both voluntary and involuntary: first, 
they can stem from the intention to strengthen the recipient government’s 
role in aid management. Country ownership and donors’ alignment with 
national priorities are central principles of the aid-effectiveness agenda. 
Increased outside influence in the name of a more efficient allocation of aid 
might thus not be desirable. Second, aid fungibility makes it difficult for 
donors to control the use of resources by the recipient government (Boone 
1995; Feyzioglu / Swaroop / Zhu 1998; Morrissey 2006). The problem of 
fungibility is generally discussed with reference to sectoral allocation and to 
the question of consumption versus investment spending, but it might apply 
to the distribution of aid across regions as well. For example, analysing fis-
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cal transfers from the Indian federal government to the different states from 
1980 to 1992, Swaroop, Jha and Rajkumar (2000, 308) find that states did 
not benefit from externally aided projects because increases in central trans-
fers on account of foreign aid to a state were associated with reductions – of 
similar or higher volumes – in other central transfers to that state.
Assuming that fungibility applies to the geographical as well as to the sec-
toral distribution of aid, donors’ room for manoeuvre can thus be very lim-
ited. However, the evidence suggests that aid is fungible only in part (see 
section 4.5). Hence, donors do have some room for manoeuvre, and it is 
important to assess how they make use of it.
5.5 Possible approaches to sub-national aid allocation
Allocating aid efficiently across sub-national regions requires, first of all, 
identifying principles that can guide resource allocation at this level. Needs- 
and performance-based approaches are generally considered with regards 
to cross-country aid allocation. However, the main ideas underlying these 
approaches can be applied to the distribution of aid across regions as well.
Very different degrees of need often characterise regions within a coun-
try. Advantaged and disadvantaged regions as well as emerging and lag-
ging ones often can be found within the same national territory (Fujita / 
Krugman / Venables 1999; World Bank 2009; Alkire / Roche / Seth 2011, 
20). Most of the considerations related to the different possible assessments 
of need – and to their effect on the distribution of aid – apply to alloca-
tions across countries and across regions equally. However, donors might 
face even tougher choices when it comes to allocation across sub-national 
regions. There are fewer barriers to migration at the sub-national than at 
the international level, which leads people within countries to concentrate 
in wealthier regions more than they do across countries (World Bank 2009, 
22). Therefore, the trade-off between targeting the places most in need or 
those hosting many people in need might be even more pronounced at the 
cross-regional than at the cross-country level.
As for performance-based approaches, their relevance will depend on the 
degree of authority that sub-national entities exercise in different countries. 
Because local governments’ control over the use of resources can be very 
limited (Leiderer et al. 2012, 235), cross-regional variations in institutional 
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performance might be less relevant for the efficiency of aid allocation than 
variations at the country level. Many of the aspects of “good governance” 
that are stressed by performance-based approaches are generally in the 
hands of the central government (Kanbur 2005). However, institutional 
quality at the sub-national level might be very relevant for aid allocation in 
federal countries, where sub-national entities have a larger say over the use 
of resources.
Besides needs and performance, there are also other criteria that donors 
might want to take into account when allocating aid across sub-national 
regions, such as alignment to recipient governments’ preferences; trade-offs 
and spillovers between rural and urban areas; and the risk of exacerbating 
inter-regional tensions. The following sections briefly discuss these.
5.5.1 Alignment to recipient governments’ preferences
Taking into account the recipient government’s preferences might be very 
important for an efficient allocation of aid across sub-national regions. 
There is an argument for allocating larger shares of aid to those regions 
where the recipient government is more likely to finance the operational 
costs often associated with aid projects. Lack of sustainability due to low 
engagement by the recipient government (Svensson 2005, 22; Bigsten 2006, 
16–17) might make aid in regions neglected by the government much less 
effective than aid directed to other parts of the country. However, recipient 
governments often tend to allocate resources based on ethnic divisions and 
patronage networks (Stewart 2005, 13; Bird et al. 2002). This might some-
times produce a trade-off between directing resources to where the govern-
ment will cooperate most, and allocating aid to the regions with the largest 
needs and where less government spending is available.
On the other hand, when large shares of government expenditure are directed 
at covering operational costs for aid-financed projects, it is also possible 
that government expenditures follow donors’ allocation patterns (Bräuti-
gam 2000, 44; Mavrotas / Ouattara 2006, 24). In this case, the distribu-
tion of aid initiatives across regions can influence the efficiency of domes-
tic resource allocation as well. For example, a donor’s decision to invest in 
remote regions with higher operational costs could make it more costly for 
the government to run the facilities provided by aid. This might reduce the 
efficiency of overall resource allocation.
Forgotten or unpromising? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 109
5.5.2 Trade-offs and spillovers between rural and urban areas
At the sub-national level it is important to consider the differences between 
urban and rural areas, which tend to have different types of and degrees of 
need (Prennushi / Rubio / Subbarao 2002, 111–112). On the one hand, rural 
areas tend to have greater needs (Bird et al. 2002).53 On the other hand, 
providing services to those regions tends to be more costly. This is not only 
because of economies of scale in densely populated urban areas (Van de 
Sijpe 2010, 17), but also because of higher transport costs (Bird et al. 2002; 
Kitchen / Slack 2006, 1) and the lack of availability of trained workforces 
in rural areas (World Bank 2009, 247; Higgins 2009, 4). There will thus 
often be a trade-off between targeting the regions that are most in need and 
those where the cost of providing services is lowest (Klugman 2002, 64). 
Acknowledging this trade-off, the World Bank’s latest Global Monitoring 
Report (2013) argues that it is most cost-efficient to target provincial cit-
ies and slums in large urban areas, since those locations tend to have large 
numbers of people in need that are relatively easy to reach (World Bank 
2013, 109).
An important question concerns the impact that development in urban areas 
might have in rural parts of the country. Positive spillovers from urban areas 
can benefit the rest of the country as well, thanks to a number of factors, 
including the promotion of economic growth; knowledge and technology 
transfers; rural-urban migration; and consequent increases in rural wages 
and in remittances to rural areas (Cord 2002, 70; Cuong 2012, 2–3). This 
might offer an argument for donors to focus on cities as engines of devel-
opment – a strategy increasingly supported by the World Bank (World Bank 
2009; 2013).
However, there are also arguments against directing aid predominantly 
towards urban areas. First, the literature is inconclusive on the extent to 
which development in urban centres trickles down to the rural hinterland 
(Calì / Menon 2013, 2). Second, focusing on urbanisation as an engine of 
development does not necessarily imply that more resources should be allo-
53 This, however, might not be the case for all types of need. For example, richer commerce 
hubs are more likely to have higher HIV/AIDS prevalence than remote regions away from 
main transport corridors (Bird et al. 2002, 32). Access to health care might be particularly 
low in remote rural areas, but cities might have a more urgent need for health care because 
of the higher risk of contagion in urban environments (Van de Sijpe 2010, 17).
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cated to urban areas. On the contrary, it might require investing in education 
in rural areas in order to provide future migrants with the tools to easily inte-
grate in cities (World Bank 2013, 11). Third, negative spillovers in health 
and security that have been observed across countries are likely to occur 
also between sub-national entities, and this consideration speaks against 
neglecting rural regions.
Finally, the question of whether it is more efficient to allocate aid to rural or 
to urban areas will also depend on the objective that donors want to achieve 
through aid in a specific country. If, for example, the primary goal is to 
strengthen governance, it might be efficient to direct most resources to the 
capital (OECD 2010a, 38).
5.5.3 Risks of exacerbating interregional tensions
Disparities in the allocation of domestic and foreign resources between 
regions can produce or exacerbate inter-regional tensions and even lead to 
the eruption of conflict (Stewart 2005; Stewart 2010 3; Kanbur / Venables 
2005; Bird / McKay / Shinyekwa 2010, 8). The literature is inconclusive 
over the potential positive or negative effect of aid regarding the chances 
for an eruption of civil war (Ruggeri / Schudel 2010, 9; Dimico 2013, 2–3). 
However, several studies suggest that an unbalanced distribution of aid risks 
aggravating pre-existing inter-regional tensions (Grossman 1991; Findley et 
al. 2011, 24; Burke 2012; Burgess et al. 2010, 17), whereas improving ser-
vice delivery in a region neglected by the central government might decrease 
its inhabitants’ vulnerability to grievance-based mobilisation efforts (Stew-
art 2010). Mitigating horizontal inequalities is considered to be one of the 
most effective ways to reduce state fragility (European University Institute 
2009, 93).
Thus, when allocating aid, donors should consider the potential of aid to 
mitigate regional disparities and contribute towards conflict prevention – or 
to do the opposite by abandoning some already neglected regions. The role 
that aid plays in aggravating or mitigating the risk of conflict would obvi-
ously impact on its effectiveness. Donors’ first priority should be to “do no 
harm” and to avoid undermining state-building (OECD 2010b). A careful 
analysis of spatial inequalities and of contested patterns of national resource 
distribution seems to be particularly important in post-conflict contexts: 
although in the immediate post-conflict period it might make sense to first 
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concentrate on the capital city in order to foster state-building, in the longer 
term under-investment in secondary cities and certain lagging regions can 
jeopardise efforts to negotiate a renewed social contract (OECD 2010a, 38).
5.6 Some evidence on aid allocation across sub-national 
regions
Being a widely overlooked topic, the allocation of aid across sub-national 
regions is treated only in a few papers. This is also due to the extremely 
scarce availability of information on this level of allocation. Most donors 
do not provide data on the sub-national location of their aid activities 
(Development Initiatives 2013, 88). Efforts to track total aid flows received 
by sub-national entities have recently been forthcoming, for example in 
Mozambique (Ziegler-Bohr 2008, 12–14). Maps that geo-reference current 
development projects and indicate their sub-national distribution are now 
being developed, notably by the AidData mapping initiative (Strandow et 
al. 2013; Stern / Powell 2011). But for the moment, poverty maps that also 
indicate the precise location of aid-financed projects are available just for a 
few countries. Moreover, they typically display only geo-referenced projects 
by the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) (Powell / 
Findley 2011, 10).
Among the few authors treating the topic of aid allocation across sub- 
national regions, some analyse the needs-orientation of individual donors in 
specific countries (ODI 2004; Powell / Findley 2011; Stern / Powell 2011; 
Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Sosa Andrés 2012), or the degree of coordination 
among donors in regional allocation at the sub-national level (Öhler 2013). 
Others (Stewart 2005; Langer / Stewart / Venugopal 2010; OECD 2010a) 
assess whether aid flows by all donors have been aggravating or mitigating 
regional imbalances. The following sections review both types of evidence.
5.6.1 Donors’ needs-orientation and coordination in aid 
allocation across sub-national regions
Because the World Bank and the AfDB are the only two donors for which 
information on the precise location of projects is available, most of the few 
existing studies on cross-regional allocation (Powell / Findley 2011; Stern / 
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Powell 2011; Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Sosa Andrés 2012) focus on allocation 
patterns by these two donors.
Powell and Findley (2011) compare the sub-national distribution of World 
Bank and AfDB projects with the proportion of individuals living on less 
than US$ 1.25 a day in different regions. More specifically, the study looks 
at whether donors are clustering their activities in areas where need is con-
centrated and spreading them out when needs are more dispersed. Mea-
sured against the distribution of need in those countries, the authors judge 
allocation patterns to be efficient in the DRC, but less so in Kenya, Ethio-
pia, Rwanda and Mozambique. In Tanzania, the authors argue that aid from 
both donors consistently goes to less needy regions (Powell / Findley 2011). 
Weak needs-orientation of sub-national allocation by the World Bank was 
found also in China (Zhang 2004), where the choice of location was mainly 
influenced by the Chinese government’s preferences, and in India (Nunnen-
kamp / Öhler / Sosa Andrés 2012), where the geographical distribution of 
projects was determined mostly by the degree of openness to trade in dif-
ferent regions.
The most extensive empirical analysis on sub-national allocation patterns is 
offered by Öhler and Nunnenkamp (2013). The study examines the location 
of World Bank and AfDB projects in 27 countries and finds that regional 
needs (measured by child mortality, maternal health and malnutrition) had 
no influence on sub-national allocation patterns. The authors also argue 
that the quality of governance (measured by the number of conflict-related 
deaths) did not play a relevant role either. Instead, the birthplace of national 
political leaders emerged as an important factor in determining project loca-
tion.
Although these studies offer important insights on the factors that can influ-
ence aid allocation at the sub-national level, they do not allow for drawing 
conclusions about the efficiency of overall aid allocation at the sub-national 
level. Since the analysis covers only two of the many donors engaged in the 
examined countries, it is possible that other donors are implementing activ-
ities in the areas that the authors identify as under-aided.
One study that examines sub-national allocation patterns by all donors 
is from Öhler (2013), who assesses the degree of coordination in cross- 
regional aid allocation among donors engaged in the same country. The 
study analyses sub-national allocation patterns by all the major donors 
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active in Cambodia, including China and several international and Cambo-
dian NGOs. The author finds a modest degree of donor coordination within 
Cambodia between 2004 and 2007, with no major difference before and 
after the 2005 Paris Declaration. For bilateral donors in particular, the like-
lihood that these donors implement a project in a certain region was not 
found to decrease if other bilateral donors were engaged in the same region 
with a similar sectoral focus (Öhler 2013, 14). The study offers an example 
of donors’ failure to take each others’ allocations into account when dis-
tributing their aid across regions. However, it does not provide information 
about what other criteria donors consider when allocating aid, or whether 
the lack of coordination leads donors to neglect certain regions.
Dionney, Kramonz and Roberts (2013) analyse aid allocation for health 
and education in Malawi. Their findings suggest that health aid seems to 
be allocated based almost exclusively on health needs. In the case of aid 
for education, however, both needs (specific to the education sector) and 
politics (mainly patronage along ethnical lines) influence the sub-national 
distribution of aid. For both sectors, less-specific measures of need, such as 
regional poverty rates, did not seem to influence allocation, whereas trans-
port costs emerged as an important determinant, with rural areas receiving 
disproportionally less.
A study by ODI (2004, 60–65) shows that donors allocated aid across Indian 
states according to the states’ relative performance in economic manage-
ment and their willingness to undergo the economic policy reforms sug-
gested by donors. Such an approach to aid allocation resulted in the richest 
states in southern and western India receiving more aid per capita than other 
parts of the country. These were also the states with the highest levels of pri-
vate investment and government expenditure per capita (ODI 2004, 60–65). 
The example of India suggests that donors adopted a performance-based 
approach to aid allocation across the country’s states. However, India might 
not be a representative example for donors’ sub-national aid allocation pat-
terns. The large size and the federal nature of the country make India’s case 
more similar to a cross-country allocation of aid than to a sub-national one.
In conclusion, the evidence is not sufficient to determine which criteria 
donors follow when allocating aid across sub-national regions, and whether 
there is a tendency to neglect a certain type of region.
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5.6.2 The degree of donors’ attention to regional imbalances
There are few studies that assess whether donors are taking possible interre-
gional tensions into account when deciding on cross-regional aid allocation 
(Stewart 2005; Langer / Stewart / Venugopal 2010; OECD 2010a). How-
ever, their findings are consistent: donors are paying insufficient attention to 
the risk that an uneven distribution of aid across regions might undermine 
national cohesion.
Stewart (2005, 22–25) finds that, in post-conflict Mozambique, the political 
domination of predominantly southern parties meant that most aid went to 
the south. For 1995–1997, the South received US$ 103.98 per capita in aid, 
compared to US$ 71.87 in the Centre; and a mere US$ 18.5 in the North, 
which was also much poorer.
Langer, Stewart and Venugopal (2010) examine eight post-conflict countries 
that span Africa (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda), Latin America (Guate-
mala and Peru), Asia (Afghanistan and Nepal) and Eastern Europe (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina). The authors find that whereas group disparities are often 
explicitly recognised and addressed in the international policy discourse, in 
practice donors rarely give special attention to neglected and discriminated 
areas. Only in the case of Nepal did donors – in collaboration with the gov-
ernment – explicitly target aid to the poorest regions, where the conflict had 
originated (Langer / Stewart / Venugopal 2010).
From consultations carried out in 2008 in six fragile states, the Monitoring 
Survey that tracks implementation of the Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2010a) concluded that 
uneven distribution of aid across different regions within a country was a 
recurrent issue. For example, in 2008 only 23 per cent of development aid 
to the CAR was spent outside the capital city, and this already represented 
an increase from the 15 per cent of the previous year. In addition to a pro-
nounced bias towards capital cities, imbalances were also found in donor 
spending across regions. The report underlines the serious neglect of some 
regions in the DRC, in Afghanistan and in certain rural areas of Haiti and 
Timor-Leste (OECD 2010a, 38). In all examined countries except Sierra 
Leone, unbalanced aid allocations contributed to perceptions of unfairness 
and, in some cases, were considered to be aggravating pre-existing regional 
divides (OECD 2010a, 20).
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Although these examples point to a lack of attention to the risks posed 
by spatial inequalities, in some cases important factors help in explaining 
sub-national disparities in the provision of aid. For example, the OECD 
report mentions that regional imbalances in Afghanistan are, at least in part, 
explained by the fact that development agencies often are in a position to 
carry out their activities only in areas where international forces provide 
security. In the DRC, special attention to the eastern part of the country is 
in line with the government’s own stabilisation and peacebuilding priorities 
(OECD 2010a, 65). Donors’ concentration in the southern parts of Haiti 
seems to be partly driven by better infrastructure in those regions as com-
pared to the rest of the country (OECD 2010a, 38).
The reviewed evidence suggests that the international community is pay-
ing insufficient attention to the sub-national distribution of aid in post- 
conflict countries. No evidence is available for non-post-conflict countries, 
but the observation that donors do not seem to be particularly concerned 
with regional imbalances in post-conflict countries does not suggest that 
they might be more attentive in more stable contexts.
5.7 Sub-national aid allocations by donors not reporting to 
the DAC
Studies focusing on the sub-national distribution of aid by non-DAC donors 
all deal with allocation patterns by NGOs. The available evidence points to 
a weak needs-orientation in NGO allocation patterns and suggests that a 
variety of different factors might lead to this outcome.
Barr and Fafchamps (2005) find that higher transport costs associated with 
delivering services in remote areas lead NGOs in Uganda to neglect the 
most isolated communities. The authors claim that this undermines NGOs’ 
ability to reach the neediest population groups, and that it is likely that those 
communities that are most in need are entirely beyond the reach of NGOs.
Other authors (Bebbington 2004; Jayne et al. 2000) also observe a weak 
responsiveness to needs in NGO sub-national allocation patterns and 
explain it by pointing to the path-dependency of their location decisions. 
In Peru, NGO resources were found to be flowing mainly towards districts 
where long-standing partnerships – often a result of personal networks – 
were in place (Bebbington 2004). In Ethiopia, Jayne et al. (2000, 2–3) find 
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that the allocation of food aid in 1995/1996 was correlated not so much 
with the geographical distribution of need for food aid in that year, but 
rather with the spatial pattern of vulnerability during the 1984/1985 famine. 
The authors suggest that rigidity in allocation patterns stems from NGOs’ 
reluctance to move their operations due to the fixed costs involved in the 
establishment of supply channels in terms of organisational structures and 
field-level infrastructure.
The most consistent finding in studies dealing with sub-national allocation 
patterns by NGOs refers to these actors’ tendency to follow allocation pat-
ters by official donors and to cluster. This pattern was observed in Bang-
ladesh (Fruttero / Gauri 2005), Tanzania (Koch 2007, 24–30) and Cam-
bodia (Öhler 2013, 17). Fruttero and Gauri (2005) explain this behaviour 
by pointing out that NGOs prefer engaging in regions where many other 
actors are present in order to diffuse responsibility. NGOs estimate the risk 
of failure in the poorest and abandoned regions to be so high that it could 
jeopardise an already established flow of funding. The authors also find that 
start-up NGOs that need to make themselves a reputation were more likely 
to expand to risky areas where fewer actors were involved. However, some 
of the factors inducing NGOs to form clusters might also be linked to effi-
ciency considerations. For example, Koch (2007, 24–30) points to the exist-
ence of economies of scale and positive knowledge spillovers coming from 
a concentration of international development actors in the same location.
In conclusion, these studies suggest that NGO allocation patterns at the 
sub-national level are mostly driven by factors other than the degree of 
needs in different regions. Given the lack of a clear picture of the distribu-
tion of needs and aid at the sub-national level, this is not surprising. Some of 
the factors identified as influencing NGO allocation patterns, such as lower 
transport costs or economies of scale, might lead to an efficient allocation 
of aid. Others, such as risk-pooling considerations, do not seem to be com-
patible with efforts to allocate aid efficiently across regions. However, the 
evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions on NGO allocation patterns.
5.8 Conclusions and policy recommendations for aid 
allocation across sub-national regions
Despite its importance for aid effectiveness, the allocation of aid across 
sub-national regions receives very little attention in both development the-
Forgotten or unpromising? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 117
ory and practice. It is absent from discussions on aid allocation and from 
most donors’ policy documents and does not appear to be an integral part of 
DoL efforts. Moreover, development targets and country aid allocation for-
mulas are based on national averages, which might set perverse incentives 
for donors and recipient governments to neglect certain regions. The review 
of available evidence on aid allocation across sub-national regions painted 
a mixed – and certainly incomplete – picture. Further research is needed 
before the efficiency of current allocation patterns can be assessed.
However, some key issues have been identified that should be considered 
by donors when allocating aid across sub-national regions. These include 
the degree of need in various regions, the degree and nature of spillovers 
between urban and rural areas, the partner government’s resource allocation 
patterns, allocation patterns by other donors active in the same country and 
the existence of inter-regional tensions.
Although donors’ influence on the direction of aid flows at the sub-national 
level might be limited due to both their desire to promote ownership and 
alignment, and due to aid fungibility, it seems useful to highlight possible 
ways in which donors can use their room for manoeuvre to avoid possible 
risks and take advantage of opportunities for effective aid.
5.8.1 Collecting data on sub-national poverty and donor 
activities and improving donor coordination
Given the large number of criteria that should be taken into account for an 
efficient sub-national aid allocation, identifying under-aided regions will 
be a country-specific exercise that requires much more information than is 
currently available. The collection of disaggregated data on various types of 
need and on other donors’ activities represents the first important step for 
identifying under-aided regions and, more generally, for an efficient alloca-
tion of aid across regions.
Obtaining accurate regional population and poverty figures can be difficult 
(Darcy / Hofmann 2003, 30; Alfani et al. 2012), but it has become easier 
thanks to the increasing availability of poverty maps. Many countries now 
have at their disposal precise geographic information about the distribution 
of poverty across their administrative regions. Further increasing the availa-
bility of detailed information about sub-national poverty landscapes would 
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allow for a more precise geographical targeting of needs. Poverty maps 
should also be complemented by a more detailed contextual analysis, which 
would allow donors to take into account other key issues besides needs, as 
outlined above. Poverty maps alone do not provide answers about where 
aid should be allocated. However, they are a helpful tool for identifying the 
regions where needs are greatest and can be used to demand transparency 
about allocation patterns from donors, recipient governments and the civil 
society in both donor and partner countries.
The mapping of needs across sub-national regions becomes particularly 
useful when combined with maps that geo-reference current development 
projects. Unfortunately, for the moment, poverty maps that also indicate the 
precise location of aid-financed projects are available only in a limited num-
ber of countries and cover only activities by a few donors. Geo-referencing 
development activities might not always be possible, especially for fund-
ing channelled through budget support or otherwise using country systems. 
Technical cooperation and cross-regional interventions that are difficult to 
locate also present challenges for geo-coding. Moreover, it remains unclear 
which coding standards should be used, and what degree of geographic 
precision is advisable. However, to the extent possible, carrying out more 
comprehensive mapping exercises of donor interventions would help donor 
coordination efforts and give the partner government a better overview of 
activities taking place in the country. Ideally, these would include also new 
and private donors, but geo-referencing activities by DAC donors would 
already represent an important step forward. Initiatives such as AidData or 
the Mozambique Donor Atlas that track location and sector of development 
projects are good examples. Knowing where aid is allocated can allow the 
intended beneficiaries to identify projects directed to them, thereby enabling 
them to provide feedback and demand accountability (Development Initia-
tives 2013, 98).
Detailed information on the regional distribution of donors within a country 
could be integrated in donor-mapping exercises that are being carried out 
as part of efforts to achieve a better in-country DoL at the sectoral level. 
More generally, the distribution of donor activities across sub-national enti-
ties could be given more relevance in the frame of in-county DoL processes. 
Information on the geographical distribution of aid included in the aid data-
bases of some countries, such as Madagascar, is sometimes used by donors 
as a basis to coordinate aid allocations across sub-national regions as well as 
across sectors. Integrating the regional dimension more systematically into 
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in-country DoL frameworks would help in averting duplication of efforts 
and inefficient concentrations of donors in some regions. As for sectoral 
DoL, here too partner countries should take on a leadership role in the pro-
cess.
5.8.2 Paying attention to regional imbalances in sub-national 
aid allocation
The analysis pointed to insufficient attention being given to the cross- 
regional distribution of aid in several post-conflict countries, and to the risk 
that this might undermine social cohesion and state-building efforts. There 
is a need to develop strategies for addressing the risk that unbalanced distri-
butions of aid could aggravate existing pockets of exclusion.
Because donors are likely to face limitations in their influence on the distri-
bution of aid at the sub-national level, it is important to work together with 
the partner government in cases where neglected regions are identified. This 
is facilitated by the fact that most governments in recipient countries recog-
nise – at least in theory – the need to address regional disparities. National 
strategy papers in many countries pay attention to regional inequalities. In 
fact, it is rather the donors’ policy documents that suggest a lack of attention 
to the issue (Higgins / Bird / Harris 2010). Statements in national strategy 
papers could be considered to be of rhetoric nature and do not automatically 
result in actual efforts to redress regional disparities (Langer / Stewart / 
Venugopal 2010). However, they offer an opportunity for donors to raise 
questions about regional inequalities when it comes to the sub-national allo-
cation of development aid. Given the politically sensitive nature of the topic, 
private donors might be in a better position than official donors to address 
the issue.
When the government is willing, there might also be space for donors to 
support government-driven programmes to redress spatial disparities. 
Examples of efforts of this kind from national governments can be found 
in many aid-receiving countries such as Cambodia, Nicaragua and Kenya 
(CIESIN 2006; Higgins / Bird / Harris 2010, 20). Donors could take active 
part in supporting those efforts where they are found, and in promoting them 
where they are not. When efforts to redress regional imbalances are not 
already in place, collecting data on various types of need at the sub-national 
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level can be a good first step towards attracting the government’s attention 
to the problem of lagging regions.
Donors’ policy options are likely to be very limited when the government is 
neglecting some regions intentionally and is not willing to address the prob-
lem. There might be some more room for manoeuvre in post-conflict set-
tings where governments attempt to establish political stability and donors 
often play a role in funding reconstruction efforts. Slightly modified alloca-
tion formulas might also help to increase partner governments’ incentives 
to promote development in neglected regions. This could be done in perfor-
mance-based allocation formulas by including some measure of regional 
equality in assessments of a recipient country’s performance.
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This study analysed the problem of under-aided countries, sectors and 
sub-national regions. It is worth highlighting some similarities and interre-
lations between the different levels at which the problem has been examined.
A recurrent theme throughout the pages of the study is that some recipients 
are less attractive than others for donors. Relative unattractiveness can be 
due to the relatively greater challenges associated with delivering aid to 
some countries, sectors or regions, but it can also be linked to the low pri-
ority status some recipients or sectors represent in donors’ eyes. Combined 
with a lack of coordination among development actors, this can result in 
some countries or sectors receiving insufficient aid.
Tackling the challenges related to delivering aid to some fragile states and 
neglected sectors is of crucial importance, because these are often also recip-
ients and areas that present great needs. Aid given in the form of capacity 
development to improve a country’s or a sector ministry’s capacity to man-
age aid might play a catalytic role not only for attracting larger quantities 
of ODA, but also for leveraging other types of private and public resources 
beyond aid. In this sense, the focus should be on finding the right type of aid 
and delivery channel, rather than on increasing aid volumes.
Concerning aid volumes, donor coordination in aid allocations is key. Ongo-
ing efforts to achieve a better DoL at all levels represent an important step 
in this direction. However, DoL processes also require donors to reduce the 
number of countries and sectors they are engaged in. This risks exacerbating 
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the problem of under-aided recipients if specialisation occurs without coor-
dination among donors. Thus, the two aspects of DoL – specialisation and 
coordination – should go hand in hand. To improve coordination in aid allo-
cations, donors should share information on aid volumes allocated to differ-
ent recipients and take each others’ allocations into account when deciding 
on the distribution of their aid. For “traditional donors”, the OECD could 
play an important role in fostering this ex-ante coordination.
Some interrelations exist between aid allocations at different levels. For 
example, international DoL might result in the emergence of orphan sectors 
or regions within countries where donor exits occur. Thus, a well- developed 
country-level coordination framework must be in place in order to make 
sure that remaining donors fill in the funding gaps that might result in some 
sectors or regions. The more advanced donors’ sectoral or regional special-
isation level, the more likely it will be that a donor’s exit from the coun-
try will have a serious impact on the funding received by the sectors or 
regions that used to be covered by the exiting donor. On the other hand, 
donor entries in under-aided countries could be used as opportunities for 
establishing an efficient distribution of donors across sectors and/or regions 
from the start. The regional and the sectoral levels of aid allocation are also 
interconnected. Duplication of efforts would only occur if two donors are 
engaged in both the same sector and the same region, whereas being active 
in the same sector does not necessarily imply duplication if donors imple-
ment their activities in different parts of the country. Efforts to achieve an 
efficient distribution of aid across sub-national regions could be addressed 
in the frame of initiatives aimed at establishing a better DoL across sectors 
within a country.
Combining cross-country, in-country and cross-sector DoL can be chal-
lenging. For example, the European Code of Conduct on division of 
labour encourages donors to concentrate on a limited number of countries 
(cross-country DoL), to focus on two sectors within each recipient country 
(in-country DoL) and to specialise in a limited number of sectors at the 
global level (cross-sector DoL) (EC 2007, 6). However, a donor’s sectoral 
specialisation might not always be in line with the different national pri-
orities of the recipient countries the donor chooses to focus on. A donor 
might select a number of partner countries on the basis of their poverty or 
institutional quality, and at the same time specialise in certain sectors on the 
basis of comparative advantages or for other reasons. These sectors, how-
ever, might not necessarily be national priorities in all the partner countries 
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selected by the donor. Thus, simultaneous sector and country specialisation 
processes could produce misalignment with national priorities. Avoiding this 
would require each donor to choose the countries to support on the basis of 
different countries’ degrees of need in the sectors the donor has specialised 
in. However, because of the many different factors influencing the selection 
of partner countries, this seems unrealistic. Sector specialisation would thus 
rather be compatible with the simultaneous presence of large numbers of 
donors within a country; each of them specialised in a few sectors. But 
international DoL aims precisely at limiting the number of donors engaged 
in each recipient country. Thus, there might be contradictions and trade-offs 
between cross-country, in-country and cross-sector DoL. The existence of 
linkages and possible trade-offs between different levels of aid allocation 
underlines the importance of implementing the three aspects of DoL in an 
integrated way, rather than independently from each other.
More generally, making sure that, at the country level, aid is well-aligned 
to national priorities is an important way to raise the value of aid without 
increasing its quantity. Efforts to improve donor coordination and alignment 
in the distribution of aid across sectors and geographical regions within 
partner countries could thus be even more important than achieving an effi-
cient allocation of aid across countries.
Two more recommendations apply to aid orphans at all three levels: first, 
acquiring better information on aid volumes received by countries, sectors 
and regions will help draw attention to recipients that are getting dispro-
portionally low levels of aid. However, because of the difficulty highlighted 
throughout the pages of this study to define what “insufficient aid” means, 
donors should avoid “automatically” allocating more aid to the countries 
/ sectors / regions identified as potentially under-aided. Rather, identifi-
cation of potentially under-aided recipients or sectors should be followed 
by detailed case studies that highlight risks and opportunities of directing 
larger volumes of aid to those recipients / sectors. Second, inefficiencies in 
aid allocation at all levels are often linked to the influence of donors’ polit-
ical and commercial interests in the distribution of aid. Therefore, donors 
should adopt clear allocation formulas based on needs, on performance or 
on other efficiency considerations. The use of allocation formulas does not 
guarantee that allocation decisions will be insulated from strategic interests, 
since the weights and indicators used in the formula can be modified in 
order to suit those interests. However, the adoption of clear allocation cri-
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teria could make politically-driven allocations easier to identify and more 
difficult to justify.
Greater transparency in aid allocations could help in making progress on 
all of the dimensions discussed above: first, it would facilitate donor coor-
dination by allowing donors to take each others’ allocations into account in 
their own funding decisions. Second, it would facilitate the identification of 
under-aided countries, sectors or sub-national regions. Third, it would pro-
vide partner governments and the civil society in both recipient and donor 
countries with the necessary information to raise questions and demand 
accountability when the distribution of aid seems to be driven by strategic 
interests rather than by efficiency considerations. Efforts to achieve greater 
transparency in aid allocations across recipients and uses could be pursued 
in the frame of ongoing initiatives such as the International Aid Trans-
parency Initiative. Partner countries could also play an important role in 
increasing transparency by making their aid receipts more transparent, too.
Given their increasing relevance, non-DAC official and private donors 
should disclose information on aid allocations as well. Although the OECD 
could be a crucial actor in fostering information exchange and coordination 
among DAC donors, new and private donors appear reluctant to engage in 
agendas perceived as DAC-driven. Here, the Global Partnership for Effec-
tive Development Cooperation could play an important role. Capitalising 
on its inclusive character, the GPEDC could foster greater engagement by 
non-traditional donors in information-sharing and coordination efforts.
Addressing the problem of aid orphans is crucial because efficiency in aid 
allocation is an important element of aid effectiveness. Overall, inefficien-
cies in aid allocation can be seen as a result of the slow pace at which donor 
coordination, harmonisation and alignment are progressing. It will thus not 
be sufficient to develop ad hoc solutions for directing larger amounts of 
aid to the specific countries / sectors / regions that will, from time to time, 
be identified as under-aided. Rather, the international community should 
address the underlying weaknesses in the aid architecture, of which under-
aided countries and sectors are just a symptom. This will be more challeng-
ing, but it is also likely to bring benefits that go beyond the problem of aid 
orphans to other dimensions of aid effectiveness.
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